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Abstract 
 
 
Between 1990 and 2010 sub-Saharan Africa experienced some of the highest levels of 
deforestation anywhere in the world. The problem has been particularly acute in what are 
known as the miombo woodlands of southern Africa. These occupy a unique ecological 
niche and are crucial to the livelihoods of millions of people in the region, yet are 
disappearing rapidly. The aim of this thesis is to identify the structural causes of this 
phenomenon in two of the miombo countries, Zambia and Mozambique. Standard 
‘resource based’ explanations for deforestation in both countries tend to focus primarily on 
demographic and economic factors, emphasising the impact of economic reforms, 
population growth, rural migration, poverty, minimal access to electricty and a lack of 
institutional resources. However I argue that these explanations do not account for 
Mozambique’s relatively better record on deforestation during the period in question, and 
that a more convincing account is offered by a ‘governance based’ explanation, which 
emphasises different forms of forest governance and institutional arrangements affecting 
the forest sector in each country. Specifically, Mozambique has fared better than Zambia 
thanks to its more secure system of traditional land tenure, the implementation of more 
progressive legislation and a sustained commitment to community based natural resource 
management. The implication is that future initiatives to curb deforestation in these 
countries should concentrate on addressing institutional and policy based shortcomings 
before implementing market based mechanisms designed to encourage conservation.  
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   “It is not so much for its beauty that the forest makes a claim upon men's hearts, as for that 
subtle something, that quality of air that emanation from old trees, that so wonderfully changes 
and renews a weary spirit.” 
 
 Robert Louis Stevenson (1905: 171) 
 
 
“We are standing on the lip of a great escarpment, gazing down a wide valley to the vast, 
seemingly unpopulated expanse beyond. The numerous hills and ridges are colour coded: yellow, 
black and dusty green mean ‘near’; memory blue means ‘far’; but how far is ‘far’ I cannot begin to 
guess. In the near distance pools of sunlight scud across the ground, like spotlights being operated 
by someone wishing to draw our attention to the finer, not-to-be-missed details of what is laid out 
before our marvelling eyes.” 
 
Guy Scott (2010) 
 
 
“A month before the rains set in, the miombo covered hills burst all at once into reds, salmons, 
pinks and coppery tinges of all hues as the Brachystegia trees flush into young leaf and, within a 
week, all this riot of colour has blended into a forest of the freshest green carpeted with legions of 
flowers. In full leaf the miombo is delightfully cool and shady, and the scanty grass a pleasure to 
walk through. In the dry season, what a change! The whole miombo forest becomes entirely 
leafless, while grass fires burn up all the grass and leaf litter. The sun beats down unmercifully 
and whichever way one turns there is the same view, the grey stems of miombo trees fading into 
the shimmering distance. The buzz of insect life has vanished, except for the sharp hiss of tsetse 
fly.” 
 
D.B. Burtt (1946) quoted from Rodgers (1998: 25) 
 
  
Figure 1: Plateau Miombo, Muchinga Escarpment, Northern Zambia. Image courtesy Stephen Robinson / WILDFOTO
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1 
Deforestation in the  
Miombo Woodlands 
 
 
 
The story of human life on this planet is bound up with the story of our relationship with 
forests and the ways in which they have shaped the cultural, political, economic and 
technological evolution of successive human societies over millennia. Along with the 
world’s atmosphere and oceans, forests constitute one of our most important global 
commons, offering renewable raw materials and energy, protecting land and water 
resources, providing recreational facilities, maintaining biological diversity and 
regulating our climate. Beyond purely material considerations most people are also 
aware of forests’ cultural and symbolic meanings, embodied in our various forms of 
story-telling, religion, legends and myth.  
 
Yet as a species we display a tendency to destroy rather than conserve forests. This is not 
a new phenomenon; humans have always cut down forests to provide fertile land for 
settlement, pasture and crops, for wood to build their homes and for fuel to give them 
energy. Until recently though our limited physical capacity meant that changes to forests 
as a result of human activities took place over many generations and on a relatively 
limited geographical scale. In the last half century that process has changed beyond all 
recognition. According to the latest global assessment by the United Nations Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (UN-FAO) we are witnessing the largest and fastest period of 
deforestation in the earth’s history. Since 1990, the average global rate of deforestation 
has been 4.9 million hectares per annum, equivalent to the loss of an area of forest the 
size the United Kingdom every five years (UN-FAO 2011).  
 
Such drastic changes have not gone unnoticed; the problem of deforestation has long 
been a rallying call for environmentalists and its palpable negative externalities are well 
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documented. It results in the loss of biodiversity, flooding, loss of topsoil, gullying, the 
loss of cultivable land further down the watershed and eventually, desertification (Sedjo 
1992; Grainger 1993; Kramer et. al. 1997; Ehrhardt-Martinez 1998). At the global level, 
it involves the removal of one of the earth’s major carbon sinks (Houghton 2005; 
Chomitz et. al. 2006; Stern 2007). Currently, the carbon released from deforestation 
activities accounts for 13 to 17 per cent of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions every 
year, greater than the contribution via emissions from vehicles such as cars, trucks and 
buses, and on about the same scale as all fossil fuel emissions from China or the United 
States (WRI 2008; van der Werf et. al. 2009).  
 
For developing countries collectively, land use, land use change, and forestry activities 
constitute an estimated one third of their total emissions (WRI 2005). Preventing 
deforestation has thus been identified as a highly cost effective strategy to mitigate future 
climate change impacts. Unfortunately, while there is a clear and growing consensus 
around the need to address the problem, the difficulty of diagnosing its structural causes 
means there is very little agreement on how best to go about it. This is what makes 
deforestation a good topic for social science research – it is a phenomenon which poses a 
severe threat to an important environmental resource, yet the origins and structural causes 
of that threat are often poorly understood.  
 
In this thesis I investigate the proximate and structural causes of deforestation in the 
miombo woodlands of southern Africa. These occupy a unique global biological niche, 
and offer a range of environmental services to millions of people in the form of 
fuelwood, food, medicine, fertile land and watershed control. Despite this miombo 
forests are some of the most poorly studied in the world. In part, this is due to the nature 
of the forests themselves – miombo is a temperate dry forest, and is different from the 
tropical forests of some other developing countries which tend to be richer in 
biodiversity and more spectacular visually. There is also a regional element involved; 
when people think about forests in Africa (if at all), they usually think about the jungles 
of the Congo Basin countries, home to the gorillas and warring rebels of popular 
discourse. Forests are not usually associated with southern and eastern Africa, which are 
more famous for their savannahs and abundant wildlife.  
 
The recent explosion of interest in forests sparked by the recognition of their potential as 
stores of carbon has also largely passed the miombo woodlands by. This is because 
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carbon stocks in undisturbed miombo woodland soils hold between ten to 60 tonnes of 
carbon per hectare, while tropical equivalents hold upwards of 180 tonnes of carbon per 
hectare. Yet the miombo woodlands are disappearing far more rapidly than the world’s 
rainforests. The average annual rate of loss is up to 1.7 per cent in some of the miombo 
countries, equivalent to deforestation rates in Indonesia, and significantly higher than 
rates in Brazil and the Democratic Republic of Congo (IIED 2010; UN-FAO 2011). 
During the same period many of the miombo countries have experienced significant 
population growth, rapid urbanisation, wide ranging economic reforms and increases in 
foreign direct investment and trade and financial flows. While such changes have 
arguably contributed to sustained periods of economic growth, they have not always 
resulted in socially equitable or environmentally sustainable outcomes. This raises 
significant questions about how the forests of the miombo countries should be managed, 
by whom and for whose benefit, requiring governance answers at the local, national, 
regional and international levels (Andersson et. al. 2004).  
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What is ‘miombo’? 
 
Miombo is the vernacular term for the dry, seasonally decidous forests that are endemic to 
southern Africa. It is distinguished from other African savannah, woodland and forest 
formations by the dominance of tree species in the legume subfamily Caesalpinioideae, 
particularly in the genera Brachystegia, Julbernardia and Isoberlinia (Campbell 1996). 
Miombo usually comprise an upper canopy of umbrella shaped trees, a scattered layer of 
subcanopy trees, a discontinuous understorey of shrubs and saplings and a patchy layer of 
grasses. Most of the tree and shrub species shed their leaves in the late dry season, after 
which miombo vegetation is bare for a short time, usually around three months. A few 
weeks to a month before the onset of the rains, the trees flush again and cover the 
countryside with bright green or red foliage. Most miombo trees and shrubs flower in the 
same period immediately before the rains.  
 
Miombo is generally situated in nutrient poor soils with rainfall varying between 650 and 
1400 mm a year. This is responsible for one of its more unusual characteristics - the 
nature of its mycorrhizal associations. Botanically, the term mycorrhiza describes a range 
of symbiotic structures formed between soil borne fungi and the roots of plants 
(Hogberg 1982). Being highly specialised in their nutritional requirement, the 
mycorrhizal fungi obtain simple sugars, amino acids and plant growth substances from 
the host for growth and development. In return, the plant gains the benefits of 
the fungus’s higher absorptive capacity for water and mineral nutrients, giving it greater 
adaptability to adverse conditions and tolerance to root diseases (Molina et. al. 1992). 
 
What is interesting is that, unlike the majority of other plant systems which show 
endomycorrhizal associations, miombo’s root systems are predominantly 
ectomycorrhizal. This means that the fungus does not penetrate the 
individual cells within the root, but lives on the outside, forming a mantle or sheath 
known as the ‘Hartig net’ (Trappe 1962). This connects in turn to long, branching 
filamentous structures of a fungus in the surrounding soil called hyphae. Taken together, 
the hyphae form massive vegetative structures known as mycelium. In this way, the 
ectomycorrhizal roots acquire access to a much greater soil volume in contrast to 
endomycorrhizal systems, and the effective surface area for nutrient absorption is greatly 
increased. Given the poor quality of soils in the miombo eco-region, this has proven to 
be a crucial evolutionary adaptation for the forests’ survival.  
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The nature of mycelium will be familiar to anyone who has seen the movie Avatar (2009). 
They create the largest living organisms in the world, stretching across thousands of square 
kilometres, and sometimes living for thousands of years (Stamets 2005). In the miombo 
woodlands, they result in the proliferation of hundreds of different species of mushroom, 
which has led to culture of mushroom gathering among indigenous people that is widespread 
in the miombo woodlands, but largely absent in other African woodlands (Buyck, et. al. 
2000; Tibuhwa 2001; Härkönen, et. al. 2003). Zambia for example is home to over 75 
different types of edible mushroom, including the world’s largest and by some accounts, 
tastiest mushroom known by locals as Chingulungulu (Termitomyces titanicus).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The miombo eco-region covers a total area of around 2.7 million km2, including 
substantial parts of Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, and 
extending as far north as the United Republic of Tanzania and the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. It is a rich and diverse biological zone, playing host to 4,590 plant species, 
35 endemic mammals (including about half the elephants and half of the rhinos left in 
Figure 2: The miombo eco-region 
Source: Campbell (1996) 
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Africa), 51 endemic birds, 52 endemic reptiles, 25 endemic amphibians and an unknown 
number of endemic invertebrates (IIED 2010; Byers 2001). Around 12 per cent of its 
total surface area is protected, and it contains the catchment basins for most of the main 
rivers of southern Africa, two of the African Great Lakes (Lake Malawi/Niassa and Lake 
Tanganyika) and the Okavango Delta (Byers 2001).  
 
The eco-region is also home to approximately 100 million people, of whom about 75 
million are poor and live in rural areas (IIED 2010). Around 39 million of these rural poor 
rely directly on miombo forests for conversion to cultivated areas or plantations, collection 
of edible plants and animals, medicinal plants and honey, fuelwood, charcoal to earn 
income, wood for construction purposes, erosion control and regulation of water supplies 
(Nhantumbo et. al. 2001; Backéus et. al. 2006). For these people the forests act as the main 
source of subsistence, income and as a ‘safety net’ in times of need (Angelsen & Wunder 
2003; Vedeld et. al. 2007). A further 15 million people living in urban areas in the miombo 
eco-region depend on a steady flow of goods from the forests in the form of wood products 
such as timber, poles, firewood and charcoal), and non-wood forest products (NWFPs) 
such as honey and beeswax, edible insects, rattan, bamboo, fibre, fruits, mushrooms, roots 
and tubers and medicinal plants (Ng’andwe et. al. 2006: 24). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3: Miombo canopy / under-canopy / grass. Image courtesy Stephen Robinson / WILDFOTO
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The key argument 
 
The central research question of this thesis is as follows: what were the structural causes of 
deforestation in the miombo woodlands of Zambia and Mozambique between 1990 and 
2010? In answering this question, I hope to explain why Zambia experienced relatively 
higher levels of deforestation during this period than Mozambique. I also hope to develop 
a better understanding of why deforestation occurs not only in these countries, but also the 
miombo eco-region as a whole. The argument that I present in the following pages is that 
different rates of deforestation can be attributed to country specific forms of policymaking 
and institutional design. This contradicts conventional, resource based explanations which 
tend to emphasise the role of underlying demographic or economic factors.  
 
The approach is rooted in critical perspectives on political economy, since it questions the 
status quo and interrogates the links between dominant structures, power and markets and 
the ways in which these undermine social and environmental justice. It takes as its starting 
point the work of Polanyi (1957) who argued that there is nothing natural about so-called 
‘laissez-faire’ style economic policies, and that free markets are deliberate constructions 
embedded into the social fabric of societies that could, “never have come into being 
merely by allowing things to take their course” (Polanyi 1957, 139). However, Polanyi also 
argued that markets have natural limits, and that counter-movements will always arise in 
order to stem their reach and impact and result in policies to mitigate their associated 
human and environmental costs. Social history in the last two centuries is thus the result of 
a double movement; while on the one hand markets have spread all over the face of the 
globe, on the other networks of measures and policies have been integrated into powerful 
institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labour, land, and money. 
 
In the last two to three decades market logic has predominated, with the material changes 
in production, trade and finance associated with globalization increasing the pressures on 
governments as well as the competition among them as they seek to generate wealth 
through the attraction of investment by multinational corporations and internationally 
mobile capital (Garrett & Mitchell 2001). The combination of these pressures has given 
rise to what Cerny has called the ‘competition state,’ characterised by a “subordination of 
policy formulation to signalling creditworthiness so as to attract and retain private 
portfolio capital flows… largely irrespective of the citizenship of the legal owners of 
capital” (Cerny 1990, 27). Thus, as global competition increases governments find it 
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increasingly difficult to protect their citizens and their environmental resources from the 
polarising effects of the market. 
 
I argue that in Zambia and Mozambique “governance matters” because it mediates these 
effects of globalisation, defining the impact of market forces on forests and generating 
distinctive policy patterns.  I call this the governance based explanation for deforestation. 
In order to justify this argument I compare and contrast the proximate causes and 
structural causes of deforestation in both Zambia and Mozambique between 1990 and 
2010. The logic behind this is as follows: for many of the indicators that conform to 
prevailing theories about drivers of deforestation, Mozambique and Zambia are roughly 
equal. They are of a similar geographical size, share similar types of climate and 
vegetation and are both heavily forested. Their rates of population growth and patterns 
of rural migration during the period in question have been roughly equivalent, and both 
have experienced rapid economic growth since liberalising their economies in the early 
1990s. However despite some noticeable advances in poverty reduction the majority of 
their citizens are still very poor and remain heavily reliant on subsistence agriculture and 
fuelwood for their energy needs.  
 
According to resource based explanations which emphasise economic and demographic 
drivers of deforestation we should, therefore, expect similar levels of deforestation in 
Zambia and Mozambique. However between 1990 and 2010 Mozambique emerged with 
a significantly better record with a reduction in its overall area of forested land of 
260,000 ha per annum compared to reduction of 425,000 ha per annum in Zambia. This 
seems strange, particularly since Mozambique has a much higher population density 
than Zambia. Given the similarity of many of the underlying socio-economic conditions 
in these two countries it appears that the resource-based explanation misses out an 
important part of the puzzle.  
 
This missing piece is the role of governance and institutions. Specifically, there are two 
reasons for Mozambique’s relatively better record. The first is arrangements around land 
tenure. In Mozambique, land reforms have given communities stronger guarantees to 
land via a formal legal arrangement and fewer obstacles to obtaining the rights to use 
that land as they see fit. Community custodianship is over natural resources and the land 
itself, promoting more sustainable long term usage and creating greater long term 
incentives to maintain forest health. Greater land tenure security has also meant that 
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communities can enter into negotiations with developers on a more even playing field 
and can therefore can derive greater benefits from forests. In Zambia, by contrast, 
tenure is insecure thanks to a system which leaves land open to confiscation by 
traditional and statutory authorities. This means that owners of forest patches have 
fewer incentives to use the land with a view towards long term conservation.  
 
The second institutional factor which has made a difference is the existence of legislation 
promoting participatory forms of forest governance. In Mozambique, the 
implementation of this kind of legislation has allowed for the partial devolution of forest 
governance to communities, and has led to better forms of cooperation between officials 
and forest users. It has also resulted in increased revenues from the forest sector, and 
has created better monitoring and more incentives towards the sustainable use of forests 
via benefit sharing mechanisms for forest guards and forest communities. In Zambia 
though, while progressive forms of legislation have been proposed, they have not been 
implemented. The absence of clear policy or legal guidelines has led to a breakdown in 
revenue collections, a lack of benefit sharing mechanisms, low morale amongst officials 
and poor relationships between the authorities and forest communities. This has resulted 
in greater overall levels of deforestation in Zambia than in Mozambique.  
 
Importantly, the governance based explanation does not argue that demographic and 
economic drivers of deforestation have had no effect in Zambia and Mozambique. 
Indeed, these constitute an important part of the story in each case. High rates of 
migration to rural areas in both countries in the early 1990s resulted in rampant 
deforestation as a result of agricultural and charcoal production activities. This was 
compounded by the implementation of economic liberalisation programs at the time, 
and in particular, reforms to each country’s agricultural sectors which left rural 
smallholders without access to inputs or markets to sell their produce. This meant 
farmers were forced to use more land, less efficiently in order to keep up overall 
production, resulting in higher levels of deforestation. Continued high rates of poverty 
and a lack of access to electricity in both countries have also created a thriving charcoal 
trade, exacerbating forest losses.  
 
Instead, the argument is that, given the similarity of economic and demographic drivers 
in each country, only a governance based explanation can account for Mozambique’s 
relatively lower rates of deforestation. This conclusion is especially important in the 
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context of trying to understand why deforestation occurs in other miombo countries, 
since key questions exist about the shape of their current and future public and private 
policy options for the management and supervision of their forests. The problem boils 
down to a simple dilemma: the countries of the miombo eco-region are those that are 
the most in need of addressing the problem of deforestation, yet they are also the least 
able to do so.  
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Some key terms 
 
Before going any further, it is perhaps useful to define what is meant by a few of the 
terms employed so far. The phenomenon under investigation in this study is 
deforestation, which refers to the total destruction of forest habitats, typically by clear-
cutting or conversion to other land uses such as agriculture. This is different from 
degradation, which refers to a change in the quality of forests and forest ecosystems via 
the loss of key species. This is most often a result of selective logging, the extraction of 
non-timber forest products (fruits, plants, wild meat, etc.), the building of infrastructure 
associated with these practices and uncontrolled fires. Although qualitatively different 
the two phenomena are closely linked. This is because forest degradation makes land use 
change easier, and therefore may lead to full scale deforestation. In other words 
degradation often acts as the precursor to deforestation. Accordingly while this project is 
concerned primarily with explaining the causes of deforestation, it does take degradation 
into account as an indirect cause.  
 
The other key distinction is between different levels of analysis. Most people are usually 
aware of what are known as the proximate causes of deforestation – the socio-economic 
activities that impact on forests, such as subsistence agriculture, cash cropping, cattle 
ranching and logging (Geist & Lambin 2001). These proximate causes can have either 
direct effects (e.g. the clear felling of forest lands by farmers for subsistence agriculture) 
or indirect effects (such as the construction of a road for logging which makes it easier 
for those farmers to access those lands). Understanding the proximate causes of 
deforestation though, is primarily an observational exercise – real analysis begins when 
trying to understand the backgrounds and preferences of the agents of deforestation, 
such as small farmers, ranchers, loggers and plantation companies, and how their sets of 
available choices are influenced by factors such as prices, technology, legislation, new 
information and access to services and infrastructure. 
 
These factors are in turn the result of a larger set of underlying drivers or structural 
causes, seen to be the fundamental forces that underpin the more obvious proximate 
causes. According to Geist and Lambin (2001: 8), structural causes can be thought of as 
a complex of social, political, economic, technological, and cultural variables that 
constitute initial conditions in the human-environmental relations that are structural (or 
systemic) in nature. In terms of spatial scale, these causes may operate directly at the 
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local level, or indirectly from the national or even global level. Kaimowitz & Angelsen 
(1998: 95) point out that “it is more difficult to establish clear links between underlying 
factors and deforestation than between immediate causes (…) and deforestation [since 
the] causal relationships are less direct“. The drawback in analysing the problem of 
deforestation at the deeper, underlying level of structural causes is therefore that it 
involves a greater level of abstraction and a greater risk of uncertainty, subjectivity and 
ideological posing (Lanly 2003).  
 
The other problem is that the relationship between different levels of analysis is seldom 
very neat and their interaction is often quite complicated. Take the hypothetical 
situation of an increase in fuel prices due to a decision by government to reduce fuel 
subsidies. This results in a slowdown in the demand for timber as manufacturing output 
slows. At the same time small scale loggers, unable to afford increased transportation 
costs, go out of business, further reducing the pressure on forests. However the increase 
in fuel prices also means that alternative sources of energy such as fuelwood and 
charcoal become relatively cheaper, and demand for them increases. And over time, as 
small scale loggers leave their concessions open, rural smallholders move in to convert 
previously forested land into cultivated land, creating new pressures on forests.  
 
The overall effect is therefore often difficult to quantify and depends to a large extent on 
context specific factors such as the size and makeup of both the formal and informal 
forest products sector, the economy wide balance of energy sources, demand for land, 
agricultural policy and the effectiveness of forest monitoring services, to name just a few. 
What this shows is how easy it to lose track without clear distinctions between the units 
of analysis and a good idea of what kind of drivers one is looking for. Accordingly this 
research project recognises that a detailed understanding of the complex set of both the 
proximate causes and structural drivers affecting forest cover changes in a given location 
is required prior to any policy intervention (Geist & Lambin 2002). In this context, it is 
worth noting the advice of Ragin (1987: 25) who points out that it is, “the intersection of 
the set of conditions in time and space that produce many of the large scale qualitative 
changes, as well as many of the small scale events, that interests social scientists, not the 
separate or independent effects of these conditions.” 
  
25 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this thesis, I group the structural causes of deforestation into three different 
categories – demographics, economics and governance-related causes. These play out in 
different and complex ways. Understanding the effect of demographic drivers for 
example, requires understanding the political and economic contexts in which 
population growth and population change occurs, how it is concentrated in certain 
geographical areas and push and pull factors driving people to move between urban and 
rural areas. The impact of economic drivers is also difficult to predict. Economic growth 
for example, might tend to make deforestation worse through industrialisation and 
demand for primary products, yet in other cases may result in productivity increases and 
growing awareness about environmental problems.  
 
It is also apparent that individuals and communities at varying levels of economic 
development interact with forests in different ways. In the case of the miombo eco-
region this usually boils down to questions about poverty and inequality, and how these 
factors affect the behaviour and incentives of people that use forests and forest products. 
Another important factor is the international context in which economic growth and 
development occurs since rates of deforestation are affected by both macroeconomic 
factors such as debt, trade and financial liberalisation, and policy choices such as 
privatisation and decentralisation. In the case of the miombo countries the kinds of 
proximate  
causes 
structural 
causes 
Figure 7: The difference between structural causes and proximate causes of deforestation 
Source: Author’s own image 
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macroeconomic policies implemented during the last two to three decades have been 
heavily influenced by international financial institutions and development partners, and 
the impact of those policies has not always been benign.  
 
Possibly the most important set of structural causes to consider however, are classified in 
the literature under the labels of institutions and governance. What exactly is meant by 
these terms? The classic contribution by North (1990; 1994) defines institutions as the 
formal and informal rules that structure incentives in human exchange and behaviour, 
whether political, social or economic. Ostrom (1990), a fellow Nobel Laureate, sees 
them as the rules, conventions and norms that determine who is eligible to make 
decisions, what information must or must not be provided and what payoffs will be 
assigned to individuals dependent on their actions. Accordingly it seems appropriate to 
define institutions as “the formal and informal rules that constrain political, economic 
and social interaction via the structuring of incentives and the determination of choices.”  
 
‘Governance’ is a far broader term. According to Rosenau (1992: 5) it is the set of 
regulation mechanisms in a particular sphere of activity which function effectively even 
though they are not endowed with formal authority. Kemp, Parto and Gibson (2005) 
suggest that is “how one gets to act, through what types of interactions and the extent to 
which actors adhere to collective decisions,” while Keohane and Nye (2000: 12) define 
governance as “the processes and institutions, both formal and informal, that guide and 
restrain the collective activities of a group.” Governance should therefore be thought of as 
a continuing process (Kaufman (2007b: 29) relying on different types of institutional 
arrangements, in which authority is conferred, conflicting or diverse interests are 
accommodated and cooperative action is taken.  
 
It is also important to note that governance takes place in overlapping spheres of activity 
and at multiple levels (e.g. local, national and international). This is because while the 
state represents an important type of governance structure, there are many other social 
and political units (such as families and clans, firms and local government actors at the 
subnational level, and corporations, NGOs and international standard-setting bodies at the 
supranational level) that govern social interactions. Thanks to globalisation, important 
shifts in the locus of governance have also occurred – migrating up to supranational 
organizations; down to newly empowered regions, provinces, and municipalities; and 
laterally to actors such as multinational firms and transnational NGOs (Held et. al., 1999). 
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According to Peters and Pierre (2002: 133), this emergence of ‘multi-level governance’ 
challenges traditional understandings of “how the state operates, what determines its 
capacities, what its contingencies are, and ultimately of the organisation of democratic and 
accountable government.” 
 
In this sense ‘governance’ is a far broader term than ‘government.’ This is because in a 
political and economic order increasingly characterised by international political, 
economic and administrative coordination, economic globalisation and growing 
subnational assertiveness, political power now comes not only from formal constitutional 
powers and the state’s monopoly on the use of force, but from the ability to marshall and 
direct resources to rent-seeking public and private actors (Peters and Pierre, 2002). Where 
‘government’ conjures up an image of formal structures ruling over people, the notion of 
governance revolves around the increasingly important role of formal and informal 
arrangements, the blurring of boundaries between public and private sectors and their 
responsibilities for tackling social issues, the power dependence involved in the 
relationships between institutions involved in collective action, and the capacity to get 
things done which does not rest on the power of government to command or use its 
authority (Stoker, 1998).  
 
Finally, it is importnant to point out that in the area of environmental regulation, the 
definition of what constitutes ‘good governance’ is still contested. Often the concept is 
given normative as well as descriptive weight. It can be used, for example, by those wishing 
to reduce the range of activities of national governments via reforms to state programmes 
and bureaucracies. This is the definition offered by the European Commission, which 
suggests that good governance consists of openness and participation, accountability, 
effective coherence, efficiency and greater sensitivity to the immediate context that is 
promised by subsidiarity (CEC, 2001). As such, this view of good governance seems 
concerned primarily with minimising bureaucratisation and hierarchy.  The problem of 
course is that in practice this may be adopted to serve the neo-liberal agenda of reducing 
the role of governments in favour of market mechanisms and corporate interests (World 
Bank, 1992; OECD, 2002). Even if this does not ‘hollow out’ the core governance 
functions of states it may lead to homogenous institutions and policies that favour the most 
mobile factors of production, often at the expense of governments’ ability to adopt policies 
that respond to the needs of their societies (Hewitt de Alcantara, 1998). 
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Structure of the study 
 
In the chapters that follow, I develop my argument in detail. To recap – the miombo 
woodlands are an important environmental resource, yet in the last two decades they 
have experienced high and unsustainable rates of deforestation. The structural causes of 
this phenomenon can be attributed to country specific forms of policymaking and 
institutional design; an argument which I call the governance based explanation for 
deforestation. This contradicts the conventional resource based explanation which tends 
to emphasise the role of demographic or economic factors. In Chapter Two I provide the 
conceptual framework from which these two types of explanation are derived. I begin by 
looking at demographic factors, such as the ‘problem’ of population growth and 
population density and the impact of different patterns of migration. I then move on to 
look at the role of economic factors, discussing the impact of income growth, 
development, poverty, macroeconomic policy and trade and investment. Finally, I look 
at governance factors, analysing the role of political systems, land tenure and property 
rights, participatory forms of natural resource management, decentralisation and 
international institutional arrangements for forest governance.  
 
In Chapter Three, I outline the research design, beginning with a justification for the use 
of the comparative case study based approach. I argue that this offers the best 
methodological approach since it allows for a controlled case comparison as an 
approximation to the logic of experiments, while including rich and detailed case studies 
which can be considered as insight generating on their own terms. I then discuss the 
comparative logic itself, showing how Zambia and Mozambique are at the same time 
both ‘similar’ and ‘incomparable’ enough to justify as the choice for the two individual 
case studies. In particular I emphasise the choice of governance as the most likely 
determinant of difference between their rates of deforestation during the last 20 years. I 
conclude the chapter with a description of the fieldwork, which took place over six 
months in 2011 and included interviews with more than 120 people and six individual site 
trips to deforestation ‘hotspots’ in each country.  
 
In Chapters Four to Six I present my research findings. I begin in Chapter Four by 
tackling the problem of establishing accurate figures on rates of deforestation in Zambia 
and Mozambique. Existing data is poor thanks to a lack of reliable past inventories and 
methodological innacuracies. I therefore make the most accurate possible estimates 
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using hard to get institutional data and guidance from experts in each country. In the 
second part of the chapter I analyse the proximate causes of deforestation in Zambia 
and Mozambique. I argue that these consist of a ‘vicious cycle’ of shifting cultivation, 
charcoal production and uncontrolled burning. These are important to identify since 
they provide important clues about the deeper, structural causes and eliminate potential 
methodological distortions in trying to compare and contrast those causes across the 
case studies.  
 
In Chapter Five, I look at the structural drivers of deforestation in Zambia. I begin with 
a discussion around the impact of structural adjustment programs implemented in the 
early 1990s. These resulted in urban to rural migration and a return for large sectors of 
the population to subsistence activities such as agriculture and charcoal production. 
These problems have been subsequently exacerbated by failures in agricultural reforms, 
high rates of poverty and the continued reliance of most citizens on woodfuel for their 
energy needs. I then proceed to discuss governance related factors. I show how forest 
governance has been crippled, first by public sector cuts made in the 1990s and 
subsequently by a failure to implement policy and legal guidelines. This means that 
forest governance remains highly centralised and poorly managed. These problems have 
been compounded by the dual system of land tenure, designed to accommodate 
Zambia’s traditional authorities on the one hand and formal government bodies and 
investors on the other. 
 
In Chapter Six, I conduct a similar analysis for Mozambique. I describe how, following 
the end of the civil war, rural areas witnessed the influx of millions of returning refugees, 
who turned to subsistence agriculture and charcoal production in order to survive. This 
occurred in conjunction with agricultural reforms which left farmers without access to 
either inputs or markets. As a result they were forced to clear more land, less efficiently. 
These problems were compounded by a growing charcoal trade, poverty and a lack of 
access to electricity. I then describe how Mozambique’s forest sector has suffered from a 
lack of capacity and funding since the end of the civil war and how, in recent years, it has 
also faced challenges from increased rates of illegal logging by foreign actors. However, I 
also show that thanks to legal reforms in land administration and commercial logging, 
local communities have been given greater incentives to conserve forests, with some 
encouraging results.  
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In Chapter Seven, I compare and contrast my findings from the two case studies. Using a 
comparative analysis, I explain why institutional and governance related factors offer the 
most convincing explanation for the difference in rates of deforestation in Mozambique 
and Zambia. In particular, I emphasise the impact of their different arrangements for 
land tenure, and the institutional and legislative factors that have resulted in the two 
countries’ divergent approaches to forest governance. I also situate my findings within 
the theoretical debates around drivers of deforestation, and show how they advance 
scholarship in this area. I conclude with a number of policy implications, and suggest 
some promising avenues for future research into the problem.  
 
  
31 
 
2 
The Structural Causes of 
Deforestation: A Conceptual 
Analysis 
 
 
 
Demographic Factors 
 
The issue of demographics seems to be an obvious place to start a discussion on 
deforestation. Human populations exist side by side with forests – and unlike with other 
environmental commons such as oceans and the atmosphere, humans compete directly 
with forests for land. We have good reasons to believe that as societies develop and 
grow, they use both land and forest resources more intensively, and as evidence, can 
point to a historical record replete with stories of vanished forest landscapes. Diamond 
(2003) for example, recounts the story of the demise of the Polynesian community that 
settled Easter Island. He argues that in the process of creating a society of agricultural 
chiefdoms, increased resource competition amongst different factions led to rampant 
and unsustainable deforestation. This made it impossible for them to build the canoes 
required to catch the fish that were a key supply of food and resources, and created 
erosion that encouraged further deforestation and reduced agricultural yields. The 
population eventually collapsed, bringing an abrupt halt to the construction of Easter 
Island's famous stone heads, and offering a dramatic example of the potentially 
disastrous effects of overpopulation in an area of limited natural resources.  
 
Diamond’s account belongs to a rich historical tradition. More than two hundred years 
ago, Thomas Malthus cautioned that human populations increase geometrically, while 
the means of production, constrained by land scarcity, the limited production capacity of 
cultivated land and the law of diminishing returns, can only increase in an arithmetic 
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ratio. He suggested that the eventual result would be widespread poverty and starvation, 
which, when combined with common diseases and epidemics, wars, infanticide and 
famine, would result in population collapse. According to Malthus (1798 [1970]: 5) the 
relationship between human societies and the resources they use is therefore governed 
by the ‘self-evident truth’ that population will always be kept in check by the principles of 
natural law – a cause, "intimately united with the very nature of man (...) the constant 
tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment prepared for it".  
 
While Malthus's ideas have been immensely influential, they have also generated 
considerable opposition. His chief contemporary antagonist, William Godwin (1793 
[1971]), suggested that humankind’s fate is fixed by social institutions rather than 
universal laws of nature, and that Malthus’s determinism ignored the ability of societies 
to reorganise themselves in such a way as to avoid natural constraints on population 
growth. Karl Marx (1867 [1976]) and Friedrich Engels (1892) were also notable 
opponents, criticising Malthusian theory for formalising what they saw as a specific 
historical form of exploitation between wage workers and capitalists and between landed 
and industrial interests as a natural law of necessity. In their view, it was the means of 
production that placed pressure on the population, rather than the other way around. As 
Gimenez (1977: 13) points out, the Marxist critique, while acknowledging the existence 
of the problems that stem from high dependency ratios and high rates of population 
growth, also shows that the Malthusian treatment of the ‘population’ problem overlooks 
the social, political, and economic structural factors that make possible such population 
patterns and processes in the first place.  
 
History seems to have proved Malthus’s critics correct. Thanks to a number of factors 
such as technological developments, changes in governance, changes in societal relations 
and migration, population growth has continued at an ever increasing rate since 
Malthus’s time (Wolfgram 1999). In the last half century global population has increased 
from three to seven billion, and according to the latest medium fertility projections of 
the UN, will continue to grow throughout this century, reaching 9.3 billion in 2050 and 
10.1 billion in 2100 (UN 2011). Nevertheless in the modern era the Malthusian premise 
continues to resonate, having gained newfound publicity in the work of a number of 
ecologists and economists during the 1970s and 1980s. This neo-Malthusian revival is 
best represented by the work of Ehrlich (1968; 1990; 1996) and Hardin (1968) who 
issued stark warnings about the limits of the world’s environmental resources. They 
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suggest that an increase in the numbers of people using resources tends to have a 
cumulative and non-reversible impact on the environment, which has a limited ‘carrying 
capacity’ – the ecological characteristics of land relative to the population influx in that 
particular destination. Their warnings are dire, with predictions of mass starvation and 
the death of ‘hundreds of millions’ (Ehrlich 1968). 
 
Population growth and forests  
 
Despite convincing theoretical critiques (Commoner 1971; Harvey 1974) and the 
subsequent failure of doomsday scenarios to materialise, much of the early deforestation 
literature has tended to take neo-Malthusian ideas as a given, positing a direct 
correlation between population growth and the clearing of forested lands for human 
settlement and land use. The process by which this occurs was usually explained in terms 
of the ‘extensification of agriculture’. This suggests that growth in population is 
accompanied by growth in demand for food, which in turn may mean growth in demand 
for arable land, and hence forest clearance. Such was the dominance of this view in the 
literature that the UN’s Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) estimated global 
deforestation rates using a model of population pressures as recently as 1990, implying 
that the percentage change in forest area depends directly on the rate of population 
growth (FAO 1990).  
 
Since the 1990s though, a number of authors have argued that the classic tendency to 
frame the debate around these kind of neat, linear relationships is too simplistic 
(Cropper & Griffiths 1994; Dietz & Rosa 1994; Rudel & Roper 1997; Scotti 2000; Reis 
& Blanco 2000). The forerunner for this line of thinking was the work of Boserup (1976; 
1981) who argued that as population grows relative to forest area, there is a tendency to 
use land more intensively, increasing agricultural output per unit of labour. The stress of 
a growing population on a shrinking forest area can thus lead to the development of new 
modes of production under which the forest stabilises and eventually expands. In 
contrast to the neo-Malthusian approach that predicts agricultural extensification 
leading to forest exhaustion, the Boserupian approach suggested that population 
pressures may also be capable of driving forest trends to sustainability via agricultural 
intensification. 
 
What this work showed was that the impact of population growth is largely determined 
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by its interaction with other socio-economic variables. In this context deforestation can 
be explained for example, as a function of high levels of population growth, but only in 
conjunction with low levels of economic development and fiscal austerity, which prevent 
the creation of jobs in other sectors that might relieve human pressure on forests (Dietz 
& Rosa 1994; York, et. al. 2002). This absence of alternative economic opportunities 
creates an army of surplus labourers and ‘shifting cultivators’ who move quickly to 
acquire and clear marginal lands for cultivation (Myers 1984; 1996; Rudel & Roper 
1997). After a few years they move on to new lands, allowing old plots to recover. 
However, as the pressure of feeding expanding rural populations increases, shifting 
cultivators allow less time for the land to lie fallow and return to its original state before 
clearing it again (Ickowitz 2006). Over time, primary growth forests are thus replaced by 
a patchwork of permanent fields and sparse secondary growth forests.  
 
Demographic pressures may also combine with the availability of land and the prevailing 
system of land tenure and distribution to determine population density, which creates 
new pressures to adapt and fosters different forms of response (Bilsborrow & Geores 
1994). Moreover, the relationship between population and deforestation trends is 
mediated not only through demand for food and agricultural land, but other factors such 
as demand for forest products like fuelwood and timber. It also depends on the indirect 
effect of other factors such as the supply of cheap labour and the spatial distributions of 
road networks (Mather et. al. 1999: 6). The current consensus therefore is that 
population pressures have little explanatory utility when analysed in isolation, and need 
to be incorporated into models that include relevant co-variables too (York, et. al. 2002; 
Burns et. al. 2003). 
 
Urban and rural migration 
 
In line with the agricultural extensification argument, deforestation is usually viewed as 
the result of population pressures, agrarian techniques and migration to rural areas. 
These effects are exacerbated by structural inequalities and the limited decision making 
opportunities available to rural populations, with ecological and long term economic 
concerns receiving lower priority than short term survival and economic gain. Following 
this logic, any process, such as urbanisation, that removes excess population from rural 
areas should therefore alleviate some pressures on forests from small scale farming, 
hunting and fuelwood gathering (Ehrhardt-Martinez 1998). Variations in household 
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composition can also have an effect, with urbanisation generally resulting in declining 
birth rates and a disproportionate reduction in the number of young people who perform 
most of the physically taxing work of clearing primary rainforest in rural areas 
(Jorgensen & Burns 2007). Patterns of rural-urban migration may also have indirect 
market effects, such the demand for increased efficiency and the development of 
alternative resources, further alleviating the pressure on forest resources (Wright & 
Muller-Landua 2006).  
 
However, other studies have shown that the causal impact of rural-urban migration is not 
always a one way process, and may be counteracted by the effect that urbanisation has on 
forests via a greater demand for agricultural commodities. Urban consumers generally eat 
more processed foods and animal products than rural consumers, creating not just greater 
overall levels of demand but also changes in consumption patterns (Kennedy et. al. 2004; 
Mendez & Popkin 2004). The resulting commercialisation of crop and livestock 
production leads to further land clearance and less sustainable methods of land use. Such 
studies suggest that the traditional mode of clearing in frontier landscapes for small scale 
production to support subsistence needs or local markets is no longer the dominant driver 
of deforestation in many developing countries (Rudel et. al. 2007; DeFries et. al. 2010).  
 
It seems then, that generalisations along the lines of “population growth does/does not 
cause deforestation” fail to capture the complexity of the processes at play. This 
literature suggests two possible reasons for this. The first is that traditional drivers of 
deforestation such as agricultural extensification are changing, and these changes affect 
the ways in which human societies interact with forests. This makes it more difficult to 
predict how shifting patterns of population growth and migration are likely to affect 
deforestation rates via changes in demand for forest lands and resources. The second, 
and more important reason is that the impact of demographic pressures are mediated via 
other factors that link humans to forests such as technology, markets and institutions.  
 
Economic and demographic trends in particular are closely related – population data 
may to some extent act as a proxy for other variables relating to economic development, 
and therefore reflect influences ranging beyond that of population growth itself (Mather 
et. al. 1999). This is not to say that demographic factors do not matter; they are obviously 
still an important variable to consider when thinking about the structural causes of 
deforestation. However, the call by Marx and Engels to arrive at a deeper understanding 
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of the social, political, and economic structural conditions within which demographic 
pressures occur still holds true. In the language favoured by economists demographic 
pressures are neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for deforestation, and should 
be thought of instead as just one of an array of forces impacting forests. 
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Economic Factors 
 
Given the geographical concentration of global deforestation in developing countries, it 
is not surprising that most economic analysis to date has focused on the effects of growth 
and development. Specifically, environmental economists have sought to understand 
whether a predictable and uniform relationship exists between levels of income growth 
and deforestation, and if so, whether it is possible to predict future trajectories of forest 
cover as levels of income change. The formal model around which much of this analysis 
has been built is known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC), named after the 
economist Simon Kuznets (1955) and his work on income distribution theory. Kuznets 
suggested that income inequality initially increases along with economic growth at low to 
moderate levels of GDP per capita and then starts declining after a certain point. His 
theory is encapsulated by the now famous graph showing income inequality as an 
inverted U-shaped function of income per capita.  
 
 
Figure 8: The EKC for sulphur emissions.  
Source: Stern (2004) 
 
Although both the theoretical and empirical bases for the Kuznets curve were 
subsequently undermined by a substantial body of research (see Moran 2005: 221-229 for 
a comprehensive review), Kuznets’s basic premise was adapted by a number of 
environmental economists in the early 1990s to suggest that a similar relationship could 
be demonstrated between levels of income and environmental quality (Grossman & 
Krueger 1991; Shafik & Bandyopadhyay 1992). Since then a spate of studies have been 
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produced that investigate various forms of environmental degradation including air 
pollution, energy usage, waste production and deforestation (Dinda 2004; Stern 2004). 
The common assertion tested in this literature is that in the early stages of economic 
development a nation relies heavily on its environmental capital in order to secure 
industrial takeoff, resulting in significant environmental damage. Past a certain 
intermediate level of development though, the exploitation of natural resources becomes 
less important for growth, reducing strains on the environment and resulting in a shift to 
a more sustainable growth path.  
 
The EKC is a simple but powerful idea, suggesting that capitalist economies have the 
potential to grow sustainably. Its implications are profound; if it is possible to prove the 
existence of an EKC and to understand why it occurs, then it may also be possible to 
design policies that ‘flatten’ or ‘tunnel through’ the income/environmental quality 
inverted-U relationship. For developing countries this holds out the prospect of avoiding 
the same levels of environmental degradation experienced by industrialised countries 
during their early growth phases (Panayatou 1993; Munasinghe 1999). More importantly 
it provides a sound rationale for the primacy of economic growth as the ultimate 
developmental goal. If the EKC holds true, then there is no need to enact policies for 
environmental protection so long as growth continues to a point where environmental 
restoration kicks in. If policy can be improved so that a more sustainable path to 
development can be found, then so much the better, but ultimately in an EKC policy 
framework growth always trumps sustainability.  
 
The EKC and deforestation 
 
Of the various forms of environmental degradation tackled in the EKC literature 
deforestation holds a special appeal. This is because it is a) a spatially fixed phenomenon 
and therefore measurable, b) unequivocally the result of human activity and c) uniquely 
intertwined with all other aspects of environmental degradation (Ehrhardt-Martinez et. 
al. 2002: 227). Specifically the hypothesised EKC for deforestation suggests that as 
developing countries begin to industrialise reliance on natural resources generates 
increased deforestation via the increased demand for forest products and forest lands. 
This is facilitated by technological advances that encourage forest clearing and by the 
expansion of available capital for productive ventures. Eventually though, the associated 
environmental costs of this process are internalised due to the commercialisation and 
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mechanisation of agriculture and the development of better and more efficient 
technologies which raise productivity and thereby reduce demand for cleared land 
(Radetzki 1992).  
 
Additional processes accompanying this change include the increased use of fossil fuels, 
a shift to new building materials and the evolution of the economic base from agriculture 
and manufacturing to more service based activities (Selden & Song 1994; Grossman & 
Krueger 1995; Ehrhardt-Martinez 1998; Ehrhardt-Martinez et. al. 2002). Populations 
also migrate from the countryside to cities, further reducing pressure on forests from 
subsistence agriculture. Finally, development brings with it a growing middle class that 
places greater emphasis on the non-market value of forests including biodiversity, 
wildlife conservation and aesthetic values. This is driven by a discursive shift as social 
norms change to idealise contact with nature and to demand protection of 
environmental quality, leading in turn to the establishment of environmental 
organisations, forest reserves and policies promoting improved land management 
(Selden & Song 1994; Baldwin 1995).  
 
Unfortunately there is little reason to believe that an EKC for deforestation really exists 
(Barbier 2001; Dida 2004). While a few authors have presented empirical data in support 
(Ehrhardt-Martinez 1998; Rudel 1998; Mather et. al. 1999) the majority find little or no 
evidence to back its claims. When tested for all forests (temperate and tropical), large-N 
cross country studies have generally derived results that are inconclusive or that directly 
contradict the theory (Shafik 1994; Panayatou 1995; Antle & Heidebrink 1995; Koop & 
Tole 1999; Meyer et. al. 2003; Culas & Dutta 2002). When applied to regions or 
countries the evidence seems to hold only in specific contexts. Cropper & Griffiths 
(1994) for example, find for an EKC pattern for Africa and Latin America, but not for 
Asia. Their hypothesized EKC transition points are also so high as to be completely 
unrealistic; under their scenarios by the time income per capita reached the posited 
levels, there would be very little environmental resources left to recover.  
 
One possible reason for this is that the disappearance of forests can have adverse 
livelihood eﬀects for the poorest people in developing countries. This is the idea that 
forests provide a ‘safety net’ for poor people during periods of hardship or as a cushion 
against unexpected income shortfalls due to for example, family illness and natural 
disasters (Wunder 2001; Angelsen & Wunder 2003). The poor will tend to use forests 
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primarily for NWFPs since they do not have the skills or capital to engage in commercial 
timber production. Also, growing timber requires secure land tenure which the poor 
often do not have, and represents a long term, high risk investment (Wunder 2001). The 
problem however, is that the same factors that tend to make forests important in the 
livelihoods of the poor also limit the scope for them to lift people out of poverty. The 
harvesting of forest products is subject to seasonal and annual ﬂuctuations, and the open 
access nature of many of the forests makes them vulnerable to overexploitation. Markets 
for NWFPs are also small, and limited access puts producers in a weak bargaining 
position relative to traders who typically provide transport, market connections and 
credit to forest product collectors (Sunderlin et. al. 2005). 
 
Other critiques have focused on statistical flaws such as the assumption of a linear and 
predictable income growth function over time (Arrow et. al. 1995; Stern et. al. 1996). 
This practice ignores declines during periods of conflict and/or economic crises, which 
may be short in duration but can have lasting effects on patterns of forest change. There 
are also significant concerns about the nature of the co-variables used in much of the 
EKC analysis since these matter as much, if not more than economic growth and income 
levels (Barbier & Burgess 2001; Ehrhardt Martinez et. al. 2002; Barbier 2004). As with 
the studies on demographic variables this line of criticism offers an important clue as to 
the failure of the EKC hypothesis to hold up under close scrutiny. Specifically it shows 
that income growth alone does not guarantee the required shift in the composition of a 
country’s economic base, nor can it be relied on to bring about the discursive shifts 
necessary to change the way a society values forest services. Rather, the relationship 
between income growth and deforestation is governed by complex feedback mechanisms 
involving multiple institutional channels that affect both market and political forces 
(Antle & Heidelbrink; 1995).  
 
Rudel (1998; 2005; 2007). has attempted to account for the criticisms levelled at the 
EKC hypothesis by focusing less on the income effect than on the dynamic causes of the 
‘forest transition’ itself Having observed a familiar pattern of forest decline and then 
recovery in many industrialised nations, he suggests that two main paths to forest 
recovery exist. The first is the familiar one outlined by the EKC literature in which 
existing forests are left alone and remote land is abandoned to revert to its original state 
as a result of economic development and urbanisation. The second is known as the forest 
scarcity path in which declines in forest cover spur price increases in the price of forest 
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products, inducing land owners to plant trees instead of crops or pasture. The suggestion 
is that this ‘transition’  can be aided and assisted by well designed government policy to 
encourage reforestation projects and manage prices. A greater emphasis on the role of 
policy is also evident in the work of Panayatou (1997) who suggests that the quality of 
policies and institutions can weaken the effect of the EKC. Such an effect has received 
empirical support from research by Bhatarrai & Hammig (2001) who test for a 
relationship between deforestation and the quality of political institutions and find that 
the internalisation of deforestation costs is brought about not just by the growth of 
income but also crucially, improvements in institutions that empower citizens through 
the enhancement of democracy, the strengthening of individual freedom and liberties 
and the establishment of the rule of law.  
 
Ecological modernisation 
 
A more critical perspective on the impact of economic factors on deforestation comes 
from studies that point out how the EKC and forest transitions approaches belong to a 
larger academic tradition known as ecological modernisation theory (EMT) (Erhardt-
Martinez et. al. 2002; Perz 2007; Ozler & Obach 2009). EMT is a view which suggests 
that the twin goals of economic growth and ecological sustainability are not mutually 
incompatible. The free market, in conjunction with limited state intervention and civil 
society support, generates efficiency gains, technological development and the types of 
social reform required to address environmental problems. The market thus contains its 
own internal dynamic, one that is best placed to respond to the demands of sustainability 
– and what is required is the conduct of policy in such a way as to unleash its problem 
solving potential (Esty & Porter 2005; Jaffe & Palmer 1997; Mol 1997; Mol & 
Spaargaren 2000; Porter 1991). Via this logic deforestation is viewed merely as the result 
of a temporary mismatch between technological regimes, population parameters and the 
social organisation of economic activities, a problem that will resolve itself as soon as 
true market forces are allowed to align.  
 
The main proponents of EMT go to great pains to point out that the economic dynamics 
behind environmental reform should not be understood as a deterministic account of 
technological progress (Mol 2001). It is still a process accompanied by power struggles, 
standstills and regression. Economic institutions and actors are not self regulating; state 
backing is always needed to get markets and economic actors moving in the right 
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direction before market actors can take over (Mol 1997; Mol & Spaargaren 2000; Mol 
2001). Political decisions, civil pressure and citizen consumer demand are thus decisive. 
Nevertheless it is the economic domain that articulates these pressures into outcomes 
and therefore plays the dominant role. Simply put the idea is, “just get the policy right, 
and markets will do the rest.” The underlying message is that it is possible for capitalist 
economies to reform themselves to promote environmental goals, and that the agent of 
this reform should be the market itself (Mol & Sonnenfeld 2000).  
 
However, a substantial critical review by Perz (2007) raises a number of doubts about the 
general theoretical and empirical validity of EMT, especially as it relates to the problem 
of deforestation. For a start EMT is not new idea; much of its language is familiar from 
the work of development economists in the 1950s and early 1960s. Like earlier forms of 
modernisation theory it is a structural-functional account that employs abstract, 
universalist arguments that when applied to concrete historical cases, miss many of the 
important context specific explanations behind development. And like modernisation 
theory it tends to derive its conclusions from the historical experience of forest 
transitions in the developed world, ignoring factors such as the experience of 
colonisation, subordination to foreign actors and export orientation toward external 
markets (Fisher & Freudenburg 2001).  
 
The prospect of facing many of the old criticisms of modernisation therefore makes 
empirical confirmation a crucial question for EMT. Yet such confirmation is sorely 
lacking. Rather, empirical studies tend to reveal two clear patterns. The first lends 
support to what is known as the ‘treadmill of production’ theory – a direct counterpoint 
to EMT’s optimism regarding free markets. Far from bringing about increased 
sustainability, free market activity and the pursuit of profit and economic growth tend to 
yield greater resource withdrawals and pollution (York et. al. 2003; Ozler & Obach 
2009). Within this framework the environmental movement is marginalised and co-opted 
by the central state and economic actors who determine policy (Ozler & Obach 2009: 
85). The second pattern is that the free market appears to operate in such different 
historical, social and physical contexts as to make the ‘grand theory’ proposed by EMT 
meaningless. As Perz (2007: 110) points out, “colonialism, biophysical processes, and 
strategic action, ranging from the local to the global levels, provide crucial supplements 
(if not alternatives) to accounts of forest change based on the experiences of advanced 
industrial countries.”  
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What this literature shows is that as was the case with demographic variables, it makes 
little sense to try and predict deforestation levels by analysing economic growth alone. This 
is not to say that growth has no effect – technological progress, increased efficiencies and 
sectoral production shifts can certainly produce more sustainable outcomes for forests. 
Likewise there is a strong argument to be made that wealthier and better educated 
populations do place a higher value on the intrinsic value of forests. However the context 
specific questions are all important, because economic growth interacts with a number of 
important variables in order to determine overall impact. The other key conclusion is that 
deforestation cannot be simply characterised as the result of a temporary misalignment of 
market forces. The historical record shows that free markets are certainly quite capable of 
creating unequal and unsustainable environmental outcomes when left to their own 
devices. This is particularly true when considering the international dimensions of the 
relationship between economic factors and deforestation. 
  
Macroeconomic policies 
 
Economic forces and their effects on deforestation do not take place in a vacuum; for most 
developing countries in the last two to three decades macroeconomic policy decisions have 
been largely constricted by international factors. In the wake of the debt crisis of the early 
1980s for example, a number of developing countries were forced to adopt structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs) at the recommendation of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Successful SAPs were supposed to move developing economies closer to their comparative 
advantage in primary sectors via investment incentives, credit concessions, tax provisions, 
agricultural pricing and lease agreements (Repetto & Gillis 1988; Capistrano & Kiker 
1992; Thampapillai 1992). They also mandated public sector reforms such as measures to 
reduce or freeze civil service wage bills and the winding down or privatisation of loss 
making enterprises (Young & Bishop 1995). Ultimately, the aim was to unleash productive 
investment and technological change as long term sources of agro-industrialisation (Stiglitz 
1987; Jaeger 1992).  
 
With regard to deforestation it was argued that these reforms, by removing distortions 
and enhancing efficiency, would reduce material wastage and bring about a more 
productive and competitive agricultural industry, thereby alleviating pressures on forests 
from further agricultural expansion. The alignment of relative prices in the entire 
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economy was expected to eliminate bias, increasing production while alleviating rural 
migration to urban areas, and greater price stability was supposed to result in better 
resource management. It was also hoped that in line with the EKC literature higher 
living standards brought about by growth would increase demand for further efficiency 
and technology gains, promoting greater interest in and creating more resources for 
environmental protection (Young & Bishop 1995, Kessler & Van Dorp 1998).  
 
Critics though, have argued that far from achieving these goals structural adjustment 
undermined sustainability via its promotion of resource depletion in countries that had 
neither the incentive nor the capacity to protect their environmental commons (Abaza 
1995; Munasinghe & Cruz 1994; Scrieciu 2007; Barbier 2000). Increased productivity and 
export orientation in primary sector activities such as cattle ranching, logging, drilling 
and mining improved returns to the conversion of forested lands without producing a 
counteracting effect to mitigate the accompanying levels of deforestation. Structural 
adjustment also mandated the removal of regulations protecting the commons, and 
brought about deep cuts in government spending. In such cases, the staff and budgets of 
environmental departments and organisations were often the first to go (Shandra 2007).  
 
Structural adjustment also had indirect effects on deforestation via attempts to reduce 
government debt, achieve a realistic exchange rate and correct trade imbalances through 
devaluation and to remove input subsidies and eliminate price controls through price 
liberalisation. According to Kahn & McDonald (1994) high levels of debt in many 
developing countries forced governments to enact policies to meet their next payment of 
interest or principal, or to sustain positions in negotiations with international lenders for 
debt rescheduling. Such policies included relying on fuelwood to reduce imports of 
energy, encouraging the export of timber products and promoting the conversion of 
forest land to farm land for agricultural exports. While such ‘myopic’ behaviour may 
have been rational in the short run, they led to unsustainable levels of deforestation in 
the long run.  
 
Trade and financial liberalisation 
 
In the wake of SAPs, most developing countries were forced to come to terms with the 
increasing scale and pace of economic globalisation (Held et. al. 1999). Material changes 
in production, trade and finance associated with this process heightened pressures on 
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their governments as well as competition among them as they sought to generate wealth 
through the attraction of investment by multinational corporations and internationally 
mobile capital. For most, commodity trade has been the most significant mode of 
articulation into the global economy, forcing them to further exploit their comparative 
advantage in primary sectors such as agriculture, logging and mining (Dicken et. al. 
2001). However, the impact that these changes have had on deforestation are not 
immediately obvious.  
 
For example, commercial logging companies and their involvement in the international 
timber trade are often identified as a cause for concern. Forest products are after all, 
internationally tradable goods whose price is determined by world markets as well as 
domestic markets. An increase in international prices for forest products due to an 
increase in world demand should theoretically result in improved terms of trade for 
exporting forest countries, creating further pressure via agricultural expansion or 
excessive logging (Cropper & Griffiths 1994). Evidence on the effect of these changes is 
unclear though. While markets for timber have certainly become more globalised many 
of these operations have not led to permanent land clearing, and attempts to estimate 
the effect of the globalisation of timber markets on deforestation do not reliably predict 
forest losses (Godoy et. al. 1997; Wunder 2003; Rudel 2007). Analysis suggests that it is 
not trade itself that is the problem, as tropical timber represents only a small proportion 
of the world’s total supply. As Barbier et. al. (1994) point out, this means that 
international timber prices do not reflect the increasing scarcity of tropical forest 
resources.  
 
A more convincing critical argument about the effects of trade liberalisation is represented 
by the theory of ‘unequal ecological exchange’ (Jorgensen 2006). In less developed 
countries economic activity is centred around agriculture and livestock, extractive 
processes and export oriented production (Jorgensen 2003; McMichael 2004; Jorgensen 
2006). This is in part due to natural resource endowments and the historical legacies of 
colonialism, but is also illustrative of the outsourcing of production from developed to 
developing countries via the broadening and deepening of global commodity chains and 
the transnational organisation of production (Gereffi 1999; Robinson 2004; Wallerstein 
2005). Trade blurs responsibility for the effects of consumption and production by allowing 
developed countries to partially externalise their consumption based environmental costs 
to less developed countries, which experience an increase in forms of environmental 
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degradation as a result (Lofdalh 2002).  
 
This ‘vertical flow’ of raw materials and produced commodities from less developed to 
developed countries is maintained by the continued emphasis of trade liberalisation 
reforms on the promotion of export led growth. This is why in developed countries, 
economic development and less deforestation usually go hand in hand. This is the 
consumption/environment paradox identified in the ‘forest transitions’ literature. 
However this is not due to internal market dynamics as argued by proponents of 
modernisation theory but rather increased cross border movement of goods and services 
in a globalizing world (Jorgensen 2006; Jorgensen & Rice 2005). A number of cross 
national studies find support for this idea by showing that higher emphasis on primary 
sector exports are closely associated with deforestation (Bunker & Ciccantell 2005; 
Rudel 2005; DeFries et. al. 2010) and that countries with higher levels of exports sent to 
more developed countries experience more deforestation relative to others (Jorgensen 
2003: Jorgensen 2006; Jorgensen & Rice 2005). 
 
This type of commodity trade, the most important form of access to the global economy 
for developing countries, is mostly organised by MNCs. These firms have gradually 
become transnationally organised and globally distributed, helped by lowered shipping 
and transportation costs and the expansion of international trade (Dicken 1998). 
According to neoliberal economists MNCs are supposed to be catalysts for sustainable 
development because they employ newer technologies and more advanced management 
practices, increasing efficiency and spurring innovation. This results in the manufacture 
of products that are less environmentally damaging. MNCs are also assumed to 
contribute to better environmental practices through the transfer of better managerial 
skills not available to host countries (Gentry 1998).  
 
However the balance of evidence suggests that foreign firms are far more likely to create 
pollution ‘havens’ than ‘halos’. They invest in highly polluting and less eco-efficient 
forms of manufacturing processes, transfer out dirty technology, disregard local laws, 
follow poor environmental practice and perpetuate technological dependence rather 
than disseminating knowledge (Zarsky 2002; 2006; Abdul-Gafaru 2006). At the same 
time economic globalisation has heightened competition amongst countries as they seek 
to generate wealth through the creation of more favourable business conditions and the 
lowering of environmental standards and regulations for extraction and production 
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(Schofer & Hironaka 2005; Clapp & Dauvergne 2005; Jorgenson et. al. 2007). The more 
central the role of foreign investment in promoting growth and employment, the greater 
the constraints of investment governance for less developed countries, with worries 
about the perceived threat of flight giving host countries added incentives to offer 
regulatory concessions. Absent obligations and given foreign investor biased norms and a 
high degree of economic globalisation, the result is what Zarsky (2006) calls ‘regulatory 
chill.’  
 
The problem of course is that the poorest countries are also those with the least 
regulatory capacity and the weakest institutional safeguards against deforestation. Ewers 
(2006) for example, suggests that the ability of nations to reduce their levels of 
deforestation depends on two variables – the quality of government and the money 
available to that nation for investment. Weak governments are more likely to permit 
ongoing conversion of forests to other land uses as an alternative to the problem of 
dealing with land reform, and individuals are more likely to be able to exploit forests for 
personal gain. Sure enough, there is consistent evidence to suggest that developing 
countries have lower environmental standards than developed countries (Morimoto 
2005). In the forest sector these include tax holidays, exemptions on log harvest quotas, 
clear cutting, logging protected species and logging in protected areas (Shandra et. al. 
2008).  
 
Some authors have summarised these various factors as indicative of the ever growing 
dependence of the world’s poorer countries on rich countries (Burns et. al. 1994 1997; 
1998; Kick et. al. 1996). An international hierarchy of unbalanced economic exchange 
relations is entrenched via market logic and the global accumulation of capital, centred 
around the concentration of exports in the primary sector and the activities of MNCs 
and international financial institutions (Wallerstein 1974; Bornschier & Chase-Dunn 
1985; Bunker & Ciccantell 2005; Chase-Dunn & Jorgensen 2003). Gains for one country 
dictate losses for other countries, and less developed countries become peripheralised in 
the world economy as they are exploited by interests in the core. Due to world systems 
impacts national deforestation rates will thus differ cross nationally in systematic ways, 
with different consequences depending on whether a country is part of the core, semi-
core, semi-periphery or periphery (Shandra 2007; Shandra et. al. 2008).  
 
This lack of regulation has contributed to a shift to what Rudel et. al. (2007) call 
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‘enterprise driven’ deforestation. They describe how plantation owners, large scale 
soybean farmers and livestock ranchers have expanded their enterprises in response to 
increasing demands from local and national urban markets in the last two decades. To 
facilitate their plans for expansion large landowners, aided by local politicians and 
bankers, have lobbied federal and provincial governments to enact policies designed to 
promote agricultural expansion at the expense of forests. The authors conclude that “the 
growing influence of coalitions of agribusiness proprietors and the continued depletion 
of forests by rural enterprises serving urban consumers both attest to the important role 
that private enterprises played in destroying (...) forests during the 1990s” (Rudel et. al. 
2007: 40).   
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Governance and institutions 
 
Studies on the relationship between deforestation and the institutional and governance 
contexts in which it takes place are a relatively new phenomenon. This can be attributed 
in part to the tendency of social scientists, and particularly economists, to look for 
generalisable models and easily quantifiable measurements of structural causes, with 
little consideration for the different social and political conditions in countries where 
deforestation takes place. However it is also because the problem is a complex one; the 
question of how forests should be managed, by whom and for whose benefit requires 
answers at levels from the global to the local (Hobley 2007; Deitz et. al. 2003).  
 
Moreover, even where solutions exist, they are provisional and subject to ongoing 
revisions as a result of demographic and economic shifts, different developmental 
processes and changes in political landscapes and scientific and policy discourses, among 
other variables (Agrawal 2007). This is not to say that institutional analysis has been 
completely ignored – for example, an impressive body of literature has emerged that 
looks at the different approaches to governing forests as common pool resources. 
However as Shandra (2007: 543) points out, “most efforts to understand the relationship 
between governance, institutions and deforestation have thus far tended to be too 
eclectic and have largely failed to build upon existing cross national research to specify 
the different external contexts in which different governance factors play a role.”  
 
Types of political regime 
 
At the national level analysis of the relationship between institutions and deforestation 
has focused mostly on types of political regimes. From a certain viewpoint it can be 
argued that modern liberal democracies suffer from a number of structural 
characteristics that prevent them from tackling environmental challenges such as 
deforestation. These include short term decision making based on electoral cycles, self-
referring decision making that ignores externalities and cross border spillover effects, 
and greater interest group concentration and pluralism that caters to narrow interests 
and leads to a gridlock in public decision making (Held & Fane Hervey 2009). These 
shortcomings have led to concern about the compatibility of democratic governance with 
the need for the type of actions required to deal with environmental challenges. Such 
thinking finds its historical precedent in the work of the 'eco-authoritarians' of the 1970s, 
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who argued that it is difficult in democracies to constrain the damaging pressures of 
economic activity and population growth on the environment. They suggested that some 
aspects of democratic rule would have to be sacrificed to achieve sustainable future 
outcomes since authoritarian regimes are not required to pay as much attention to 
citizens’ rights in order to establish effective policy in key areas (Hardin 1968; 
Heilbroner 1974; Ophuls 1977). 
 
Such thinking has been subsequently undermined by a body of theory arguing that there 
are a number of reasons why democracies are more likely than authoritarian regimes to 
protect environmental quality (Holden 2002). Democracies have better access to 
information with fewer restrictions on media and sources of information and greater 
transparency in decision making procedures (Payne 1999). They also encourage scientific 
research and the exchange and dissemination of new evidence, which is responsible for 
our awareness about different forms of environmental threat in the first place (Giddens 
2008: 74). Concerned citizens can in turn influence political outcomes not only through 
the ballot box but through pressure groups, social movements and the free media – 
channels that are closed in autocracies (Payne 1995). Finally, there are many examples of 
cases where environmental interest groups have been able to overwhelm business 
interests pursuing environmentally damaging practices and of cases where they have 
changed the public agenda (Falkner 2007; Bernauer & Caduff 2004).  
 
At the same time authoritarian regimes have fewer incentives to adopt or stick to 
sustainable policies. Environmental concerns are often trumped by economic 
development plans and external security (Porritt 1984), and those in power control a 
substantial fraction of society’s resources, encouraging payoffs to a relatively small elite 
(Bueno de Mesquita et. al. 2003). Given their insecurity of tenure in office dictators can 
be expected to have high discount rates which favour allocation of resources at present 
at expense of the future (Dida 1997). Leaders are also unaccountable to the public, 
giving them even less incentive to enact long term policy (Congleton 1992). In 
democratic countries there are structures and institutions which curtail the extent of 
these behaviours. These kinds of checks and balances either do not exist in autocratic 
countries or where they do, are usually ineffective (Dida 1997).  
 
Empirical findings on the relationship between types of political regimes and 
deforestation are inconclusive. While Li & Reuveny (2006); Mather et. al. (1999) and 
51 
 
Dida (1997) find support for the idea that more democracy results in less deforestation, 
Ehrhardt-Martinez et. al. (2002) and Midlarsky (1998) find no evidence of a significant 
effect. Part of the reason might be due to the different types of transmission mechanisms 
that translate policy commitment into policy outcomes. Battig & Bernauer (2009) for 
example, find that while the effect of democracy on political commitment to 
environmental protection is positive, the effect on policy outcomes is ambiguous. They 
observe that the causal chain from scientific knowledge about environmental risks to 
public perceptions of such risks, to public demand for risk mitigation, and from there to 
policy output, is shorter than the one leading from policy output to policy outcome. The 
result is that democratically elected officials respond quite well to public demands for 
environmental protection but tend to discount implementation problems, hoping that 
voters will not be able to identify these within a short enough time period to use their 
votes as a punishment for their failure to deliver. 
 
Land tenure and property rights 
 
Other research has focused on the role of institutional arrangements governing forest 
tenure. This refers to the combination of legally or customarily defined forest related 
rules that define who can use what resources, for how long and under what conditions 
(Barbier & Tesfaw 2012). Much of this work is modelled around the idea that conserving 
forest to yield long term sustainable outputs is an investment decision, with the security 
of property rights affecting the magnitude of investment and the efficiency with which 
inputs are allocated (Keefer & Knack 1995; Jindal et. al. 2011; Sandbrook et. al. 2010, 
Campbell et. al. 2008). ‘Investors’ such as local users, commercial companies and 
government actors will not forego current consumption without assurance that such a 
sacrifice will yield future benefits. This assurance is normally in the form of a legal 
contract or the force of reputation.  
 
However when legal and political institutions are volatile or predatory, owners are 
exposed to the risk that their parcel of land will be invaded by squatters, harvested by a 
timber company or confiscated by a government official. This diminishes their incentive 
to invest and causes forest users to extract and sell forest goods as fast as possible, or to 
clear land in order to establish legal claims (Deacon 1994; Southgate 1998; Kaimowitz et. 
al. 1999). According to Deacon (1994) insecure property rights arise when governments 
lack power, stability and popular support to enforce property laws. Weak and unstable 
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governments are incapable not only of acting as a guarantor for private resources, but 
also of preventing free access to resources on government owned land. Furthermore if 
government institutions are short lived, investment in government owned assets is not a 
good idea; leases to harvest from government forests are of too short a duration and too 
subject to uncertainty to provide enough incentives to conserve their long term economic 
value. 
 
Ownership security is also weakened by the absence of accountability in countries 
governed by the rule of individuals and dominant elites. In such cases property claims, 
taxation and regulation may depend on cliques and systems of patronage rather than a 
predictable set of political and legal institutions. By implication then, improvements in 
the quality of political institutions and governance should result in a corresponding 
decrease in unsustainable levels of deforestation This argument has been made by 
Bhattarai & Hammig (2001), who find that improved governance, measured via indices 
of political rights and civil liberties, reduces pressure on environmental resources and 
leads to better conservation of forest land. Culas (2007) focuses on additional factors 
such as the enforceability of contracts by governments and the efficiency of government 
bureaucracies and finds for a similar effect.  
 
A related line of research has found a strong association between institutional 
corruption and deforestation and (Dauvergne 1997; Barbier, et. al. 2005; Smith et. al 
2007; Koyuncu & Yilmaz 2009). While laws may designate large tracts of forested land 
as reserves, regulations are often circumvented by entrepreneurs who pay government 
officials to give them free rein in extracting resources. Corruption activities can take the 
form of illegal contract approval for private enterprises, the under pricing of wood, 
harvesting of protected trees, smuggling of protected products and allowing logging 
without licenses. The forestry sector is also more prone to illegal activities and corrupt 
acts than other sectors due to high rents, low visibility, low salaries of government 
officials, non-standardized products and the broad discretionary powers of local forestry 
officers (Rose-Ackerman 1997; Koyuncu & Yilmaz 2009).  
 
Participatory approaches to forest governance 
 
Much of the concern about the world’s environmental commons in general and the 
problem of deforestation in particular can be linked to the work of Garrett Hardin 
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(1968). He suggested that two factors were driving environmental degradation: the 
human need for resources, and the way in which we organise ourselves. Using the 
example of a common grazing ground, he pointed out the effect of each herdsman 
pursuing a rational course of action by grazing more and more of their cattle. “Therein,” 
he concluded, “is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to 
increase his herd without limit – in a world that is limited. Ruin is the destination toward 
which all men rush, each pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the 
freedom of the commons. Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all” (Hardin 1968; 162). 
Accordingly Hardin advised that only two institutional arrangements could liberate 
resources from this ‘tragedy of the commons’ – full government control or privatisation.  
 
Pioneering work by Ostrom (1990) and Ostrom, et. al. (1994) however, criticised 
Hardin’s taxonomy for being too simple. They showed that commons users were not 
hopelessly trapped in the continued overuse of resources by highlighting the important 
differences between the public and private management of what they called ‘common 
pool’ or ‘common property’ resources (as opposed to Hardin’s ‘open access’ resources). 
Common pool resources are those for which it is costly to exclude others from use but 
for which the use of the resource is subtractable; that is, one user’s harvesting diminishes 
what is left for others to harvest (Ostrom 1990). The design of traditional property rights 
arrangements for such types of resources can create incentives for grievous depletion 
rather than sustainable use, whereas the characteristics of resources and social 
interactions in many subsistence societies present favourable conditions for the evolution 
of effective self-governing resource institutions.  
 
Empirical studies have subsequently showed that all types of ownership regimes – private 
property, common property and government property – are compatible with 
improvements, declines and stability in forest conditions (Dietz et. al. 2003; Gibson et. 
al. 2002; NRC 2002). Of these, common property arrangements in particular have 
received a lot of attention, with the literature broadly agreeing that four clusters of 
variables are relevant to the successful governance of the commons (See Agrawal 2001; 
Gibson 2001; Ostrom 2001; Dietz et. al. 2003, Gibson et. al. 2005; Agrawal & Gupta 
2005; Agrawal 2006). These are the characterics of the resource system (such as size and 
boundaries); user group characteristics (such as the size of group, whether group 
boundaries are clearly defined, the degree of group heterogeneity, levels of trust among 
users, level of dependence on the resource and original endowments); institutional 
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arrangements (such as rules for access, usage and enforcement) and the external 
environment (including the actions of state and non-state actors and demographic, 
cultural, technological and market related factors at the local, national and global 
levels).  
 
Viewed as a whole this literature suggests that there is no simple recipe or optimal 
design for local institutions to effectively limit deforestation (Deitz et. al. 2003; Ostrom 
2005). Forests occur in a wide variety of physical and ecological settings, with different 
sizes and boundaries. Given the different characteristics of the groups that use them and 
the variety of different external factors that influence their decisions, rules that work well 
to facilitate collective action for one group may not work well when used by others. 
Differences both within and between user groups allow some to ignore the established 
rules of commons use or to reshape the rules in their own interest (Dietz et. al. 2003). 
The challenge is therefore to move beyond the simple presumption that there is one or a 
limited set of institutions that work to solve all commons dilemmas and to sort out which 
factors are most important in achieving successful management in particular settings 
(Gibson et. al. 2005). The literature also suggests that there are productive avenues of 
research and dialogue between those who focus on external factors as critical influences 
on local forest governance and those who focus primarily on community institutions 
themselves (Agrawal 2007).  
 
The increased attention to common pool resource management can be thought of as 
part of a growing institutional preference for the decentralisation of forest resource 
management. Decentralisation can be defined as any political act which involves a 
transfer of powers from central government to lower level actors and institutions. It 
generally takes one of two forms – devolved governance to lower layers of government, 
or a transfer of management rights to local communities (Andersson et. al. 2004). Most 
analysis on the decentralisation of forest governance has focused on this latter type, in 
combination with the new ways of thinking about local governance arrangements as 
advocated by common pool resource management scholars (Agrawal & Ribot 1999; 
Andersson & Gibson 2007; Agrawal et. al. 2008).  
 
The traditional view is that decentralisation is expected to lead, under the right 
conditions, to improved efficiency, equity and responsiveness to citizen demands. Local 
users are assumed to have better information about local conditions and preferences, 
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leading to better targeted policies and lower transaction costs. Efficiency is further 
increased via the consolidation and internalisation of costs and increased competition 
among jurisdictions (World Bank 1997). Decentralisation is also a means of increasing 
downward accountability, thereby institutionalising and scaling up popular participation 
(Agrawal & Ribot 1999; Ribot 1995). This makes greater use of the capacity of local 
users to identify and prioritize environmental problems more accurately. Local groups 
are also more likely to respect locally generated rules, making resource use monitoring 
easier to conduct (Ribot 2002; Larson & Ribot 2004; Ribot et. al. 2006).  
 
According to Agrawal (2012) as a result of decentralisation reforms undertaken by 
governments in the Global South, forest area under community governance has 
increased from 200 million ha in 1980 to 450 million ha today. Another study by 
Sunderlin et. al. (2008) has shown that the percentage of the global forest estate 
designated for use or owned by local communities and indigenous peoples increased 
from 9.2 per cent to 11.4 per cent between 2002 and 2008, and that the proportion of 
forests under community management are now equivalent to those under conservation 
in public protected areas. This is occurring because central governments are under 
pressure from a number of sources to extend rights over their natural resources. These 
pressures include fiscal deficits, aid from international donors that is conditional upon 
local participation, pressures from communities and indigenous groups for greater 
control over their lands and evidence that local actors have the capacity to protect and 
use forest resources sustainably and at lower costs than government agencies (Lemos & 
Agrawal 2006; Agrawal 2012).  
 
Increasing globalisation and the search by international finance for lucrative 
opportunities further increases pressure at the local level for equitable resource access; 
this is particularly true in Africa, where governance institutions are weak and national 
economies are dependent on a rich natural resource endowment, and where conflict and 
political instability are fuelled by attempts to control access to resources (Hobley 2007). 
However it is an open question whether such changes have translated into better 
resource conditions. One problem is that the necessary institutional arrangements are 
rarely observed or when they are, have serious design flaws and a marked lack of 
accountability (Agrawal & Ribot 1999). They have also encountered strong resistance 
from central governments who regardless of rhetoric, policy and legislation, erect 
imaginative obstacles in the path of decentralised institutions (Agrawal 2001; Ribot 
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2002; 2003; 2004; Ribot & Larson 2005).  
 
Others have suggested that the problem lies not with the failure to properly implement 
policy but with the policy rationale itself (Tacconi et. al. 2006). For a start, 
decentralisation is supposed to improve governance by scaling up local representation 
and greater community involvement. However many countries have weak representative 
institutions and representative decision making processes, and local authorities and 
vested interest groups can manipulate institutions and opportunities created by 
decentralisation for their own benefit. Only when they reap political and financial 
rewards are local politicians interested in investing time and resources into forestry 
activities (Andersson et. al. 2004). Depending on which interest group demands are 
stronger, and the level of government support and supervision, decentralised policies 
also create different patterns of incentives that help determine degree of success. Where 
incentives are skewed local politicians favour short term private benefits such as 
kickbacks from timber concessions over long term goods such as protection of soil 
fertility, control soil erosion, safeguard water supply and ensuring a stable source of 
forest products (Andersson & Gibson 2007).  
 
Another problem with participatory approaches is the presumption that the devolution 
of management to the local level must be better both in social and ecological terms to 
that of management under state control. As Hobley (2007: 12) points out, perhaps one 
of the reasons for this is that the origins of the community based natural resource 
movement did not emerge from a pro-poor agenda but from a strong anti-state position. 
It may also partially stem from the romanticised view that traditional communities 
always live in harmony with natural resources (McCay 2001). However as Tacconi (2007) 
suggests, policymakers should investigate the real level of benefits and the associated 
choices people in rural communities actually make about whether to conserve forests or 
not. Outcomes depend on range of conditions including benefits derived from 
alternative land uses such as annual and perennial crops. Likewise, forests may not do 
much more than act as a ‘safety net’ for the rural poor, and are therefore less likely to be 
prioritised in local poverty reduction efforts (see also Wunder 2001).  
 
Even if the ideal decentralisation model was implemented then, it appears forest 
conservation would not necessarily follow. The advantages and disadvantages of 
transferring control over resources to communities are therefore better considered 
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within whatever paradigm of locally based resource management is most appropriate, 
e.g. co-management, joint forest management, common pool resource based 
management or private access and property rights. These resource management systems 
can in theory, take place in either politically centralised or decentralised states. These 
conclusions are remarkably similar to those reached by researchers looking at common 
pool resource management, who suggest that successful institutions depend on a number 
of context specific factors rather than one or a limited set of institutional policies. 
 
International institutions 
 
Forests may be affected by institutional arrangements that operate across state borders. 
Such institutions provide various mechanisms for environmental governance and 
influence the social and political contexts in which national and local efforts at forest 
management take place, even if they are not designed with that intent (Dietz et. al. 
2003). According to Dingwerth (2008: 11) these governance processes, "appear to 
resemble international regimes – with the important difference that it is not states but 
non-state actors who generate both the principles, norms, rules, and decision making 
procedures and the expectations associated with them. Hence, we might speak of 
transnational regimes that have emerged in many areas where international regulation is 
either absent or weak."  
 
In recent years certification schemes have emerged to become an important mechanism 
for standard setting and governance in the environmental realm (Auld et. al. 2008). 
These are market based initiatives fostered by private and semi-public organisations and 
entities to assure compliance with social, economic and environmental sustainability 
principles (Cashore et. al. 2004; 2007; Overdevest & Rickenbach 2006; Rametsteiner & 
Simula 2003).This move towards private regulation is symptomatic of a more general 
trend in global environmental governance (Falkner 2003; Pattberg 2005). It can be 
attributed to the spread of new problems beyond the ability of the individual states to 
manage, the emergence of new private, non-governmental and civil society actors and a 
change in their capacity to act, and accountability deficits of more traditional forms of 
global policy making (Benner et. al. 2004; Reinicke 1998; Chan & Pattberg 2008).  
 
In addition to promoting private voluntary initiatives, non-governmental and civil society 
actors can have an impact on forest management in developing countries via a variety of 
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other methods (Shandra 2007). They can influence the normative impact of international 
environmental treaties by raising awareness and can monitor compliance by governments 
by pointing out embarrassing failures and hypocrisy (Friedman et. al. 2005; Keck & 
Sikkink 1998). Governments are thus squeezed from both above via international 
compliance pressures and from below, via local community advocacy efforts (Schofer & 
Hironika 2005). NGOs can also support problem solving initiatives at the sub-
governmental level by providing funding, technical assistance and organisational and 
facilitative support. However, NGO initiatives in this area have been criticised for being 
ad hoc and limited in scale and geographical scope. Such problems are exacerbated by 
NGOs’ ‘go it alone’ attitude, and competition amongst agencies to secure funding can 
result in unintended and potentially negative consequences (Shandra 2007). NGOs also 
tend to be paternalist and reformist, advocating programs and policies designed to alter 
the political status quo while being unaccountable to local populations (Bryant & Bailey 
1997; Powell & Seddon 1997). 
 
At the international level efforts to create a global convention to stop deforestation have 
existed since the United States first proposed one in preparation for the 1992 United 
Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). The outputs of these 
negotiations were limited to two pieces of ‘soft’ international law: a non-legally binding 
statement commonly known as the ‘Forest Principles’, and Chapter 11 ‘Combating 
Deforestation’, of Agenda 21. In 1995 negotiations on a global convention began again 
with the creation of the Intergovernmental Panel on Forests (IPF), a sub-group of the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) which later became the 
Intergovernmental Forum on Forests (IFF) in 1997. At the end of its lifespan in 2001 the 
IFF forged a consensus around the creation of a new UN body, the United Nations 
Forum on Forests (UNFF), which in turn negotiated the Non-Legally Binding 
Instrument on All Types of Forests (NLBI) in 2007. Unfortunately despite this 
impressive roster of meetings and negotiations, the international community has not yet 
managed to create a legally binding agreement on forest management and to date there 
is no ‘hard’ international law on forests. All the legal outputs on forests that have been 
negotiated such as the UNCED forest principles, the IPF and IFF proposals for action 
and the NLBI, are non-legally binding (Humphreys 2005).  
 
Various interpretations of this process are available. An institutional perspective, which 
views policy success or failure on the basis of the effectiveness of norms, conventions, 
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procedures and laws in achieving a desired outcome, suggests that efforts to achieve 
effective forms of global forest governance have failed due to the continued inability of 
states to reach a legally binding international agreement (Humphreys 2005; Dimitrov 
2005). By contrast, ideational, constructivist and interpretive perspectives suggest we are 
seeing a marked change in global forest policy arrangements on the basis of discursive 
changes (Elands & Wiersum 2001; Bengston et. al. 2005; Selby et. al. 2007). Concepts of 
sustainability are now firmly rooted in policy discussions and deforestation and forest 
degradation are now framed in terms of biodiversity loss and climate change, offering 
strong hope for policy innovation, management change and sustainability effects on the 
ground (Arts & Buizer 2009).  
 
Arguably the most significant recent international institutional development for the 
future of forest management though, has occurred via international negotiations on 
another global environmental issue: climate change. In the last few years a global market 
for carbon offsets has been created via the demand for and supply of carbon reductions 
that can be priced and exchanged under either the international climate regime created 
under the Kyoto Protocol or the parallel voluntary market. Under the Protocol, 
provision is made for transfers from Annex 1 (developed) to non-Annex 1 (developing) 
countries in the form of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows 
for the sequestration of emissions from afforestation (the planting of trees on land that 
has no history of forest cover) and reforestation (the planting of trees on land that has 
been previously forested). Crucially though it has no provisions to allow non-Annex 1 
countries to receive credit or payments for avoiding deforestation. Many argue that 
while rewarding afforestation and reforestation is appropriate for most developed 
countries currently experiencing forest stock gain, avoided deforestation seems relevant 
to measure ‘additionality’ in most tropical countries where deforestation is the major 
concern (Barbier & Tesfaw 2012, Adhikari 2009, Wunder 2006).  
 
Accordingly, at the Bali Conference of Parties (COP13) at the end of 2007, countries 
agreed to create a mechanism for ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and 
Degradation’ (REDD) as a potential component of a post 2012 climate change regime. 
The following year, inspired by concerns that focusing exclusively on deforestation and 
degradation could encourage bad behaviour, a ‘+’ was added to denote the inclusion of 
the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest 
carbon stocks (Cronkletin et. al. 2011). The UN-REDD+ Programme became 
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operational in September 2008 with a US$75 million budget and potential funding of 
US$4 billion. It currently supports countries in two ways: via direct support to the design 
and implementation of UN-REDD National Programmes and via complementary 
support to national REDD+ action through common approaches, analyses, 
methodologies, tools, data and best practices. As of July 2012 total funding for these two 
streams of support totalled US$117.6 million (UN-REDD+ 2012).  
 
However, there is considerable controversy surrounding current proposals for REDD+. 
A central question is whether forest conservation should be financed through a market 
based trading system for forest carbon credits (based on the current CDM model), 
through a separate fund drawn from either dedicated tax revenues, proceeds from GHG 
emission allowance auctions, voluntary government contributions or via a combination 
of all of these (Bosetti 2009). The current consensus seems to be that the qualified 
success of carbon trading platforms like the European Union Emissions Trading System 
(EU-ETS) demonstrates the feasibility of relying on market based ﬁnancing approaches 
(Lu & Liu 2012). There are also serious concerns around how REDD+ would actually 
work. Recent research by Romijn et. al. (2012) for example, reveals that the majority of 
non-Annex 1 countries have insufficient means to monitor their forest cover and carbon 
stock. In general capacities are less well established for carbon stock measurement than 
for measuring forest area change.  
 
Developing countries are also concerned about sovereignty issues, fearing that allowing 
credits for avoided deforestation could result in the ‘buying up’ of their forests, thereby 
constraining their economic growth and development goals (Phelps et. al. 2010). Other 
research has pointed out that the success of REDD+ will depend on compensation 
terms and forest tenure (Westholm et. al. 2011; Barbier & Tesfaw 2012). The fact that 
REDD+ activities are likely to be led by governments means that decisions about how 
local communities will be involved remain within the purview of the central state. Even 
when national governments choose to involve local communities, REDD+ schemes are 
therefore likely to be regulated by national rather than customary law, which may impact 
significantly the extent to which customary tenure systems are recognized and protected 
under national legislation (Barbier & Tesfaw 2012; Cotula & Mayers 2009). Where 
tenure security over forest is weak, REDD+ can pose a risk for forest communities, who 
could be dispossessed, excluded and marginalised (Barbier & Tesfaw 2012; Sandbrook 
et. al. 2010). Finally, there are concerns that REDD+ will not encompass broad ranges 
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of desired outcomes. For example, many have warned that a carbon market for avoided 
deforestation may adversely impact biodiversity and other forest ecosystem services 
(Phelps et. al. 2011). There are also concerns that the focus on tropical forests or 
peatlands, which tend to hold the most carbon, ignore the importance of the ecosystem 
services provided by wetlands and other types of forest. Accordingly, while avoided 
deforestation offers a unique opportunity for mitigating the effects of climate change, 
achieving it on the scale required is likely to be an untidy and difficult business. 
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Type of explanation Structural cause Description 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
FACTORS 
Population 
growth and 
density 
Overall impact determined by interaction with other 
factors. Empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
Migration 
patterns 
Overall impact determined by interaction with other 
factors. Empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
ECONOMIC 
FACTORS 
Income growth 
Overall impact determined by interaction with other 
factors. EKC literature suggests ‘forest transition’ past 
certain levels of income. Empirical evidence is lacking. 
Economic 
liberalisation 
Direct effect via the improvement of returns to conversion 
of forested lands without producing a counteracting 
mitigating effect. Indirect effect via changes to government 
debt, exchange rates and trade balances. Empirical 
evidence is inconclusive. 
Poverty 
Direct effect on deforestation due to use of forests as 
‘safety net’. Causality runs from the poor to forest 
dependence. Empirical evidence confirms this. 
Trade and 
investment 
Direct effect on deforestation via the outsourcing of 
environmental degradation to multinational companies. 
Empirical evidence confirms this. 
GOVERNANCE  
FACTORS 
Political regimes 
Effect is unclear. Both authoritarian and democratic 
regimes supposed to improve environmental outcomes. 
Empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
Land tenure and 
property rights 
Direct effect via the creation of incentives to conserve 
forests for long term sustainability. Quality of institutions 
and strength of rule of law determines overall impact. 
Empirical evidence confirms this. 
Participatory 
forms of forest 
governance 
Devolution of forest governance to communities results in 
greater forest conservation. Empirical evidence confirms 
this. 
International 
institutions 
Effect is unclear. REDD+ is potentially significant for 
forests however, there are significant concerns over 
monitoring, sovereignty and impact on communities. 
Empirical evidence is inconclusive. 
 
Table 6: A summary of the literature on structural causes of deforestation  
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Conclusion 
 
First impressions of this literature suggest a large array of different causal patterns. The 
sheer volume can be quite overwhelming. In designing a comprehensive analysis, there 
may be as many as 20 to 30 distinct factors which could be factored as potential variables. 
One of the major challenges for the scholar therefore, is to create an appropriate 
conceptual framework. In this review, I have categorised the different structural causes 
of deforestation under the headings of demographic, economic and governance factors. 
These are summarised in Table 1, on the preceding page. However, I have created this 
summary with the full knowledge that many of these factors tend to operate in messy and 
complicated ways, and may fall under more than one category. This is why it is important 
to make sure that each category of causes is not analysed in isolation.  
 
I am also aware that there is more than one way to conceptualise this problem – others, 
such as Geist & Lambin (2001) for example, have covered the role of technology related 
factors such as agrotechnological change, applications in the wood sector and 
agricultural production factors. However, I have chosen not to include technology 
factors in this analysis for two key reasons. The first is that I consider them to be a 
component of factors that have already been included in this conceptual analysis, such as 
agricultural intensification or ecological modernisation. This is not to say that 
technological change does not have an impact on forests. Rather, I would argue that it is 
more likely to do so as a result of changes to deeper, underlying socio-economic 
conditions. In this sense, technological change can be thought of as endogenous to this 
particular conceptual model. 
 
The second reason for not including technology as a potential structural cause of 
deforestation in this model is that for most of the miombo countries, the proximate 
causes of deforestation require only very basic technologies. For example, as I show in 
Chapter 4, most deforestation in Zambia and Mozmabique is the result of subsistence 
style agriculture, clearance of forests for charcoal using hand tools, and the setting of 
fires. All of these activities require little technological input, and the methods have 
remained largely unchanged for the last 50-100 years. In this sense, technology (or the 
lack of it) can be thought of more appropriately as a function of economic development 
in these countries, rather than as an independent factor in its own right. This means that 
not only is technology difficult to isolate as an explanatory variable, but it also has a 
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minimal effect in the two countries under investigation. It therefore offers little useful 
insight into why these two countries are experiencing different rates of deforestation. 
 
Keeping all of these caveats in mind, there are some important lessons to take away. The 
first is that our intuitions about deforestation are no guide for what happens in reality. 
For example, the link between population growth and natural resource degradation 
seems to be an obvious one. Yet as this literature review has shown it does not always 
necessarily result in deforestation and in some cases, may reduce it. Similarly, even a 
cursory investigation shows that romanticised notions of sylvan, nature communing, local 
communities bear little resemblance to the realities of daily life for most people that rely 
on forests for their livelihoods. Local forest users are just as likely to behave in short 
term and unsustainable fashions as the shareholders of logging companies or urban 
consumers. This depends of course, upon the context in which those decisions are made. 
In trying to understand and properly diagnose the structural causes of deforestation in 
developing countries at both the national and sub-national levels, the analyst therefore 
needs to go beyond lazy characterisations or generalisations and avoid relying on 
popular knowledge or intuition.  
 
The second lesson is that the analyst cannot simply take large scale demographic, 
economic and political phenomena and predict how these are likely to impact 
deforestation without first taking into account a host of other criteria. In this sense, 
conclusions about the impact of a particular variable are almost always likely to be 
context specific. That said, some general patterns appear to be discernable – population 
growth need not always equal environmental degradation, there is no reason to expect 
that an EKC for deforestation exists, and leaving forest conservation to market forces is 
unlikely to produce sustainable outcomes. Another related lesson is that it is often 
necessary to disaggregate each of the broad causal categories into their respective 
components. Population growth has both rural and urban components, economic factors 
include both domestic and international market forces, and different types of 
institutional arrangements exist at different levels of analysis.  
 
Finally, the common thread running through most of these arguments is that institutions 
appear to mediate both the enabling and constraining effect of population pressures, 
economic growth and markets, defining their impact and generating distinctive policy 
patterns. The existence of certain types of institutional arrangements, such as the strong 
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enforcement of property rights and openness and transparency, appears to partially 
mitigate many of the worst effects of deforestation, while for others, such as global forest 
governance or local common property resource management, the effects are less certain. 
In sum, the literature suggests that deforestation depends not only on structural causes 
such as population growth and income but also, crucially, on governance arrangements 
and the institutional contexts in which they occur. What is clear is that these 
arrangements deserve closer attention when thinking about the design of environmental 
policies affecting the forest sector, and that further empirical work is required in order to 
better understand this aspect of the problem.  
 
In closing, it might be useful to leave off with where this chapter began, by returning 
Jared Diamond’s account of the lost civilisation of Easter Island. At first glance, this 
might appear to be exactly the kind of thinking which this chapter has warned against. 
However, upon closer reading, the message becomes a little clearer. Diamond does not 
suggest that it was uncontrolled population growth or a finite supply of resources alone 
that spelled the demise of the Easter Islanders, but rather, the effects of these factors in 
conjunction with their societal practice of inter-tribal warfare and their inability to 
recognise this problem and solve it in time to save both their forests, and eventually, 
themselves. It is a lesson that serves as a timely reminder to those concerned with the 
causes and consequences of deforestation in the modern era.  
 
  
Figure 9: Railway between Beira and Inhaminga, Sofala Province, Mozambique. Image by author.
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3 
Methodology 
 
 
“Always watch where you are going. Otherwise, you may 
step on a piece of the Forest that was left out by mistake.” 
 
Winnie the Pooh 
 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis I identified a crucial yet relatively ignored 
environmental problem: the miombo woodlands of southern Africa, in spite of their 
value as a unique ecological area and as an economic resource, are disappearing at an 
unprecedented rate. Until now research into this phenomenon has failed to adequately 
specify the structural causes of this problem. Accordingly I established the identification 
of these structural causes as the central task of this thesis, and defined the key concepts 
and the key terms of the study. In the second chapter, I went on to identify a few 
potential answers to the question of what drives deforestation in the miombo woodlands, 
based on existing theories and empirical research in other countries and regions around 
the world. I divided these answers into what I called economic, demographic and 
governance factors, and suggested that amongst them governance was likely to be the 
key to answering the study’s central question.  
 
In this chapter I turn to the task of explaining how I carried out the actual investigation. 
I begin by making the case for employing a comparative approach to the problem. I 
suggest that, in spite of some well known drawbacks, the comparative approach offers 
the best way to achieve both analytical rigour and detailed, case study specific insights. 
This makes it possible to provide answers to the question of what drives deforestation at 
both the case (i.e. national) level and regional level, and adds to the general literature on 
drivers of environmental degradation. I then justify the choice of Zambia and 
Mozambique as the two country case studies, establishing the analytical framework and 
the choice of independent and dependent variables on which this study focuses. I explain 
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why comparing the records of each of these countries offers some possible insights into 
why certain economic, demographic and governance factors are likely to have a greater 
effect on deforestation than others, and make clear the assumptions on which the 
required comparative logic is based. Finally, I describe the actual research design, 
showing how the fieldwork was carried out and how I acquired the necessary quantitative 
and qualitative data. 
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Choice of methodological approach 
 
Methodological approaches to problems in social sciences are generally divided into one of 
three main categories – statistical, case study or comparative approaches. There are long 
standing debates about the particular merits of each, usually corresponding to the 
participant’s preference for quantitative or qualitative analysis. In statistical approaches 
many cases are studied, with the focus on a limited number of variables which are 
abstracted and partially removed from the context of the case studies as a means of 
simplifying assumptions. This method employs formal hypotheses stating universal 
relationships, makes use of operational definitions and places an emphasis on quantitative 
data obtained by means of measurement and the use of instruments. These techniques 
therefore reflect an underlying positivist ontology and epistemology (Faure 1994). By 
contrast, in case oriented studies a single country or a small number of countries is studied, 
with the focus on an individual case in its historical specificity and taking into account the 
total configuration or constellation of factors and conditions. The case is an entity which is 
thoroughly studied once but in which there is no variation in dependent and independent 
variables during the period of investigation. This embrace of complexity and the use of 
‘thick description’ rather than statistics in case oriented studies reflect a greater affinity for 
qualitative interpretations of social science problems (Lor 2014).  
 
The comparative approach is arguably a ‘third way,’ between the statistical method and 
case study based approaches, since it employs the experimental logic of the former in 
conjunction with the qualitative insights generated by the latter. This is the approach 
adopted by this project. Some authors (e.g. Lijphart 1971; 1975) refer to the technique as 
‘the comparative method’ or the ‘comparative cases strategy.’ Smelser (1976) refers to it as 
the ‘method of systematic comparative illustration’ while Ragin (1987) calls it the ‘case 
oriented comparative method.’ It has a rich pedigree, dating back to classic studies by 
Skocpol (1979) on social revolutions and Weber (1930) on the role of the Protestant ethic 
in the development of capitalism. The number of cases is usually small – at least two and 
not usually more than five or six. The deciding factor however is not the number of 
countries but the method of analysis, first outlined by John Stuart Mill in A System of 
Logic (1843).  
 
Mill described how techniques approximating the scientific method could be employed by 
social scientists to infer the existence or absence of causality through correlation between a 
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dependent variable and an independent variable across a small number of cases of social 
phenomena. When the cases have the same outcome, it is assumed that the independent 
variable will be the same for all cases, with each of the other variables having some 
variability across cases. This was what Mill called ‘the Method of Agreement.’ Its corollary, 
‘the Method of Difference,’ sets up the research in such a way as to explore whether two or 
more cases differ on an independent variable and on a dependent variable while being 
similar on at least several other relevant independent variables. When the cases differ in 
outcomes, then it is assumed that the independent variable will have some degree of 
correlation with the dependent variable, with all other correlations having lower values.  
 
Critics have argued that attempts to draw general conclusions from the kind of intensive 
analysis of one or a few cases employed by the comparative approach are flawed by various 
problems of selection bias, lack of systematic procedures and inattention to rival 
explanations (for example, Achen & Snidal 1989; Geddes 1990; King et. al 1994). These 
criticisms stem from the assumption that “every branch of inquiry... if it is not strictly 
controlled experimentation, has the essential logical function of experiment in inquiry” 
(Nagel 1971: 452). Since the comparative method employs too few cases for proper 
experimental control, it is nothing but a poor approximation of more sophisticated 
statistical analyses (Jackman 1985). Important differences among cases can almost always 
be identified, and these emerge as possible rival explanations.  
 
Lijphart (1971: 685) succinctly identifies this as the problem of “many variables, small 
number of cases.” The prospective researcher may argue that a particular rival variable is 
an implausible influence, and justify this with reference to theory or results from previous 
cases, but this does not suffice as empirical proof. Some degree of covariance between a 
rival explanatory variable and the outcome therefore requires the juxtaposition of 
alternative ‘similar’ cases or conducting more detailed ‘within case’ analysis (King et. al. 
1994; Collier 1999). Even this may not be enough; as Meckstroth (1975: 134) observes, 
“the basic problem is that the comparative method, as derivative of Mill's methods, 
provides no criteria to select among the limitless supply of attributes that might be 
introduced as controls or as explanations for any given phenomenon. Thus, all possibilities 
are equally relevant as far as the method is concerned, and, as long as an endless variety of 
possibilities must be considered, the method cannot justify conclusive statements about 
explanatory relationships.”  
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Another problem, raised by Lieberson (1991) is that those utilising the comparative 
approach tend to avoid probabilistic thinking either in theory or in empirical 
applications. This is because in contrast to the probabilistic techniques of statistical 
analysis required by large-N studies, they attempt to identify causal configurations that 
necessarily (rather than probably) combine to produce a particular outcome. This 
requires very strong and therefore often unrealistic assumptions – a deterministic set of 
forces, the existence of only one cause, the absence of interaction effects, confidence that 
all possible causes are measured, the absence of measurement errors and the assumption 
that the same clean pattern would occur if data were obtained for all relevant cases.  
 
In reply, qualitatively oriented scholars have argued there are far greater flaws inherent 
in statistical approaches, most notably Sartori’s (1970) powerful warnings against the 
problems of conceptual travelling (the application of concepts to new cases) and 
conceptual stretching (the distortion that occurs when a concept does not fit the new 
cases). Quantitative analysis can therefore identify general propositions that hold 
reasonably well across a range of cases, but often fail to explain any particular case well. 
More recently a number of scholars have also argued that the traditional view that 
qualitative research cannot identify causal relationships is based on a restrictive and 
philosophically outdated concept of causality (e.g., Shadish et. al. 2002; Maxwell 2004b; 
Lieberson 2005). They suggest that causality should be thought of instead in terms of 
processes and mechanisms, rather than simply demonstrating regularities in the 
relationships between variables (Maxwell 2004a). Deriving causal explanations from a 
qualitative study is not an easy or straightforward task, but qualitative research is not 
different from quantitative research in this respect. Both approaches need to identify 
and deal with the plausible validity threats to any proposed causal explanation. A major 
strength of qualitative studies is therefore their ability to get at the processes that lead to 
these outcomes, processes that experimental and survey research are often poor at 
identifying.  
 
However, qualitative analysis in the form of single, in depth case studies, while good for 
generating hypotheses and locating causal mechanisms, is weak on external validity and 
specifying causal effects (Gerring 2007). Consider for example questions regarding 
institutional arrangements for environmental governance. Are sanctions always more 
effective at inducing behavioral change than rewards and, if not, under what conditions 
are rewards more effective? Are pollution problems, on average, more difficult or easier 
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to resolve than wildlife preservation problems? Do demands for new behaviors generally 
work better or worse than bans on existing behavior? As Mitchell (2002: 58-59) points 
out, such questions are difficult to answer convincingly with single cases, because most 
institutional arrangements do not employ both sanctions and rewards, address both 
pollution and wildlife problems, or both ban some behaviors and require others.  
 
Accordingly, single case studies may generate compelling findings that the case studied 
quite well but in doing so, sacrifice the ability to map those findings to other cases. In 
this sense, the comparative approach offers advantages since it allows for a controlled 
case comparison as an approximation to the logic of experiment, while including rich and 
detailed case studies which can be considered as insight generating on their own terms. 
The researcher is able to study the selected country cases in depth and is closer to the 
data, so the problems of comparability and concept stretching are alleviated; appropriate 
countries can be chosen and richer, multidimensional, less abstract concepts can be 
employed. Furthermore, “considerable attention can be paid to unravelling complex 
relationships including relationships of multiple and conjunctural causation within each 
country and over time” (Lor 2014: 14).  
 
In this sense, comparative analysis can help the researcher move along the spectrum 
from statements of possibility towards statements of probability. It offers the potential to 
replace claims that “this strategy worked in this historical case” with more convincing 
policy relevant and contingent prescriptions of which strategy is likely to work best to 
address a given problem under given conditions. This advantage of the comparative 
approach is explained by Ragin (1987: 35) as follows: “The goals of case oriented 
investigation often are both historically interpretive and causally analytic. Interpretive 
work attempts to account for significant historical outcomes or sets of comparable 
outcomes or processes by piecing evidence together in a manner sensitive to historical 
chronology and offering limited historical generalisations which are sensitive to context. 
Thus, comparativists who use case oriented strategies often want to understand or 
interpret specific cases because of their intrinsic value (…). The companion goal is to 
produce limited generalisations concerning the causes of theoretically defined categories 
of empirical phenomena common to a set of cases.” 
 
The choice to employ the comparative approach in this thesis was therefore taken 
because it picks out a path through what Evans (1996: 4) calls the ‘eclectic, messy center’ 
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in the methodological field, located between the alternatives of general theory and deep 
immersion in specific cases. This revised interpretation of Mill’s technique delivers 
powerful advantages. Contrasting cases adds confirmation that comes from observing 
differences in the causes that cannot be observed in single case studies. The deliberate 
selection of cases that match in other relevant respects eliminates threats to the 
inference’s validity that would often be present without this design. A multiple case study 
designed this way is more convincing than many single case studies and many studies of 
multiple cases selected without regard to theory, yet is still able to deliver the payoffs of 
the case study that are lacking in statistical studies. 
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The comparative logic of this study 
 
Much of the existing literature on drivers of deforestation suffers from methodological 
drawbacks. The statistical methods employed by macro level, quantitative studies for 
example, are often suspect; they mix proximate causes and structural causes in their 
independent variables and raise potential statistical problems of multicollinearity and 
biased estimates, distorting the interpretation of cause and effect (Rudel & Roper 1997; 
Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Geist & Lambin 2001). Moreover, in order to produce 
meaningful cross country results, structural causes are assumed to affect deforestation in 
the same manner across countries. This is obviously a strong assumption because studies 
indicate that the effect of and interaction between demographic, economic and 
governance related factors may differ greatly from one country to the next (Kaimowitz & 
Angelsen 1999: 81).  
 
That said, local level case studies, while having the virtue of pointing to clearer policy 
directions, tend to lack a sense of proportion. A study on say, the growing demand for 
forest resources in the Copperbelt of Zambia may contain some more generalisable 
lessons for policymakers at national or possibly regional level, but does not take into 
account the full range of structural causal factors, as well as the various geographical and 
historical contexts involved (Rudel 2005: 20). Accordingly, analysis in this thesis takes 
place at the country level, in line with the orientation of most comparative social science 
towards what Ragin (1987: 3) calls ‘large macrosocial units.’ The task of the 
comparativist is to try and identify the similarities and differences amongst these units in 
order to try and understand, explain and interpret diverse outcomes. These similarities 
and differences constitute “the most significant and easily identifiable features of the 
social landscape,” (ibid: 6) hence the preference in this study for national level 
explanations that cite macrosocial phenomena.  
 
Unlike in statistical studies, which employ sampling, the cases themselves are carefully 
selected for the purpose of the study. A number of factors come into play when 
considering this. It is intuitively obvious that there is little point in comparing entities 
that are so different that hardly any commonality can be found. Neither would it be 
useful to compare entities that are so similar that little difference of interest can be 
found. Instead, when cases are selected for comparison, they should be comparable in 
respect of the phenomenon or theory that is of primary interest in the study. Sartori 
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(1991: 246) has stated that the entities to be compared should have both shared and non-
shared attributes. They should be at the same time ‘similar’ and ‘incomparable.’  
 
With these criteria in mind, two countries, Zambia and Mozambique, appear as likely 
candidates for comparison. Geographically, they are of a similar size – Zambia's total 
land area is 753,000 km² and Mozambique's is 801,600 km². This makes them the 39th 
and 36th largest countries in the world respectively. As neighbours on roughly the same 
latitudes they have similar ecological and climatic characteristics, and share a major 
southern African river system, the Zambezi. They have similar, tropical climates, with 
the wet season beginning in October/November and the dry season in March/April, and 
temperatures averaging between 10°C and 25°C in winter and 18°C and 30°C during 
summer. Each of them has large expanses of forest, covering an area of 49.9 million 
hectares in Zambia (66 per cent of the country), and 40.6 million hectares in 
Mozambique (51 per cent of the country). In both countries, miombo is the predominant 
forest type. This makes them key members of the miombo eco-region.  
 
The two countries also share a number of socio-economic characteristics. Both belong to 
a select cluster of African countries that made the transition to democratic rule in the 
early 1990s. Until November 1990, Mozambique was formally a socialist one party state 
ruled by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO). During the 1980s it suffered 
one of the most protracted and devastating wars on the continent, claiming the lives of 
one million people and displacing more than six million. As early as 1983 however, the 
government began to introduce various political reforms aimed at transforming the 
country into a more pluralistic society. Those efforts culminated in the enactment of a 
new constitution in November 1990 which provided for a multiparty political system, a 
market based economy and free elections. In 1992 a General Peace Accord was signed 
and in 1994, after the enactment of constitutional guarantees for a multiparty political 
system, successful elections were held. FRELIMO retained government control and the 
former rebel movement, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO) became the 
main opposition party. Since then four general elections have taken place, most recently 
in 2009, with FRELIMO retaining control in each one.  
 
Zambia made a similar political transition in 1991 following a series of economic crises 
and protests against the state during the 1980s. Economic grievances were channelled 
into political demands for multi-party democracy, resulting in a peaceful transfer of 
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power from the incumbent party, the United National Independence Party (UNIP), to 
the cross ethnic pro-democracy movement, the Movement for Multiparty Democracy 
(MMD). Since then, Zambia has held four multi-party parliamentary and five 
presidential elections, most recently in 2011 when the main opposition party, the 
Patriotic Front (PF), staged the first change of government since the MMD gained 
power in 1991. This places Zambia amongst a select group of African multi-party 
systems along with Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana, Madagascar, Mali and Mauritius that 
have experienced two peaceful electoral turnovers, thus qualifying as a consolidated 
democracy under result oriented minimalist definitions such as Przeworski’s (1991) 
definition of democracy as uncertainty of outcome and Huntington’s (1991: 267) 
definition of democracy being consolidated when an incumbent has lost power twice 
through competitive elections. 
 
In both Zambia and Mozambique, democratisation was accompanied by macroeconomic 
stabilisation, the privatisation of state assets, public sector reform, agricultural reforms, 
the lifting of trade barriers and de-regulation of the financial sector. The result was an 
almost overnight transformation from predominantly socialist systems of central 
planning and control to market oriented private sector driven economies. Mozambique 
experienced a subsequent economic take off, with the average real GDP growth rate 
soaring from 0 per cent (1981–1992) to 8.1 per cent (1993–2008), making it the fastest 
growing non-oil economy in sub-Saharan Africa over the period (AfDB 2009). Good 
macroeconomic management also attracted substantial foreign direct investment (FDI), 
with inflows increasing from an average of 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1993–98 to an average 
of 5.2 per cent of GDP in 1999–2010 (Nucifora & Pereria da Silva 2011). As a result, per 
capita GDP has trebled since 1992 and the poverty headcount fell from 69 per cent in 
1996 to 54 per cent in 2002 (Thurlow & Wobst 2004).  
 
In Zambia the initial results of the reforms were not as spectacular, thanks largely to 
fluctuating world prices of its main export, copper (World Bank 2004). However, since 
1999, economic growth has been on an upwards trajectory, averaging more than seven 
per cent GDP growth per annum, the longest uninterrupted growth period since 
independence (IFAD 2011). In 2006, inflation was brought down to single figures for the 
first time in history, enabling the government to reach the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) completion point, and resulting in the cancellation of most foreign 
debt. Today the country has a growing trade surplus, increasing foreign exchange 
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reserves and an exceptionally low level of public debt.  
 
Despite high levels of recent economic growth though, the economies of Zambia and 
Mozambique remain largely dependent on subsistence agriculture, resource extraction 
and a few isolated mega projects. In Mozambique, agriculture accounts for 25 per cent of 
GDP, around 75 per cent of total employment, and is the main source of income for over 
80 per cent of the population (World Bank 2011). It is followed by manufacturing (12 
per cent), trade and retail services (11 per cent), transport and communications (10 per 
cent), financial services (seven per cent) and extractive industries (one per cent). Zambia 
has a similar economic structure. Agriculture accounts for about 17 per cent of GDP and 
70 per cent of employment, while manufacturing adds 18 per cent to GDP, and services 
about 60 per cent (Green 2009). Mining exports centred on copper account for 70 per 
cent of the total value of exports and around six per cent of GDP (ZDA 2011). 
 
Critics argue that Zambia and Mozambique’s failure to transform the structural nature 
of their economies is the result of development strategies driven by the demands of 
foreign investors, in conjunction with local elites with strong ties to the ruling apparatus. 
This has resulted in the promotion of large scale industrial and resource extraction 
projects via tax holidays, changes to mining and labour codes and the waiving of 
environmental regulations. However, these foreign owned, capital intensive, export 
oriented companies make only a small contribution to job creation, tax revenue, use of 
domestic intermediate inputs and profit reinvestment (Nucifora & Pereria da Silva 
2011). Instead of royalties and taxes from those projects being employed to benefit 
surrounding communities and to underpin a broad range of social and redistributive 
programmes, they have been established in a way that negates the possibility of any kind 
of nationalist or developmental state emerging (Saul 2011).  
 
Moreover, despite their strong growth rates, Zambia and Mozambique continue to 
remain heavily dependent on foreign aid, further weakening the ability of their 
governments to chart an independent developmental path. Mozambique is widely 
recognised as a ‘donors darling’ thanks to its compliance with International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) and World Bank economic policy prescriptions. Since 1993, aid inflows have 
remained fairly constant as a percentage of GDP, at an average of around 14 per cent of 
GDP a year, financing investments in education and health and substantial investments 
in rebuilding the country’s infrastructure. Between 1992 and 1999, the average aid given 
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to Mozambique stood at US$1.36 billion per year, and between 2000 and 2010, grew to 
US$1.54 billion per year. In 2009, Mozambique recorded total ODA of over US$2 
billion, an all time high, substantiating the view that the country has become structurally 
dependent on aid (Phiri 2012). 
 
Zambia has received similarly high level of aid. Between 2000 and 2010 average ODA 
per capita was US$86, higher than the equivalent figure of US$74 in Mozambique during 
the same period (OECD 2012). However, aid flows have tended to fluctuate due to 
differences in the government’s economic governance performance. This has led some 
observers to conclude that an economic liberalisation agenda has been maintained and 
has progressed due to persistent donor support and conditionality (Wohlgemuth & 
Saasa 2008; OPM 2010). The importance of aid in Zambia is also revealed by its 
contribution to the government budget between 2000 and 2005, when it accounted for an 
average of 43 per cent of the total. Since then however, its contribution has dropped to 
around 30 per cent of the budget in 2007, and to just over 20 per cent of the budget in 
2011 (Faust et. al. 2012).  
 
In both countries the ruling parties have also been heavily criticised for not supplying the 
kinds of socioeconomic benefits demanded by citizens (Cuanguara & Hanlon 2010; 
Hanlon 2010). Mozambique still ranks as one of the poorest countries in the world, with 
over 70 per cent of the population living on less than US$1 a day, and lacking basic 
services such as clean water supplies and access to health facilities and schools (World 
Bank 2011). Since 2002, poverty reduction has stalled, and in the UN's latest Human 
Development Index, Mozambique ranks 184th of 187 above only Burundi, the Niger and 
the DRC (UN 2011). In Zambia, although overall rates of poverty fell between 1998 and 
2006, gains have recently stalled, and in some rural areas have been reversed (Phiri 
2012). Its HDI ranking is slightly better than Mozambique's but actually experienced a 
fall in value until 1999, thanks to the elimination of food subsidies and free social 
services, and has improved only slightly since then. More than 60 per cent of the 
population still lives on less than US$1 a day.  
 
The two countries also fare poorly on indicators of inclusive concepts of democratic 
consolidation such as a viable and competitive party system, respect for and efficacy of 
key institutions, accountability to citizens, and tolerance of participation by the media 
and civil society in the political process (Gyimah-Boadi 2004; Bogaards 2007). In 
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Zambia, two decades of multi-party rule under the leadership of the MMD has been 
marked by the failure of institutional reforms to counter state malpractice and corruption. 
Repeated attempts to reform the constitutional rules that would have allowed more 
autonomy for the electoral commission, parliament and media have failed, resulting in 
continued gaps in accountability and the growing concentration of power in the executive 
office (Rakner & van de Walle 2009; Rakner 2012). Similarly in Mozambique, there is a 
lack of entrenched democratic culture amongst elected public representatives, and few 
civil society organisations are involved in formal and informal accountability mechanisms. 
Governance remains rooted in a top down centralist model resulting in the politicisation of 
local consultative forums, a lack of linkages between community based organisations, 
citizens and government decision making structures, and a lack of political commitment to 
accountability (Phiri 2012).  
 
Accordingly, on many of the measures predicted to have an impact on rates of 
deforestation, Zambia and Mozambique appear to be roughly similar. They are of a 
similar size, share similar types of climate and vegetation and are both heavily forested. 
Their demographic makeup is roughly similar, and the population of both countries is 
predominately rural. Both have experienced similar rates of population growth and similar 
patterns of rural-urban migration during the last 20 years. Both also underwent transitions 
to multiparty democracy and rapid economic liberalisation in the early 1990s, and since 
then have experienced strong economic growth. However, their economies continue to be 
dominated by smallholder agriculture, and despite some noticeable advances in poverty 
reduction, the majority of their citizens still live on less than US$1 a day. Both countries 
also continue to rely heavily on donor assistance and policy prescriptions.  
 
Following many of the standard predictors of deforestation rates outlined in Chapter Two 
then, we might reasonably expect Zambia and Mozambique to have experienced similar 
levels of deforestation during the last two decades. This is not the case though. Between 
1990 and 2010 total forest cover in Mozambique declined by 5.2 million ha, at an annual 
rate of 0.64 per cent (260,000 ha) per annum. While this is high, placing Mozambique 
amongst the top 40 countries in the world by annual percentage change in forest cover, it is 
still manageable. In Zambia however, total forest cover has declined by 8.5 million ha, at 
an annual rate of 1.24 per cent (425,000 ha) per annum. These rates of loss are nothing less 
than catastrophic, and give Zambia the dubious honour of having the highest rate of 
deforestation in the world for any country with a forest estate greater than 25 million ha 
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(see UN-FAO, 2010).  
 
The difference in these rates of deforestation represent something of a puzzle, particularly 
in light of the two countries’ respective demographic characteristics. Zambia's total 
population in 2010 was 13.04 million, having grown from 9.88 million in 2000 and 7.75 
million in 1990. This gives the country an average population growth rate of 3.41 per cent. 
Rural dwellers made up 61 per cent of the total population in 2010, compared to 65 per 
cent in 2000 and 62 per cent in 1990. In Mozambique, total population in 2007 was 20.64 
million, up from 16.11 million in 1997, and giving it a population growth rate of 2.81 per 
cent. Rural dwellers there made up 70 per cent of the total population in 2007, slightly 
down from 71 per cent in 1997. Thus, while rates of population growth, rural/urban divides 
and migration patterns in each country are roughly the same, Zambia’s population density 
is lower at 17.3 persons/km2 than Mozambique’s at 29.7 persons/km2.  
 
Yet Zambia, despite having a population density that is more than a third lower than 
Mozambique's, has a deforestation rate that is almost twice as high. As the figures in Table 
2 on the following page show, this makes little sense – if anything, a quick comparison 
suggests it should be Mozambique that has the higher rate of deforestation. Admittedly, 
these figures are indicative, and are not meant to replace serious, sustained quantitative 
research. However, they do suggest that explanations which rely primarily on quantitative 
economic and demographic indicators miss out an important part of the picture. In line 
with the governance based explanation outlined in the opening chapter of this thesis, that 
‘missing part’ is likely to be accounted for by the role of governance and institutions.  
 
The problem with governance factors however, is that they are very difficult to measure 
using quantitative indicators. This is why, while the preliminary comparative analysis does 
include some broad institutional arrangements (for example, types of political regime) it 
says very little about others such as corruption, land tenure, legislation or decentralisation. 
There are some resources, such as the Corruption Index or the World Governance Index, 
which do offer a possible way of operationalising governance, but these are relatively 
broad, and unable to capture more specific effects in either the forest sector or related 
sectors. This makes it more difficult to determine the effect of governance and institutions 
on deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique using statistical analysis alone, and is why 
the comparative, case study based approach offers the most appropriate method for 
explaining the apparent discrepancy between each countries’ rates of deforestation.  
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Indicator Zambia Mozambique 
Land area  752 618 km2 799 380 km2 
Forest area 49.9 million ha (2004) 40.6 million ha (2005) 
Population 13.04 million (2010) 23.93 million (2011 est.) 
Population density 17.3 persons/km2 29.7 persons/km2 
Population growth rate 3.41% 2.81% 
GDP (2011) 19.21 billion (2010 US$) 12.80 billion (2010 US$) 
GDP per capita (2011) 1,160 (2010 US$) 470 (2010 US$) 
GDP growth (1990 - 2011) 7.60% 8.16% 
Poverty rate 59.3% (2006) 54.7% (2008) 
External debt (2011) 25.7% 43% 
Net ODI received (1990-2010) 24.2 billion (2010 US$) 35.8 billion (2010 US$) 
Economic Freedom Index (2010) 100 of 179 111 of 179 
Democracy Index (2010) 97 of 167 92 of 167 
Corruption index (2011) 101 of 178 116 of 178 
Human Development Index (2010) 150 of 169 165 of 169 
Deforestation rate (1990-2010) 425,000 ha/annum 260,000 ha/annum 
Annual change in forest cover -1.24% -0.62% 
 
Table 7: Economic, demographic and institutional indicators for Zambia and Mozambique 
Sources: World Bank Development Indicators; Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development Statistics; United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation Global Forest 
Assessment; Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom; Economist Intelligence Unit 
Democracy Index; Transparency International Corruption Index; United Nations Development 
Programme Human Development Index.  
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Research design 
 
The research approach employed by this project is primarily qualitative in nature, and 
based on a combination of interviews and site visits conducted in Zambia and 
Mozambique between January 2011 and July 2011. This is backed up and corroborated 
by a wide range of materials and data, including hard to get institutional data (e.g. 
figures on the de-gazetting of forest reserves), satellite imagery and a vast array of 
documentation and reports from governments and domestic and international NGOs. 
The finished case studies also incorporate articles from domestic and foreign presses, 
and academic literature on politics, economics and natural resource management in each 
country.  
 
The fieldwork was conducted as follows. Three to four months prior to my departure, I 
began building up a database of key individuals and organisations who were either 
involved in, or had specialist knowledge about forestry and forest governance in Zambia 
or Mozambique. I obtained the names of these individuals and organisations through 
government websites, online conference attendance lists, policy and research papers, the 
databases of multinational organisations such as the UN’s FAO and the World Bank, 
and from personal recommendations by colleagues at the London School of Economics. 
Also, throughout the year preceding fieldwork, I regularly consulted online sources of 
news and commentary dealing with Zambia and Mozambique, looking for references to 
environment and natural resources related issues.  
 
These techniques resulted in a list of around 30 to 40 persons in each country who I 
knew were involved in some capacity with forest governance or natural resource 
management. This approach allowed me to (at least temporarily) decide who should be 
interviewed, and which fields of inquiry should be addressed as part of my research. 
However, creating lists of organisations, people and questions did not ensure access to 
the various sources of information needed or to the participants and their field of 
practice. As such, early planning and coordination of sources and materials were the only 
ways of overcoming these problems. Accordingly, two months before arriving in each 
country, I sent an introductory email to each person on my database, personally 
addressed, presenting my research and asking for a possible meeting.  
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I obtained the titles and email addresses for most of these people from conference lists 
or via individual organisational websites. While a number did not reply, I was able to 
arrange interviews with at least 10 to 15 people in each country before I arrived. The 
creation of a database was also extremely useful in gaining an understanding of the 
general structure of the environmental sector in each country, and meant that I was 
already familiar with many of the names of people and organisations that respondents 
mentioned during the course of my interviews. Once I began conducting interviews I 
asked each interviewee for specific further recommendations and referrals. In this way, I 
was able to obtain the names and contact details of a number of other people who had 
not appeared during my online searches. This was particularly important in light of the 
nature of the forest sector in each country, since many people with specialised 
knowledge either have limited access to the internet or do not attend conferences and 
workshops.  
 
I was aware that in larger, more developed countries, this referall technique runs the risk 
of creating sample bias since people are likely to recommend others within their own 
networks who hold similar views on a particular problem. However, in countries like 
Zambia and Mozambique the environmental sector is generally very small, comprising at 
most a few hundred individuals. Accordingly I was assured of obtaining a fairly 
representative sample. Using this approach I was able to conduct 71 interviews in 
Zambia and 53 interviews in Mozambique, lasting an average of one hour, and 
encompassing a diverse range of participants as possible. Respondents included both 
current and former national directors of forestry, country directors of multilateral and 
bilateral donor organisations and heads of departments of academic institutions. I also 
interviewed low and mid-level government employees and local officials in order to 
obtain a full range of views and opinions. A breakdown of the types of participants is 
provided in Table 3 on the following page (for a detailed list of all interviewees please 
see Annex 1). The majority of these interviews were conducted in the capital cities of 
Lusaka and Maputo, while a smaller proportion were conducted in the Copperbelt 
region of Zambia and regional forestry headquarters in Solwezi in Zambia and Beira in 
Mozambique. 
 
My goal over the course of the interviews was to solicit individual opinions on the 
problem of deforestation, and knowledge about the active networks and organisations in 
the forest sector. What I was looking for was an account of how governance had evolved 
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over the previous two decades and how it had impacted (and is still impacting) forests in 
each country. I wanted to know who the responsible agency in government was, what the 
mandate of that agency was, and how effectively they were performing their role – what 
were they doing well, and what were they doing badly, and why? Often these questions 
were very political, since both countries have distinct hierarchical and clientelistic 
political cultures. I also tried to gain an understanding of how high a priority forest 
conservation was for the governments of these countries, and what kinds of policies and 
legislation were in place to achieve this.  
 
As such, formal semi-structured interviews proved to be the most appropriate method of 
engagement. The open ended nature of each interview encouraged conversation and 
allowed for flexibility with respect to unanticipated issues, or in order to tap into the 
experience and insights of respondents (May 1993). My interviewing skills therefore had to 
be flexible enough to accommodate surprises in each conversation. Throughout the 
interviews, I was taking notes either of ideas that were emerging from what the respondent 
was telling me or important points to note when the interview was going in an 
unanticipated direction. The semi-structured format also provided a forum for the 
informants to question me, as the researcher, about my own biases, impressions, 
motivations and intentions. Accordingly, interviews were both “contextual and 
negotiated,” and designed to avoid confirmation bias on my behalf (Charmaz 2006: 27). 
 
Organisation Type Mozambique Zambia 
Academic and research 8 13 
Bilateral donors and embassies 6 6 
Central government 14 11 
Local government 5 6 
International NGOs 7 13 
Local NGOs 4 14 
Private sector 9 8 
Total 53 71 
 
Table 8: Breakdown of respondents by type of organisation 
Source: Table created by author 
 
Before each interview, I informed the interviewee that that their views would not be made 
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public unless I had previously obtained their written consent. I said that, should I wish to 
attribute a direct quote, I would contact them and offer them the opportunity to remain 
anonymous. I also used written notes rather than an audio recorder during interviews, 
since many of the individuals I was interviewing were elites and I was worried that a 
recorder would make the respondent uneasy, too cautious or cause them to give me an 
official line only. I made it clear that interviewees had the right to refuse to answer any of 
the questions and were free to stop the interview at any time. These precautions were 
designed in order validate the subjective experience of my informants, a key ethical 
requirement of the research process (Oakley 1981). 
 
The preparation of my list of questions was made before leaving for fieldwork. In order to 
elicit the ideas, views and opinions of my interviewees, I tactically developed questions in 
order to focus and organise this intended information (Johnstone 2007: 111). I began with 
questions about the individual’s professional background. This served as both an 
‘icebreaker’ and a way to establish each respondent’s area of expertise and credentials. I 
then moved on to questions about rates of deforestation in their country, and about the 
key socio-economic activities that were driving this. This was important in terms of 
gathering data and in terms of ensuring the respondent was aware of the methodological 
distinction between proximate and structural causes of deforestation. The key part of the 
interview was taken up with questions about the structural causes of deforestation. These 
questions were left open-ended, in order to allow respondents to emphasise whether they 
thought these were the result of either demographic, economic or governance-related 
factors. I also asked about whether the respondent thought any of those drivers had 
changed over time. The final part of the interview was left open in order to follow any 
interesting lines of enquiry, or to confirm any earlier statements. 
 
In addition to conducting interviews, I made four individual trip to deforestation 
‘hotspots.’ These were places that had been recommended to me by individuals during the 
course of my interviews. In March 2011 I visited the city of Ndola, where I interviewed a 
number of academics and experts from the Copperbelt University, home to Zambia’s most 
renowned forest research institute. Following this, I spent six days in Solwezi, in the far 
north west of Zambia. This part of the country is home to the largest unbroken expanse of 
miombo forests in southern Africa, and gave me a chance to see miombo in its pristine 
state. However, in recent years, there has been some significant isolated examples of 
deforestation due to new settlements, especially in and around two major mines in the 
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province, the Kansanshi Mine and Lumwana Mine.  
 
In April 2011, I visited the town of Mpika in north east Zambia. This area is one of 
Lusaka’s main sources of charcoal supply and has experienced significant deforestation. A 
number of forest reserves are now so badly degraded that they have been de-gazetted by 
the government. Nevertheless there are still some isolated patches of pristine miombo in 
some of the more remote areas. I spent a number of days there with officials from the local 
forest services, and accompanied them on a series of patrols. This trip also allowed me to 
witness first hand the effects of the charcoal trade in action, since Mpika lies on one of the 
country’s main transportation routes, linking Lusaka to Tanzania, the DRC and Kenya in 
the north, and Zimbabwe and Botswana in the south.  
 
In June 2011 I visited the city of Beira, home to the former headquarters of Mozambique’s 
forestry and wildlife services. Deforestation in this area during the last 20 years has been 
rampant, especially in and around the peri-urban outskirts of the city. The area is also home 
to some of the country’s largest forest plantations and commercial logging companies. There 
have been significant concerns in recent years about illegal logging in the area, and the Beira 
port has been identified in a number of reports as a key transit point for foreign companies 
shipping unregistered timber products overseas. Following a week in Beira, I spent three 
days in the nearby Gorongosa National Park. This area has seen the implementation of a 
number of CBNRM programs in recent years, and the forests there are in good condition. I 
also spent two days visiting the forestry service headquarters in the nearby town of Chimoio, 
and a conservation project site in the Chimanimani National Park, two hours south.  
 
These field visits, in addition to providing what Brady, Collier and Seawright (2004) describe 
as ‘data set observations’ which generate scores on independent and dependent variables, 
provided me with the opportunity to make ‘causal process observations,’ which shed light on 
the relationships amongst the independent variables and between these variables and the 
dependent variable. The active engagement of people, places and contexts also allowed me 
to carry out reality checks on many of the answers provided by respondents during my 
interviews. More generally, the fieldwork portion of this research project allowed me to 
either confirm or debunk hypotheses generated during the development of the conceptual 
analysis, and allowed for contextual and discursive insights that might not have been 
available via more generalised macro level approaches. Finally, the fieldwork provided me 
with an opportunity to determine whether my findings had any broader relevance for the 
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societies under investigation. 
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Figure 11: Sites visited during fieldwork in Mozambique 
iSource: Mappery.com 
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4 
Rates and Proximate Causes of 
Deforestation in Zambia and 
Mozambique 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I present some of the key findings from my fieldwork. In the first part, I 
look more closely at the existing data on rates of deforestation in Zambia and 
Mozambique – the key variable which this study is trying to explain. Much of this data is 
either inaccurate or unreliable, and research in this area has generally been plagued by a 
failure to properly investigate the origin of widely accepted figures. Zambia for example, 
is often cited as a country with the world's second highest rate of deforestation, an error 
resulting from methodological mistakes made during a series of provincial forest 
assessments in the late 1990s. Similarly, data on deforestation in Mozambique from a 
recent 2007 national inventory is based on simplified and highly unreliable models 
linking population growth to environmental degradation. Despite this, these figures are 
widely cited and reported without any caveats in a number of reports and policy 
documents in national and international fora. 
 
These potential inaccuracies are a crucial consideration for this research, since much of 
the comparative logic behind the choices of Zambia and Mozambique as case studies 
hinges on their different rates of deforestation during the period in question. If it turned 
out the data on the dependent variable in either case was incorrect, and that these 
countries had for example, experienced similar levels of deforestation, faced with similar 
economic and demographic pressures, but in different institutional contexts, it would 
make it very difficult to claim that governance was the most important determinant of 
difference. During the course of the research it was important therefore, to establish the 
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most accurate possible figures on rates of deforestation and to include any assumptions 
or caveats that may have compromised their validity.  
 
In the second part of the chapter I present my findings on the proximate causes of 
deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique. While the focus of the research is on trying 
to understand the structural causes of deforestation in each country, it is impossible to 
do so without first knowing what activities are causing forest loss in the first place. Large 
scale agricultural expansion and illegal logging for example, may be the result of very 
different structural conditions, or they may be the result of very similar ones. However, 
there is little point in attempting to make this distinction unless we have more 
information on the nature and magnitude of those activities in the first place. An 
empirical account of the different proximate causes of forest loss in Zambia and 
Mozambique provides analytical clarity as well as being insight generating and valuable 
in its own right. Crucially, I make the argument that the proximate causes of 
deforestation in both countries are relatively similar. This makes it possible to 
subsequently conduct a useful comparison of different structural causes in Chapters Five 
and Six.  
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Rates of deforestation  
 
Obtaining accurate data for deforestation rates is notoriously difficult. At the macro 
level, large-N, cross country studies usually derive measures of levels of deforestation 
from the Forest Resource Assessments (FRAs) of the UN’s FAO. This data has a 
number of serious shortcomings. FRA definitions of what constitutes a ‘forest’ has 
changed over the course of successive reports and the quality of the data is suspect, since 
it relies on individual member reporting. As Grainger (2007) has shown, these figures 
are often so unreliable as to be almost meaningless; while they can be used to 
extrapolate certain patterns, there are serious drawbacks to using actual data values for 
serious, sustained scientific research.  
 
In recent years, partially in an attempt to address these shortcomings, a number of 
African countries have received funding from the FAO to update their forest 
inventories. Unfortunately though, this has done little to improve the quality of the 
existing data. This is because when researching rates of deforestation, there is an 
important distinction between studies which attempt to provide a snapshot (inventories) 
and those that estimate a trend. To get a trend you need data over time, and for that, you 
need a number of inventories. Unfortunately the last reliable forest inventories were 
carried out for many African countries during the colonial era. Even where new 
inventories have been released they are often subject to controversy thanks to different 
systems of vegetation classification.  
 
Thus, despite the recent advent of easily obtainable satellite imagery going back at least 
30 years there are significant gaps in the record. Satellite images may also often include 
the wrong ‘tiles’ which are different sizes to their equivalent modern counterparts, or 
which overlap on different coordinates and therefore increase the chance of sampling 
error (Achard et. al. 2007; Hansen et. al. 2008). There are also temporal and spatial 
problems related specifically to monitoring forest cover change in the miombo 
woodlands, where activities such as shifting cultivation are common (Temudo & Silva 
2011). Spatially, this leads to a complex mosaic of primary or mature forest, cultivation 
ﬁelds and fallow vegetation. The small size of cultivation ﬁelds, usually between one and 
two hectares, consisting of plenty of bush or secondary forest, is an additional difﬁculty 
since at resolutions of one kilometre or less, they appear almost completely 
indistinguishable from healthier forest patches (Sedano et. al. 2005). 
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Zambia 
 
Until recently, the last reliable inventory data from Zambia came from between 1952 
and 1967, when records were meticulously kept in the country’s various colonial districts, 
and from vegetation maps compiled between 1967 and 1972. A number of assessments 
were conducted in the 1980s, but these extrapolated trends based on old district data and 
vegetation maps from the 1960s (de Backer et. al. 1986; Millington & Townsend 1989). 
A separate study combined the old data with low resolution satellite imagery at the 
regional scale (Erkkila 1989). These studies suggested that total growing stock was 
between 3 and 4 billion m3 and that forest cover was somewhere around 60 million ha. 
The next major attempt to compile an inventory was done under the Zambia Forestry 
Action Plan (ZFAP) in 1996. However, while it was able to utilise newly available 
computer simulations, its core baseline data was still based on the 1960s district 
inventories and forest management plans – hopelessly out of date by this stage. Total 
growing stock was estimated at 4.2 billion m3, and the forest estate at 43.6 million ha 
(Alajarvi 1996).  
 
In 1998, the newly instituted Provincial Forestry Action Plan (PFAP) made an attempt 
to update some of the inventories, using 1993 as a reference year. However, inventories 
were only conducted in three of Zambia’s nine provinces: the Copperbelt, Luapula and 
Southern Province. The choice of these provinces was due in a large part to their status 
as the most severely deforested areas of Zambia – a factor which made extrapolation of 
the results to the national level methodologically suspect. This did not stop the FAO 
from using those extrapolations for its FRA of 2000. To make matters worse, only two 
reference points were used for the UN study: 1974, based on an update of the 1960s data 
from de Backer & Chakanga (1986), and 1993, based on the new PFAP provincial forest 
inventories (Mukosha & Wamunyima 1998). Unsurprisingly, the study revealed hitherto 
unheard of deforestation rates, estimating total forest cover at 31.2 million ha, and 
deforestation rates of 851,000 ha/year between 1990 and 2000 (UN-FAO 2001). This is 
the origin of the often repeated claims that Zambia has the second highest rate of 
deforestation in the world.  
 
In 2003, assessments were conducted in all nine provinces under the Forest Support 
Program (FSP), utilising up to date satellite imagery to define the limits and 
classification of forest cover (MTENR 2008: 9). The FSP also provided the first 
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comprehensive assessment of past inventories, revealing many of their shortcomings. 
The result was updated and independent inventory data, and the overall forest estate 
was estimated to be 33.5 million ha. Once again, this suggested an unprecedented rate of 
deforestation; however, as with the forest inventories conducted five years previously, 
there were significant misgivings, given that it was data from the provincial and local 
levels being applied to the national level. In 2005 therefore, the UN-FAO released its 
next FRA report, this time, with the data for Zambia based only on studies from the 
1980s (Millington & Townsend 1989; Chakanga & de Backer 1986). The decision to use 
these as reference sources was taken, “because most publications base their references 
on these studies,” and because there was a “certain degree of alignment in terms of 
forest description between the various national classes” (UN-FAO 2005b: 6). The 
resulting estimate of forest cover was 42.4 million ha, growing stock of 1.4 billion m3, and 
annual deforestation rates of 444 800 ha between 1990 and 2005.  
 
By the mid 2000s, officials realised that an update of the national forest inventory was 
urgently required. In 2005, a joint project between the Ministry of Tourism, 
Environment and Natural Resources and the FAO was launched, called the Integrated 
Land Use Assessment (ILUA). The project incorporated remote sensing data with 
sampling from 248 plots on the ground, and promised to provide the first objective 
assessment of national forest cover in Zambia in over 30 years. The results showed a 
growing stock of 2.9 billion m3, and a much higher forest cover than previously thought, 
at 49.9 million ha (MTENR 2008). In a special study conducted alongside the ILUA, 
Abel Siampale, the officer from the Zambian Forestry Department in charge of remote 
sensing, carried out his own, independent assessment of forest cover change using 
satellite images from Google Earth, and reported that annual forest loss between 1990 
and 2005 averaged between 250,000 ha and 300,000 ha. However, by his own admission, 
these results were likely to be compromised by the poor quality of the images used, and 
by mismatches between Google’s standard tile coordinates and those of the ILUA 
report.  
 
Another problem was that sampling intensity for the ILUA was not ideal – of the 248 
plots identified 221 were analysed, and the sampling error for forested land was 7.8 per 
cent at 95 per cent probability (MTENR 2008). Considering this figure equates to almost 
4 million ha of forest estate, it represents a significant margin of error. Nevertheless, the 
ILUA and its companion study were a significant improvement over previous estimates 
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of deforestation rates. They were certainly more accurate than the FAO’s latest estimate 
from its FRA of 2010. This utilised the same GIS tiles as the ILUA, but since it operated 
on different geographic coordinates, only 66 were valid. This meant the sample size was 
too small, and the data was hopelessly inaccurate, reporting an annual deforestation rate 
of 166 600 ha between 1990 and 2010 (UN-FAO 2006a). This rate is almost three times 
lower than the one reported in the FRA of 2005, and almost six times lower than 
reported in the FRA of 2000. Needless to say, consistency has not been one of the FAO’s 
strong points. 
 
The overall impression of forest inventories and the estimation of deforestation rates in 
Zambia is thus fairly chaotic. Until the ILUA was released in 2007, there had been no 
objective assessment of the condition of the vegetation cover since 1967. Moreover, since 
many of the data sets have been collected independently of each other, there is a lack of 
consistency of applied methods (Kamelarczyk 2009). Accordingly, while deforestation is 
unlikely to be as rampant as the 2000 FAO report claims, nor is it possible for it be as 
low as suggested by the ILUA report from 2008 or the UN’s latest FRA of 2010. Taking 
their particular merits and shortcomings into account, it seems that the true figure is 
likely to be a weighted average of these reports. Accordingly, the figure adopted in this 
research project is an average annual loss of 425,000 ha (1.24 per cent) between 1990 
and 2010. 
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Mozambique 
 
Forest inventories in Mozambique have been conducted with more regularity than in 
Zambia, although for obvious reasons none were conducted during the war. Since the 
1970s, there have been three main inventories, plus updates and a number of smaller 
local inventories. The first ever large scale inventory was carried out in 1980. It used 
Landsat Multispectral Scanner System (MSS) images from 1972, combined with 
exploratory sampling in commercially important forests. The result was one national and 
ten provincial 1:1,000,000 maps with information on forest type/land use, timber volume, 
proportion of valuable timber species, location of potential timber production forests 
and a regeneration assessment. However, because of limited resources for image 
interpretation and ground verification, the results of the 1979/1980 inventory were of 
relatively low precision (Michalak et. al. 2002). There were also some glaring mistakes. 
For example, the agricultural area was underestimated by around 3.6 million ha due to 
cashew trees, mango trees and coconut palms being classified as other wooded land or 
even forests (FRA 2005: 15). Forest types were also underestimated due to the poor 
quality of some of the images used and to the some of the images being taken in the dry 
season, when most of the trees were leafless and therefore not detected.  
 
In 1994 therefore, a concerted attempt was made to update the inventory, using Landsat 
Thematic Mapper (TM) images from 1990 and the same land cover classification as the 
1980 inventory. It also incorporated a partial ground survey, and corrected the previous 
errors on agricultural area estimates. The national and provincial maps were updated 
and a new 1:250,000 map of mangroves was produced. Although the update suffered 
from the same types of precision problems as the 1980 inventory, it did derive a far more 
accurate indication of land use type and the magnitude of natural vegetation change by 
utilising two similar sets of images. The total extent of forest cover was estimated at 20 
million hectares in 1990 and a total loss of 2,739,106 ha of forests and other wooded land 
was estimated for the 18 year period between 1972 and 1990 – an annual loss of around 
152,000 ha per annum (Saket 1994).  
 
The following year the National Directorate of Forestry and Wildlife, supported by the 
FAO and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), prepared an 
additional national forest types map with a higher resolution of 1:250,000. It used the 
same set of Landsat images as the 1994 study, but with different vegetation 
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classifications: 20 as opposed to 17 in the previous two studies (Michalak et. al. 2002). 
The results from the 1995 study were used for the FRA of 2000, which estimated 
deforestation rates at 64,000 ha a year between 1990 and 2000, and for the FRA of 2005, 
which estimated rates at 50,000 ha a year between 1990 and 2005. These are almost 
certainly inaccurate, since they effectively estimate rates for all the years after 1990 using 
data that only exists for the years before 1990.  
 
In 2007, this perverse situation was partially rectified by an updated national forest 
inventory funded by the FAO and the Italian government. Controversially, the report was 
undertaken by an Italian geographical information systems (GIS) company called 
Agriconsulting S.p.A, at the insistence of FAO headquarters in Rome. According to Carla 
Cuambe, an official at the UN-FAO, at the time the move was heavily criticised since it did 
not incorporate input from people with previous expertise in Mozambique. The final 
report, authored by Marzoli (2007), utilised LANDSAT 5 TM images from the 2004/2005 
period, and adopted the new FAO land cover classification. The mapping benefited from 
extensive fieldwork in the entire country for control and validation of interpretation, and 
updated technology to allow for on screen visual interpretation of the satellite image 
results (FRA 2010). Forest cover was estimated to be 40.6 million hectares (51 per cent of 
the country), while other wooded formations, such as thickets, shrubs and forests with 
shifting cultivation, covered 14.7 million hectares (19 per cent of the country).  
 
However, while the accuracy of the land cover map was relatively high – between 86 per 
cent to 80 per cent for the main land cover classes and greater than 90 per cent for the 
forest classes, there were some major problems with the estimates of deforestation rates. 
Thanks to the new land category classifications, the 2007 inventory could not be 
realistically compared the 1994 and 1980 inventories. Instead, the authors took the 
decision to use a model that drew a direct link between population growth and forest 
cover. Justifying this decision, they explained, “the basic assumption of the model is that 
population pressure is the main factor behind deforestation. Human population growth 
generates the need for new agricultural areas and deforestation due to high demand for 
woody biomass to produce charcoal” (Marzoli 2007: 59, translated). However, the figure 
they obtained, 219,000 ha per annum, is unreliable since the model on which it is based, 
from the FRA of 1990, has been so thoroughly discredited by the existing literature. 
Indeed, it seems strange that the decision to use such a model was taken by a reportedly 
reputable GIS firm in the first place.  
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It is therefore still unclear how much of the discrepancy between the 2007 inventory and 
the 1994 inventory is due to the reclassification of forests to match with UN categories, 
and how much is due to real changes. There is still no reliable data for national rates of 
deforestation, despite assurances from the FAO to the contrary. Instead, it is probably 
more informative to look at two other indicators on rates of deforestation. The first is for 
mangroves, for which it was possible to make a comparison between the 1972 1990 and 
2004 figures since the formations are relatively easy to identify and delineate with 
satellite imagery (Marzoli 2007). The 2007 inventory revealed that the total area of 
mangroves lost between 1972 and 2004 was 51,000 ha. The rate of decline increased from 
67 ha per year (0.2 per cent) between 1972 and 1990 to 217 ha per year (0.7 per cent) 
between 1990 and 2004. Extrapolated to the national level this would equate to a loss of 
277,000 ha per year.  
 
The second study was a detailed analysis of changes in land cover in Manica Province for 
the period between 1990 and 2004 (Jansen et al. 2008). The study utilised Landsat 5 
images, comparing identical image tiles taken from the two dates. This revealed a total 
forest loss of 464,000 ha during the period in question, corresponding to an average 
annual rate of 0.81 per cent. Extrapolated to the national level, this would equate to 
322,000 ha. However, as detailed in a WISDOM (2008) report on charcoal usage in 
Mozambique, mangrove forests in Mozambique have been especially hard hit in the last 
20 years, and the Manica province is currently in ‘deficit’ for its local balance level for 
woody biomass. These two studies are therefore likely to represent the upper limit of 
national deforestation rates. Assuming therefore that the 2007 national inventory 
represents the lower limit, it seems reasonable to estimate an annual average 
deforestation rate of 260,000 ha (0.62 per cent). While this figure could conceivably be 
lower it is very unlikely to be higher, and for the purposes of this study appears to be the 
best possible estimate given the current shortcomings of existing data.  
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Proximate causes of deforestation  
 
According to a definitive study by Geist & Lambin (2001), proximate causes of 
deforestation are human activities that connect changes in land cover (biophysical 
attributes of the earth’s surface) and land use (human purpose or intent applied to 
human activities that directly alter the physical environment). These activities reflect 
human goals which constitute underyling social driving forces. They are different from 
structural causes of deforestation in that they can be interpreted as the more immediate, 
direct forms of land use and directly impact upon forest cover (Ojima et. al. 1994). 
Identifying both the proximate causes and structural causes in the course of this analysis 
is important, since the major interactions and feedback processes between these factors 
reveal the system dynamics that commonly lead to deforestation.  
 
In the deforestation literature (e.g., Ledec 1985; Lambin 1994; Mainardi 1998; 
Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998; Contreras-Hermosilla 2000), proximate causes are 
commonly grouped into three broad categories: expansion of cropped land and pasture, 
harvesting or extraction of wood, and the expansion of infrastructure. However, as 
pointed out by Geist & Lambin (2001: 6), a number of other activities, such as cattle 
ranching or the setting of fires, can also be included as they are broad, aggregate entities 
which do not lend themselves easily to categorisation. In Zambia and Mozambique, 
three proximate causes stand out as the key activities driving land use change. Shifting 
cultivation is the leading cause, identified by more than half of all respondents during 
the course of this research. It is followed by charcoal production, identified by about one 
third of respondents, and uncontrolled fires, identified by around one tenth. A fourth 
cause, illegal logging, was identified by a very small percentage of respondents in 
Mozambique. A visual representation of these responses is displayed on the following 
page.  
 
Most respondents however, emphasise that deforestation is usually caused by some 
combination of at least two of these proximate causes, and usually all three. The results 
are backed by most of the available literature. For example, in their most recent 
evaluation of their support to the forest sector in Zambia, the Finnish Development 
Agency suggests that the main causes of forest degradation are “clearance for 
agricultural production and the dependence of a large proportion of the population, 
even those in urban areas, on woodfuel for energy” (Hardcastle et. al. 2010: 2). For 
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Mozambique, they also identify woodfuels and shifting cultivation, as well as “wildfires, 
which are one of the most serious threats to forest resources“ (FINIDA 2009: 11). 
 
In other research, Chitondo (1997) finds that, “most forest area in Zambia is lost annually 
through deforestation resulting from agricultural expansion and charcoal production,” 
while for Mozambique, Ribeiro (2009: 3) suggests “the main cause of deforestation in the 
country is human pressure in the form of burning forest areas to open cultivation areas, 
firewood collection and charcoal production.” Zambia’s recent Readiness Plan Idea Note 
(R-PIN) to the World Bank for UN-REDD+ funding identifies, “the expansion of 
agriculture and escalating demands for woodfuel (charcoal) and timber as the main 
reasons for the huge losses of woodlands and forests” (Chunduma 2009). Similarly, 
Mozambique’s R-PIN application reports that “the sources of forest loss and degradation 
include subsistence and commercial agriculture due to unsustainable land use practices 
including use of fire in land clearing and hunting and increasing demand for biomass 
energy in the urban areas” (GoM 2011: 7).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Zambia Mozambique 
Agriculture 
Charcoal 
Fire 
Illegal logging 
Figure 12: Proximate causes identified by respondents as the leading cause of deforestation in each country. 
Source: Author’s own image 
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Shifting cultivation 
 
The impact of agriculture occupies a central position in contemporary debates around 
deforestation in developing countries (Ruthenberg 1976; Stromgaard 1989; Nandwa 2001). 
The debate revolves around the practice of shifting cultivation, an agricultural system that 
involves alternation between cropping for a few years on selected and cleared plots and a 
lengthy period when the soil is rested. Since it often involves burning to assist with clearing 
vegetation and to increase soil fertility, it is also known as slash and burn agriculture. 
Traditionally it is the method used by smallholders with minimal access to equipment and 
inputs and with little knowledge of modern farming techniques. In Mozambique, 
smallholders account for 96 per cent of all farm households, and for 90 per cent of the area 
of land under cultivation (World Bank 2011). In Zambia, smallholders account for 80 per 
cent of the farming sector and 85 per cent of the area of land under cultivation (CSO 2011).  
 
In both countries subsistence farming predominates, with only marginal surpluses sold in 
local markets (Batadizirai et. al. 2006). Inputs are minimal – in 1999 for example, the 
percentage of irrigated cropland in Zambia was less than one per cent, compared to nearly 
four per cent in the rest of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and 18 per cent in the rest of the world. 
Average fertilizer use was ten kg per ha, below the SSA average, and nearly ten times less 
than the global average (Jorgensen & Loudjeva 2004; Jayne et. al. 2007). In Mozambique, 
the FAO estimates the country’s irrigation potential at 3.3 million ha, yet only 40,000 ha are 
currently irrigated, and not all of that is functional or effective (UN-FAO 2002). Less than 
five per cent of households use fertilizer, and only slightly more than ten per cent of 
smallholders use animal traction.  
 
The dominant technique in both countries is slash and burn agriculture. In Zambia, this is 
known as citemene (meaning ‘to cut’), and is described as follows by Kakeye et. al. (2006): 
 
“At the beginning of the dry season, men go into the woodlands and climb trees to cut off 
branches in large tree-cutting areas. After these branches have dried adequately, women carry 
and pile them in the center of the cutting area. At the onset of the rainy season, the wood pile 
is set on fire, and when the fires have extinguished, a field emerges. In the first year, the 
villagers plant finger millet and cassava, their main food crops. During the next three years, the 
field is continuously planted in a rotation of crops, such as groundnuts and beans, and after this 
time, the field is abandoned and left fallow. Citemene fields range from 0.2 to 0.7 ha according 
to the household composition; the average area measured was approximately 0.45 ha. The tree-
cutting area is about seven times larger than the citemene field.“ 
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In Mozambique, a similar practice occurs on what are known as machambas, patches of land 
approximately 0.5 ha to three ha in size. As with the citemene system, after burning mixed 
cropping is practised in the ﬁelds, where maize is sown with a variety of other species such as 
sorghum, millets, several grain legumes (groundnut, bambara groundnut, beans, cow pea, 
pigeon pea, among others), cassava, pumpkins, rice and other minor crops (Temudo 2011). 
These are then farmed for as long as they produce good yields (usually between two to four 
years) before farmers move on to clear a new patch of land (Herd 2007; Ryan 2009). Under 
these kinds of systems, where selective cutting is practiced, the period of time for which the 
land is left undisturbed before it is returned to is usually 20 years, and in clear felled areas, up 
to 60 years (Chitondo 1996). Historically, this has provided enough time for the full recovery 
of the forest – research by Ryan (2009) shows that woody carbon stocks in the miombo 
woodlands recover from clearance after 30 years of abandonment.  
 
Accordingly, it is not the practice of shifting cultivation itself that has created the problem; 
indeed, it has been practiced sustainably for centuries in both Zambia and Mozambique 
(Sprague & Oyama 1998; Moore & Vaughn 1994). Rather, it is that the sustainability of the 
system hinges on the availability of land and the period of time the woodlands are given to 
recover. Research by Chidumayo (1987; 2002) and Kemp & Chidumayo (1998) for example, 
has shown that the system has a particularly high requirement of woodland compared to crop 
production; in order to support a plot of one hectare, a farmer needs to have access to, on 
average, 28 ha of woodlands. This means that the land’s ‘carrying capacity’ is limited to about 
three or four persons per square kilometre.  
 
In the last two decades though, demand for land in both countries has increased, and the 
result is that the fallow periods for slash and burn agriculture have decreased from the usual 
20 to as little as three or four years (Kapakele 2006). This is too short for miombo recovery – 
early studies by (Boaler & Sciwale 1966) indicate that prolonged cultivation of five years or 
more in the same area represents a critical limit for destruction of rootstock and therefore 
miombo regrowth potential. Quite simply the productivity of the system has been too low to 
support the demands made on it. As a result, shifting cultivation has begun changing in many 
ways at once and is experiencing a trend towards more permanent cultivation. Only the 
widespread availability of land has staved off a greater crisis (see Jansen et. al. 2008; Temudo 
2011). This change from traditional forms of shifting cultivation to more permanent forms 
represents a critical threat for miombo re-growth potential. 
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Charcoal production 
 
“Charcoal production is a poor man’s business...”  
  
NL Agency (2010) 
 
In addition to farming many of Mozambique and Zambia’s citizens engage in other types 
of activities such as charcoal production, fishing and the collection of non-wood forest 
products (NWFPs). These kinds of activities are not mutually exclusive. Research by 
Mather (2009) for example, finds that fishing and charcoal production activities have a 
significant positive association with crop income in certain parts of Mozambique. This 
highlights an important point namely, that it is common for the majority of rural 
households to undertake non-farm activities in response to (or simultaneously with) their 
crop production. This diversifies their income streams, giving them additional security in 
the case of unexpected events such as crop failures. It also allows them to derive an 
income stream all year round, since so many resource collection activities are seasonal in 
nature. The most common of these activities is collecting and producing fuelwood in the 
form of firewood and charcoal.  
 
In rural areas, the dominant form of fuel is firewood. Around 86 to 90 per cent of 
households rely on it for all their cooking, heating and lighting needs. Consumption 
patterns vary. In Mozambique, estimates for annual individual consumption are between 
600 and 800 kg, and the average figure for the country as a whole is estimated at around 
695 kg (WISDOM 2008). In Zambia, the average figure is smaller, with a recent study by 
Bwalya (2007) estimating a figure of around 370 kg. However, as Kalinda et. al (2008: 
63) have pointed out firewood usually takes the form of dead wood, branches and twigs. 
Even where trees are felled they are done so selectively, and according to quality, and 
there is very little wholesale clearance of forest areas. Only in very few places where 
firewood is scarce do people resort to cutting down young regrowth, which they leave to 
dry before transporting it to the village. Accordingly firewood collection exerts a 
‘negligible’ impact on forest conditions and deforestation (FAO 2001; Chidumayo 1997).  
 
For the millions of people living in Zambia and Mozambique’s urban and peri-urban 
areas however, charcoal is the fuel of choice, replacing firewood as incomes rise. This 
transition has been described as the traditional ‘fuel ladder,’ a model which proposes 
that, as families gain socioeconomic status, they abandon technologies that are 
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inefficient, less costly and more polluting, (Smith 1987; Barnes & Floor 1996). In this 
situation, charcoal succeeds firewood, and is then supposed to be substituted in turn by 
kerosene, gas and commercial electricity as consumers climb up through the rungs. 
Charcoal represents an improvement over firewood because it has double the energy 
content, is easier to transport, handle and store, fetches good market prices and is 
cleaner when burnt (Mulombwa 1998). Or in the words of a Mozambican retailer, “it 
sells well, doesn’t go rotten and children don’t steal it.”  
 
For the poor, charcoal is particularly important; 98 per cent of low cost urban 
households are heavily dependent on charcoal as their main source of their domestic 
energy, and it accounts for about 20 per cent of their total spending. However, as 
research in both countries by Puna (2008), Drigo et. al. (2008) and Herd (2007) has 
shown, even as affluence increases households continue using charcoal in significant 
amounts, due not only to its cheapness and convenience but also due to cultural reasons. 
Even in households where alternative fuels are used, charcoal is often used as a backup 
fuel or the main fuel for preparation of certain foods. As a result, charcoal usage in both 
countries is around 70 to 80 per cent of all urban households and annual consumption 
rates average between 120 kg and 140 kg per person (Technoshare 2008). 
 
So what makes charcoal a problem where firewood isn’t? There are two key reasons. The 
first is that charcoal production is a very inefficient way to use wood. It is usually done 
via the traditional ‘earth kiln’ method, which involves felling trees, crosscutting, building 
an earth kiln over the wood, slow burning (usually around a week) and then breaking the 
kiln to recover the charcoal (Chidumayo 1992). Research suggests that this method has 
low efficiency rate, converting only around 15 to 25 per cent of total wood used 
depending upon several factors such as tree species, log arrangement and experience 
(Herd 2007). Producers can also experience kiln failures due to unburned wood or the 
conversion of wood into ashes. Research by Puna (2008) for example, shows that 
producers in Mozambique lose an average of five kilns a year, equivalent to over 400 to 
500 kg of charcoal per producer. Thanks to these inneficiencies in the production 
process, urban consumers therefore tend to use much more wood overall than their rural 
counterparts.  
 
The other problem with charcoal production is the way the wood is harvested. This takes 
one of two forms. The first is selective cutting, whereby certain trees that provide good 
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quality charcoal are selected and cut for charcoal production. Traditionally, only logs 
with a girth greater than roughly 3cm DBH are used and trees will not be cut below 
30cm to allow for regeneration (Syampungani 2008). Large tree species (>20cm DBH) 
with high caloric values are the most preferred, due to the large quantity of dense and 
hard charcoal they produce. According to local forest users in Mpika in Zambia and in 
Gorongosa National Park in Mozambique, preferred species in the miombo woodlands 
are: the Apple-Leaf (Lonchocarpus capassa), the Lebombo Ironwood (Androstachys 
johnsonii), the Silver Cluster-Leaf (Terminalia sericea), the Leadwood (Combretum 
imberbe), Buffalo Thorn (Ziziphus mucronata), the Rhodesian Copalwood (Guibourtia 
conjugata) and the Velvet Bushwillow (Combretum molle).  
 
The other method is clear felling, in which most or all trees in a harvest area are cut 
down. This is usually practiced in conjunction with slash and burn agriculture, where the 
farmer will invite charcoal producers to clear a given area in return for the rights to 
produce and market charcoal resulting from the clearance process (World Bank 2009). 
Not surprisingly, this is the more destructive form of charcoal production since it results 
in permanent land use change. The problem is that this practice now predominates; 
according to Mikael Reina, FINIDA’s Chief Technical Advisor to Mozambique’s 
forestry department, the average charcoal producer in Mozambique now clear fells 
around 50m3 of wood to get 1m3 of charcoal.  
 
This is thanks to an increasingly commercialised charcoal industry with sophisticated 
supply chains involving not only producers, transporters and consumers, but also 
middlemen, consortiums, and wholesalers (NL Agency 2010). Most of this trade takes 
place informally, with charcoal transported and traded clandestinely in an attempt to 
avoid authorities, taxation and penalties. In the absence of oversight and in response to 
increased demand producers have begun disregarding species, girth and height when 
cutting, resources are exploited all year round and woodlands are given very little time to 
regenerate between fallow periods. There is also an increasing tendency to use more 
motorized equipment such as chainsaws for cutting the trees which increase the 
productivity of the operations allowing the operators to cut more trees in less time (Puna 
2008).  
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Fire 
 
Fire is an important land management tool for rural communities in Zambia and 
Mozambique, who use it as a means to improve socio-economic and environmental 
aspects of their livelihoods. Uses include the preparation of land for cultivation, 
improving visibility around settlements and foot paths, keeping away dangerous animals, 
clearing roadside areas before or after road maintenance operations, management of 
grazing land, charcoal burning, caterpillar breeding, honey collection and hunting 
(Zolho 2007; Erikson 2007). Such practices are ancient; in the tropical savannas of 
Africa, intentional burning has been practised for at least 50,000 years, and miombo has 
adapted to burning regimes to the point where fire now forms an intrinsic part of its 
natural vegetative cycle (Trapnell 1959; Rose-Innes 1971; Lawton 1978; Chidumayo 
1989; 1997; 2004).Recent research by Ryan (2009) for example, shows that fires every 
two to three years are necessary to facilitate regeneration and soil nitrification and 
therefore maintain the observed tree biomass in a typical miombo woodland area.  
 
Accordingly, it is not fire itself that causes deforestation. Instead, the problem is where 
fires occur either too often or with too great an intensity. This can reduce the stem 
density, sprout stocking rate, dominance and coppicing effectiveness of most miombo 
species, and thus affect the normal regenerative potential of the majority of species in 
the miombo woodlands (Zolho 2007; Ryan 2009). This is what has happened in the 
forests of Zambia and Mozambique in the last two decades. In Mozambique the average 
of 5.5 million ha burnt annually between 1982 and 1992 increased to almost nine million 
ha by 2001 (Taquidir 1996). Likewise, the number of individually recorded fires 
increased from 51 021 in 2001 to 138 856 in 2007 (UN-FAO 2011). In parts of the 
country, some fires now start as early as March each year, with intensity and frequency 
increasing as the vegetation moisture content drops to a low by late August to October. 
In some cases, fires continue burning until the first rains in November or December 
(Saket 1999). While similar satellite data for Zambia is unavailable, studies by 
Chidumayo (1998) have shown that the average returning interval of fire has decreased 
to an average of 18 months and in some places, to as little as nine months.  
 
Part of the problem is that for most rural communities, the timing of burning is clearly 
linked to particular livelihood activities. Eriksen (2007) for example, documents the 
practices of a typical community in the Kafinda Game Management Area in central 
Zambia. Villagers start burning at the local chief’s signal in late August to early 
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September for caterpillar harvesting. The aim is to encourage an earlier flush of new 
leaves which caterpillars require for breeding. This is followed by burning in October to 
clear and fertilize citemene fields, and to kill diseases, pests and weeds in the long 
undergrowth of grass. The dominant practice is therefore to set fires later rather than 
earlier in the season. However, the higher leaf flush due to higher biomass at this time of 
year leads to more intense fires (Mulombwa 1998).  
 
Moreover, even in areas where early burning is conducted, recently cut over areas for 
charcoal and agriculture have high amounts of leftover wood debris. In such instances, 
even early burning exercises can be fierce and damaging, especially to recovering 
woodland (Chidumayo 1997). Fire is also used all year round for flushing animals for 
hunting, smoking out bees for honey and to burn pathways through areas of long grass. 
The process is self-reinforcing. Burning encourages a taller and thicker growth of grass, 
which is valuable to local villagers for roof thatching and mats. However, the grass not 
only harbours pests which then need to be removed, but when it is burned produces vast 
amounts of combustion material which contributes to bushfires becoming so hot and 
intense that they can become uncontrollable and “burn with the wind for weeks at a 
time” (Eriksen 2007: 249). The result is that stressed forest lands in both countries have 
ended up being further degraded, locked into a vicious cycle of burning, clearing and 
ever shorter recovery periods.  
 
A vicious cycle 
 
So far, this analysis has confined itself to describing the effects of each of these 
proximate causes (shifting cultivation, charcoal production and burning) in isolation. 
However, the cause-effect mechanisms that lead to the loss of forest area are complex 
and difficult to attribute to just one factor. As Cuambe (2010: 15) points out, it may be 
easy to identify a correlation between one of these proximate causes and forest 
degradation, but it is not easy to prove a direct causal relationship. For example, it might 
seem evident that intense and unsustainable charcoal production leads to heavy 
degradation or even complete loss of forest cover; on the other hand, it is also true that 
charcoal production is often a simple by-product of shifting cultivation into previous 
forested lands. In this case, a reduction in the demand for charcoal might still do little to 
reduce the overall deforestation rate.  
 
 
109 
 
Accordingly, it makes more sense to analyse the proximate causes of deforestation in 
Zambia and Mozambique in combination. It is only then that the true magnitude of their 
effect becomes apparent. Take for example, a primary patch of miombo forest adjacent 
or close to a rural community. Local users begin by cultivating small plots of land on the 
edges of the woodlands, concentrating on crops that do not require inputs such as 
fertilizer, and using traditional methods such as citemene to create machambas. 
Encouraged by demand from passing trucks on their way to the urban centres, and 
requiring additional sources of income due to low yields and the potential for crop 
failures, users clear more land than is necessary. They then use the surplus for charcoal 
production. At the same time, they set fires, making the clearing process easier, as well 
as improving the harvest of other sources of NWFPs such as caterpillars.  
 
Due to increased demand and pressure on forest resources though, the harvesting cycles 
are shortened and fires become more frequent as people strive to earn a living. They also 
become more intense as they are set later in the year. Neither the land that is cultivated 
nor the land that is cut for charcoal is allowed to recover sufficiently before it is cleared 
or burnt again. At a certain point, the regeneration potential of the forest is exceeded, 
and the land becomes permanently converted to fields and pasture. Unfortunately, given 
the lack of inputs and sustainable farming techniques, the now permanently converted 
land is unable to sustain its users for long, and so the cycle begins again, with users 
moving to new areas of primary forest with greater crop and charcoal producing 
potential. It is this therefore – the negatively reinforcing cycle created by the 
combination of shifting cultivation, charcoal production and uncontrolled fires – that 
results in the types of permanent deforestation that have taken place in Zambia and 
Mozambique in the last two decades.  
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5 
The Structural Causes of 
Deforestation in Zambia 
 
 
 
Zambia is one of the most heavily forested countries in Africa, with total cover estimated 
at close to 50 million hectares, or around two thirds of the country (MTENR 2008). This 
abundance of forested land means that, of all the countries in the southern African 
region, Zambia has the largest forest estate relative to population – approximately 3.5 ha 
of forest land available per capita, compared to 0.2 in Malawi, 1.7 in Zimbabwe and 1.6 
in Mozambique. It also means that outside the more urban and peri-urban parts of the 
country, most of the population lives in close proximity to some form of forested land. 
Most of this is miombo forest, concentrated in the upper plateaus of the country, and 
comprising around 80 per cent of the total. Elsewhere, there are closed mopane forests 
in the south western part of the country, a major eucalyptus plantation in the 
Copperbelt, and a number of smaller local and regional plantations scattered around the 
various provinces (Jumbe et. al. 2008). 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, in recent years Zambia’s forest estate has 
disappeared rapidly. According to most observers, in order to understand why this has 
occurred one needs to go back to the early 1990s, and examine the impact of structural 
adjustment programs which changed the nature of the Zambian economy almost 
overnight. This commenced a process of agricultural expansion and growing demand for 
woodfuel and charcoal that has continued until today. That process has continued in 
more recent years thanks to structural factors such as high levels of poverty and high 
rates of urban population growth, and has been compounded by limited access to 
electricity and continued reliance on subsistence agriculture for most of the country’s 
poor. I explore these issues in greater detail in the first three sections of this chapter. 
 
 
In the fourth and fifth parts of the chapter I present an alternative argument, namely, 
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that the most important drivers of deforestation in Zambia have not been economic or 
demographic, but institutional in nature. I show how the dual system of land tenure, 
designed to accommodate Zambia’s traditional authorities on one hand and the more 
formal government agencies on the other, has encouraged landholders to clear forests 
with little thought to long term sustainability. I also argue that forest management in 
Zambia is in urgent need of schemes to decentralise forest management, yet vested 
interests and institutional failures have prevented the Zambian Forestry Department 
(ZFD) from implementing the necessary policy reforms. I conclude that the resulting 
deadlock has left the forestry policy space wide open and poorly regulated, and that it is 
this, more than any other single factor, that has resulted in Zambia’s unusually high 
levels of deforestation in the last twenty years.  
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Structural adjustment and agricultural reform 
 
During the 1990s the Zambian economy underwent one of the most sustained 
liberalisation programs ever conducted on the African continent. By some accounts, the 
pace and scale of change were as fast, and as uncontrolled as reforms carried out in the 
Soviet Union during the same period (Mwenechanya 2009). Measures imposed included 
price decontrols, the liberalisation of the foreign exchange market, the liberalisation of 
export and import trade, fiscal austerity measures to reduce the budget deficit and 
control inflation, the adjustment of interest rates and the tightening of monetary policy, 
reform of the civil service and the privatisation and liquidation of state enterprises 
(Simutanyi 1996). While many of these had been agreed upon by the previous 
government in conjunction with the Bretton Woods institutions, under the newly elected 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) they were imposed with far greater zeal 
and enthusiasm.  
 
The effect on the livelihoods of ordinary Zambians was devastating. Overnight the 
unemployment rate rocketed, thanks to the downsizing of government (the biggest 
employer) plus a slew of closures in the private sector. Between 1990 and 1995, more 
than 70 per cent of the labour force in the mines, telecommunications, electricity and 
railways was laid off (Rakner 2003). Employment in the mines halved again between 
1995 and 2000, and salaries were reduced, transforming employees into the ‘working 
poor’ (Fraser & Lungu 2007). This rapid de-industrialisation led to a substantial increase 
in urban to rural migration as the newly unemployed moved to nearby lands around 
towns and cities (Potts 2005). Lacking any alternatives, many took up livelihoods such as 
farming, fishing and charcoal production to survive. Between 1990 and 2000, the number 
of rural households engaged in agriculture increased by 113 per cent, and in urban areas 
it increased from one per cent to 12 per cent of total households (Govereh et. al. 2009).  
 
Unfortunately, things were not easy for the new would-be farmers. Historically, the state 
had lent a strong helping hand in the agricultural sector, managing markets at both the 
input and output stages, subsidizing production through the provision of smallholder 
credit, fertilizer and seed and operating a system that offered all producers the same 
price irrespective of location (Masters & Nuppenau 1993; Collier & Gunning 1999). The 
government had also provided widespread agricultural extension services in most rural 
areas to help farmers in identifying markets, adopting new techniques, reducing fertilizer 
costs and reducing livestock diseases. In the wake of structural adjustment however, 
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most forms of assistance disappeared. Producer and consumer subsidies were 
eliminated, price ceilings were abolished and left to be determined by the market, state 
institutions for the marketing and distribution of maize were dismantled and agricultural 
extension services were drastically reduced (Thurlow & Wobst 2006).  
 
As a result, the amount of fertilizer imported for distribution declined from over 100,000 
metric tons in the early 1990s to less than 40,000 tons in 2000, while prices more than 
doubled over the same period (Jorgensen & Loudjeva 2004). Productivity declined, with 
yields falling by 14 per cent between 1981 and 2001, and the area of land under 
cultivation for maize shrunk drastically, decreasing by 165,000 ha (22 per cent) between 
1990 and 1999 (Kapakele 2006). In response, many small scale farmers, especially those 
in more remote areas, shifted from the production of staple crops in permanent fields 
known as faamu to the production of alternative crops via citemene (Holden 2001). 
Between 1990 and 2000 the proportion of households producing cassava increased from 
32 per cent to 55 per cent, millet from 21 per cent to 30 per cent, and sorghum from 10 
per cent to 23 per cent (Jayne et. al. 2003).  
 
The reasoning behind the farmers' decisions to switch was fairly straightforward. In 
2002/3 a World Bank study was carried out in ten different study sites selected to 
represent a variety of agro-ecological zones, modes of livelihoods, levels of access to 
markets, services and infrastructure and cultural/ethnic groups (see Jorgensen & 
Loudjeva 2004). When asked to rank causes of low crop yields, every community started 
with the same two: fertilizer was not available on loan and fertilizer supplies were always 
late or too expensive. Other studies by Kakeya et. al. (2006) and Kapakele (2006) show 
how, until the mid-1990s, smallholders alternated between citemene and faamu 
production but that, following market liberalisation, faamu cultivation ceased to be 
viable in outlying rural areas, and citemene became the only alternative. Both studies 
show that the motivation for smallholders to return to citemene cultivation was driven 
primarily by a lack of money and access to loads for inputs such as fertiliser and 
equipment. In each case, farmers tended to draw a direct link between these obstacles 
and the liberalisation of the agricultural sector as carried out by the Zambian 
government.  
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Public sector cuts 
 
For forests, the other important outcome of Zambia’s SAP was the drive towards reduced 
government spending in the form of the Public Service Reform Program (PRSP). 
Launched in 1993, it had three aims: to make the Zambian public service leaner, to 
improve human resource management and to decentralise and devolve administrative 
power away from central ministries in Lusaka to field stations and local government 
structures (Mulikita 2003). It was one of the conditions imposed by the World Bank, who 
according to those involved, gave the Zambia government an ultimatum to cut its size to a 
level where its wage bill did not exceed 8.9 per cent of national GDP (see Makano 2008: 
204). As a result 24,000 full time employees were removed from the payroll overnight, 
while permanent salary freezes were enforced for remaining civil servants.  
 
However, the trimming of civil services was done via a stipulated proportion in each 
department, rather than by evaluating each area according to need. It meant that the 
Zambian Forestry Department (ZFD) which had high number of staff (thanks to its large 
geographical range and the nature of its task), was one of the first to feel the cuts. The 
ZFD also made an easy political target for ministers looking for savings, since forests were 
thought at the time to contribute relatively little to the economy and viewed as resource 
‘sinks’ rather than ‘sources.' Accordingly, the ZFD was forced to undergo major 
readjustments, moving its headquarters from Ndola to Lusaka, downsizing its 
departments, cutting back on research and retrenching hundreds of employees. In 1991, 
total staff numbered just over 1500; by 2000, only 883 remained.  
 
The disappearance of field staff, cut from 1273 to 478, was particularly damaging. These 
were the primary custodians of the country’s vast forest reserves, responsible for the daily 
monitoring and enforcement of forest rules and regulations and in most cases, the only 
contact between the ZFD and the communities that lived there. As Lewis Bangwe, a 
former ZFD employee put it to me, “the idea of structural adjustment was to cut the fat 
out of the civil service, which sounded great at the time. Unfortunately for the Forest 
Department, they ended up removing all the muscle and none of the fat.” Once local 
communities saw that nobody was directly responsible for forests their natural tendency 
was to use them unsustainably, thanks to the pressures brought about by the changes in the 
Zambian economy. There was no control over what was allowed to be extracted, how 
much, or when it could take place.  
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Reductions in government expenditure also translated into low allocations to forestry 
programs, effectively curtailing any new initiatives and hobbling the activities of 
remaining field staff. The problem went all the way to the top – according to Fabian 
Malambo, a former district officer, in 1997 the then president Frederick Chiluba visited 
a forest reserve which had been settled by a local community and remarked “I don’t see 
any forest here, all I see are cabbages!” ZFD employees complain that these attitudes 
continue today. Forestry, they say, is simply not a priority for government. Money for 
vehicle maintenance and fuel allowances is non-existent, and staff are forced to revert to 
bicycle or foot to get around.  
 
Meanwhile, at headquarters, managers and administrators have come under increased 
pressure to de-gazette forest reserves, especially those near urban areas (Njovu 2004). 
Any attempt to regulate or stop illegal forest settlement invariably meets with opposition 
thanks to the machinations of local politicians, who have a strong interest in allowing 
their constituencies access to an easily accessible and cost free resource. In effect, forests 
have been politicised – once people move into forest, they create a ward (i.e. a political 
entity) with stronger voice than the ZFD, whose ability to resist is minimal. Forest 
guards, unwilling to incur the displeasure of their superiors, and fearful of being 
retrenched in a country where the unemployment rate remains at over 50 per cent, can 
do little except watch as the forests are slowly destroyed.  
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Access to and usage of different energy sources 
 
For those Zambians either unwilling or unable to farm, or looking to supplement meagre 
incomes, charcoal production offers an ideal alternative. The average per capita income 
from charcoal production in Zambia has been shown to be almost five times higher than 
that from farming (Serenje et. al. 1994; Chidumayo 2001). Cross border trade also offers 
lucrative opportunities – according to Chilufya Kapwepwe, a former MP who now runs a 
local environmental NGO, the price of the average bag of charcoal in neighbouring 
Tanzania and Kenya can be up to four or five times higher. In 1997, the government 
estimated that 41,000 rural households were employed full time in charcoal production 
and an additional 4,500 people were involved in transportation, marketing and 
distribution (GRZ 1998b). However, as Jumbe et. al. (2008) have pointed out, few rural 
households specialise in one full time activity and it is therefore likely that the total 
number of households benefiting financially from the charcoal industry is much higher.  
 
For example, according to a detailed study undertaken in 1999 and 2000 for the 
Charcoal Potential Southern Africa Program (CHARPOSA), in just one district, 
Chongwe, 9,000 households were involved in charcoal production and made US$ 2.1 
million through the supply of 61,000 tons to Lusaka markets in 2000 (Chidumayo et. al. 
2001). According to one official most became charcoal producers during the previous 
decade because of the “low profitability of crop production and lack of capital for farm 
inputs and machinery.” Demand for this resource has been driven by the Zambian 
population’s continued reliance on woodfuels. This is certainly the official line taken by 
the ZFD, whose head, Anna Masinja Chileshe, stated in 2001 that, “the dependence on 
woodfuel by most households increases pressure on the forests while alternative energy 
sources are not immediately available” (Chileshe 2001: 13).  
 
One of the main reasons for continued reliance on woodfuels is the lack of access to 
electricity. Only 22 per cent of Zambians are officially connected to the grid, up from 
13.8 per cent in 2000 and from less than 10 per cent in 1994 (Brew-Hammond 2010). In 
rural areas, the problem is even more marked: only 3.2 per cent have access, up from 1.7 
per cent in 2004, 1.5 per cent in 2000, and 0.8 per cent in 1990 (UN-REDD 2010; 
Haanyika 2008; GRZ 2000). Supply, which is the responsibility of a parastatal, the 
Zambian Electricity Supply Company (ZESCO), comes primarily from the three main 
hydroelectric stations: Kariba North Bank (600 MW), Victoria Falls (108 MW) and 
Kafue Gorge (900 MW). However, capacity is not an issue – the country has an installed 
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capacity of 1,774 MW, a peak load of 1,028 MW, and undeveloped hydropower potential 
of over 6,000MW. Nor is it a result of a continued lack of attention to the problem – 
electrification has featured prominently in development plans throughout the last 20 
years. 
 
Instead, the problem is that the task facing ZESCO is simply enormous (Haanyika 2008). 
Zambia is a large country, with low population densities, and long distances from the 
major hydropower stations located in the southern part of the country to most rural 
areas. Those challenges are compounded by high poverty levels, which have a significant 
bearing on electricity consumption and the capacity of rural dwellers to pay for new 
connections and on-going consumption. Actual usage of electricity is likely to be far 
lower than official figures, especially in rural areas, where it is used primarily for 
community centres, schools and clinics. Most individual households either do not have 
electrical appliances such as lights and stoves in their houses, or cannot afford the bulk 
payments required for electricity consumption. These households therefore continue to 
rely primarily on woodfuels for their energy needs.  
 
Poverty also contributes to increased vandalism of electricity infrastructure, while limited 
technical skills to construct, maintain and operate rural supply systems affect the rate of 
electrification and the reliability of electricity supply. Others, such as Ianchinova & 
Lundstrom (2008), suggest the inconsistency between excess supply and poor access is 
due to the dominance of the mining industry in the energy sector, which has discouraged 
the expansion of electricity infrastructure to other productive sectors. This continued 
lack of access, combined with the relatively high cost of electricity and petroleum based 
fuels means that woodfuels, and especially, charcoal, look likely to continue to be the 
dominant form of energy supply in Zambia for some time to come. 
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Land tenure 
 
In Zambia, land is administered under what is known as a dual tenure arrangement, with 
provisions for both private property and customary law. This is because, under both the 
colonial and post-colonial governments, land could not be bought or sold, and was 
instead administered either by the state or by traditional authorities. One of the first 
priorities for the new government following the transition to multi-party democracy 
therefore, was to introduce an arrangement allowing for the sale of land and private 
property, in line with the overall move towards a market driven economy. Accordingly, 
in 1995, the Land Act was passed, abolishing the old categories of ‘reserve’ and ‘trust’ 
land and combining them into customary areas. Customary land comprised 94 per cent 
of the total, and was intended to be left to evolve according to local traditions and 
conditions. The remainder was left as statutory land whose allocation would be subject to 
statutory law and whose prices would be determined according to market forces (Adams 
2003). Not surprisingly this land, although only a small proportion of the total (6 per 
cent), is the most valuable and productive land in Zambia, concentrated in and near the 
cities, along the railway line between Livingstone and the Congo border, in the mining 
areas of the Copperbelt, and in certain productive farming areas (Ianchinova & 
Lundstrom 2008).  
 
The 1995 Act was passed quickly and with almost no consultation, despite considerable 
opposition at the time from traditional leaders, civil society, and other key stakeholders 
who argued that it would disadvantage poor people and undermine the authority of 
traditional leaders (Norfolk, 2004). In practice, the role of the chiefs did not actually 
change much. They still continue to grant rights to occupy and use all land in customary 
areas, impose restrictions on its use for activities such as cultivation or the grazing of 
animals, and resolve disputes with the help of groups of elders (Adams 2003). Under 
customary law, individuals can obtain land via the clearing of virgin bush, as a gift, in 
exchange for goods, or in exchange of services and marriage. However, while they can 
use it and pass it on to family members through inheritance, de facto recognition extends 
only to protection of use and occupancy rights. There are no formal documents of land 
ownership, no taxes paid and users have no legal management privileges (van Loenen 
1999). Insecurity of tenure is therefore a problem – many of those on customary land 
have expressed a desire for formal titles in order to avoid dispossession, to protect fixed 
investments and to ensure transfer to heirs (Smith 2001).  
By contrast the system governing the rights over statutory land is administered by the 
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central government under English statutory law, mortgageable and subject to taxation, 
and distributed in 99 year leases. The procedure for acquiring a lease though, is long and 
complicated. Applicants are required to submit a plan for approval by the local 
municipality, who determines whether the land is unoccupied. The application is sent to 
the Ministry of Lands, and the applicant is then required to hire a licensed surveyor. If 
the Surveyor General approves the surveyor’s plans then a lease is given for 99 years. 
Leasehold tenure can also be acquired by converting customary land, but this requires 
the resident chief’s approval, and is limited to 250 hectares (GRZ 1995b). All leases 
under statutory law constitute private ownership, and lessees hold title for the land as 
well as usage and exploitation rights for its resources. However, the Act allows for titles 
to be retracted when subsurface resources of ‘national significance’ (i.e. valuable 
minerals) are discovered (UN-REDD 2010).  
 
Crucially, under the Land Act of 1995, all land is vested in the President on behalf of the 
people, thus creating a strange hierarchy, with customary land recognised, but given a 
lower status. According to some, such as Ville Luukanen, an economic advisor at the 
Embassy of Finland, this means that ‘dual’ land tenure is little more than a myth. 
Granted, permission to occupy the land is needed from the chief, but ultimately titles are 
granted by the Ministry of Land. This leads to a patriarchal and outdated system of land 
management that allows politicians to “use land as a sop to chiefs and keep them happy 
by buying votes.” It also creates an ongoing tension between commercial agriculture and 
tourism, with demands for strong property rights, and a lack of support for the same 
founded on customary land rights (Metcalfe & Kepe 2008). Others, such as Jean-Michel 
Pavy, a natural resource expert at the World Bank, insist that the question of whether 
dual land tenure is a problem depends on traditional authorities. Where they are 
educated and tend to use their power wisely it works well. However, in the absence of 
checks and balances it is open to abuse. The question therefore, “is not whether the 
traditional system has value but how to modernize it.”  
 
The continued lack of formal property rights in customary areas has resulted in a 
number of perverse outcomes for Zambia’s forests. For example, research by Unruh et. 
al (2005) shows how migrants moving to new areas will tend to clear more land than is 
necessary for fear that the local leadership may subsequently take back any uncultivated 
land. Where all land has already been allocated, new migrants arriving in the area 
looking for land may approach the local leadership and make the case that patches of 
apparently unused forest land should be taken from the current holder and allocated for 
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clearing by new migrants instead. Existing holders of forest patches in customary areas 
are therefore encouraged to clear them as quickly as possible so as not to incur 
allegations of non-use by others seeking land. Such insecurities are not confined only to 
customary land. Backlogs at the Ministry of Land for formal land applications are 
anywhere between four months and two years, and there is a notable lack of surveying 
facilities – Zambia has only 13 licensed surveyors, administering many thousands of 
applications a year. Government has attempted to circumvent these problems by 
granting 14 year leases based only on a sketch plan, which does not require a surveyor. 
However, this has led to increased boundary disputes because of the inaccuracy of plans 
and the backlog of cadastral surveys.  
 
The overall pressure this places on government departments is intense, especially given 
the political importance of land issues. Also, since land has not been released quickly 
enough, especially in urban areas and adjacent to forest reserves, informal and illegal 
forms of squatting have proliferated, and are allowed to survive due to political pressure. 
Moroever, if an individual buys a piece of forested land and subsequently fails to 
‘develop’ it (i.e. by cutting down the trees) then it can be repossessed. Under the current 
land law therefore, using a forested property for beekeeping for example, which requires 
trees, would not count as development. As one environmental activist put it to me, the 
mindset is that “this place is empty because there are only trees here.” It means that 
under the current system of land management, development works against sustainability 
by definition as well as in action. 
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Forest governance and legislation 
 
Responsibility for the management of Zambia's forest resources lies with the Zambian 
Forestry Department (ZFD). The ZFD traces its origins back to a decision by Zambia’s 
colonial government in 1948 to establish 181 national and 300 local forest reserves, 
covering almost nine per cent of the total land surface of Zambia (Makumba 2002). A 
Forest Policy was drawn up and a Forestry Department was established to look after the 
reserves, with the emphasis on forest protection and management, forest surveys and 
administration. In 1965, the Policy was updated, and the Forestry Department was 
renamed the Zambian Forest Department (ZFD) and divided into two main parts – the 
provincial field organisation, and the specialist divisions (Forest Management & Plans; 
Beekeeping; Forest Products; Forest Silviculture; Training; and Provincial 
Management). In the following years ZFD offices were established in every district of 
Zambia.  
 
This structure was formalised by the Forests Act of 1973. It stated that forests in a legal 
context are those occurring in state reserves, customary land and on privately owned 
land, and that all trees on state and customary land are vested in the President on behalf 
of the people. In practice, the President’s authority was vested in the Chief Conservator 
of Forests (CCF) in Ndola. That authority was delegated in turn to provincial officers, 
responsible for all forestry activities at the provincial level, and then to individual district 
offices comprised of a chief officer and a staff of extension assistants, forest rangers and 
forest guards who were supposed to carry out patrolling, licensing and general protection 
duties. Access to and management of reserves was supposed to be strictly controlled by 
district field staff, while indigenous forests on customary land were managed in terms of 
extraction through concessions and licensing.  
 
The use of forest products by local users was regulated by local by-laws and administered 
by local authorities, but these were legally powerless to control use by outsiders if they 
had licenses issued by the ZFD. Forest management therefore focused either on 
plantations or the exclusive protection of forest resources with forest production as a 
secondary aspect. Traditional authorities and local communities were given very little say 
as to how forest resources should be managed, and forest dwelling communities were 
given no rights over resources at all. As Lewis Bangwe, a former forester and current 
food security expert at the African Development Bank put it, the ZFD was designed as a 
policeman and as a protector of natural forests, but not to engage in outreach and 
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collaborative projects.  
 
Over time however, as institutional sclerosis under the one party state crept in, the ZFD 
became run down and its systems too inflexible to deal with the growing threats to the 
country’s indigenous forests (Makano 2008). By the 1990s, it had become clear that a 
new arrangement for the country’s forest sector management and regulatory 
organisation was required. Accordingly, in 1995, as part of a larger process of review for 
the entire environmental sector, the Zambia Forestry Action Programme (ZFAP) was 
conceived, with the stated goal of providing for “the national management and 
conservation of forest resources to enhance the contribution of the forest sector to social 
and economic development, poverty reduction and the improvement of food security” 
(GRZ 1995a: 2). The ZFAP also conducted an extensive review of the Forest Policy of 
1965 and Forest Act of 1973. One of its key recommendations was to begin the process 
of empowering those living close to or involved with the forest resource base with much 
greater ownership of and responsibility.  
 
This coincided with the Provincial Forestry Action Plan (PFAP), intended to support 
and improve the ZFAP process by developing new forms of revenue collection and 
sharing in partnership with local communities (FINIDA 2005). To this end, it created 
three forestry management plans for the Luapula, Copperbelt and Central Provinces. In 
1998, the Zambia Forest Policy (ZFP) of 1998 was released, incorporating 
recommendations from the ZFAP lessons learned under the PFAP. It was based on five 
principles – sustainable forest resources management, capacity development, formation 
of partnerships, private sector involvement in forestry development and the promotion 
of equitable participation of all sections of the community (WWF 2004). Crucially, the 
ZFP committed Zambia to the introduction of participatory approaches to forest 
management. It stated that all stakeholders and particularly communities should be 
involved in the management of forests, that the role of traditional rulers should be 
recognised, and that partnerships with local users and the private sector in preparing 
management plans should be encouraged. Its guiding principle was therefore the idea of 
inclusiveness (WWF 2004).  
 
This principle was formalised by the 1999 Forests Act, which provided a general basis for 
the sharing of forest revenue between the government and local communities. In order 
to achieve this, the Act mandated the establishment of a Zambia Forestry Commission 
(ZFC) to take over the responsibilities of the ZFD, and the creation of Joint Forest 
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Resource Management Areas (JMAs) to be managed by Village Resource Management 
Committees (VRMCs), comprising community, NGO and private sector representatives. 
The legal guidelines were far from perfect. For example, existing regulations for the 
handling of government funds were supposed to be scrapped entirely once the ZFC was 
in place. However, there was no provision to allow new forms of licensing and revenue 
collection by communities, a requirement which donors suggested was the only feasible 
practical option to capture the mostly decentralised, very small scale forest production 
by people in rural areas (FINIDA 2005).  
 
There was also no mechanism for harmonising structures between sub-sectors – joint 
forest management (JFM) was potentially available not only to communities living in 
national and local forests and open areas, but also to those in game management areas 
(GMAs) bordering national parks. It meant that in theory, there could have been two 
parallel structures with similar functions operating side by side within GMAs – an almost 
certain recipe for disaster (GRZ 2005). Even so, the 1999 Forests Act was a vast 
improvement over its predecessor. The 1973 Forests Act was written on the assumption 
that the ownership, control and management of specified forest areas could be delegated 
to other persons or authorities only should the CCF approve it (Chunduma 2009). 
However, it contained no enabling provision for the transfer of ownership, meaning that 
in practice all responsibilities remained vested in the office of the CCF. Moreover, under 
the old arrangement, delegated authority did not apply to open areas, leaving a 
significant part of the forest estate outside the ZFD’s jurisdiction and thus without any 
kind of formal institutional arrangement for forest management. This situation 
embodied centralised forest management, in which government had absolute power over 
all aspects of forest management. There was no ‘participatory’, ‘collaborative’ or ‘joint’ 
forms of management whatsoever.  
 
Resolving these shortcomings was the new Act’s strength – it encompassed the principles 
of participatory forest governance in an attempt to readdress existing management 
inadequacies. The newly proposed ZFC would be able to operate semi-independently of 
government, with its own stream of revenues, and therefore free from the political 
strictures of budgetary allocations. In this respect, it accorded with the government’s 
overall developmental policy of decentralisation. The 1999 Act also harmonized forestry 
with other pieces of legislation, and incorporated provisions for international 
agreements and conventions (WWF 2004). The proposed plans had also become 
increasingly urgent. In 1997, the ZFD had been internally restructured in response to the 
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cuts mandated by the World Bank’s Public Service Reform Program (PSRP). Many of 
the department’s most experienced and qualified staff had been forced into early 
retirement or, anticipating the cuts, had left for better paid and more secure work in the 
private sector and with development organisations and international NGOs.  
 
The effects of this restructuring were felt almost immediately. Most employees were now 
confined to urban centres, funds were not available to support practical forest 
management and patrolling, and most seriously of all, the department suffered an abrupt 
loss of institutional memory (Makano 2008; FINIDA 2005). For those left behind, 
uncertainty and low morale bred growing disillusion, and there was a deep sense of 
frustration arising from the perception that many of the department’s best employees 
had been lost because of political manoeuvring. The restructuring entailed by the PRSP 
had also resulted in a shift in emphasis from forest management to forest extension. 
Headquarters were moved from Ndola to Lusaka, and the former divisions were 
hurriedly disbanded and restructured into just an Extension and Research Branch. These 
were fields that had formerly been regarded as support to the more important activities 
of the main divisions. Now, they had been placed at the forefront of the ZFD’s strategy.  
 
Thanks to this strategic shift the first employees to face the chop were forest guards, the 
first line of defence for Zambia’s forests. According to Royd Vinya, a former forestry 
district manager, numbers shrank from about two to three guards per reserve to only two 
to three guards per district, wholly inadequate for protection. Many guards were actually 
encouraged to become redundant, offered attractive redundancy packages, and replaced 
by a smaller number of more qualified (at least, on paper) extension assistants. Most 
however, did not have the required training – according to Makano (2008), only  47 per 
cent of the new assistants had experience in forest management while only 26 per cent 
had done forest extension work. In terms of skills, 40 per cent were trained in forest 
management, 20 per cent in forest extension and only 10 per cent in forest research. 
Restructuring had thus taken place with little or no thought towards experience, training 
and resulting placements. 
 
The 1999 Act offered a solution to many of these problems. Participatory approaches to 
forest governance could make up for the lack of monitoring on the ground, and also 
offered the potential for significantly increased revenues from small scale forest 
industries. One suggestion for example, was a two tier system for revenue sharing. For 
small scale collection and harvesting of forest products, communities would issue 
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licenses and collect revenue, and remit 30 per cent to the ZFC. The issue of large scale 
concessions and management of payments would be done by ZFC, with the community 
ensuring that license conditions were adhered to. The ZFC would remit 70 per cent of 
revenue back to JFM communities (see FINIDA 2005: 19).  
 
According to a number of former employees, within the department itself anticipation 
was also high, since it was felt that the new ZFC would implement a new level of 
professionalism, generate and allocate more resources to forest management, increase 
capacity, improve communications and help reach out to other stakeholders. 
Unfortunately though, despite being passed in Parliament and endorsed by the Zambian 
Cabinet, the Forestry Act of 1999 was never implemented, due to a failure to issue the 
required commencement order to put it into effect. Today, more than a decade later, the 
Forest Policy of 1998 and the Forestry Act of 1999 remain dormant, and the forests and 
forest reserves of Zambia are still managed under the Forest Policy of 1965 and the 
Forest Act of 1973. The result is that the only institution tasked with managing Zambia’s 
forests has effectively been left operating in limbo, paralysed by premature restructuring, 
budget cuts, uncertainty over its future and an increasingly demoralised staff.  
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Institutional paralysis 
 
In the years following the non-implementation of the Forests Act, the ZFD has become 
the home of ‘office foresters’ instead of ‘forest officers,’ lacking a clear vision or purpose, 
and rarely visiting the field to acquaint themselves with events on the ground unless 
prompted by the prospect of per diems and subsistence allowances (Makano 2008). Staff 
technical skills are underutilised, and poor planning has led to the absence of essential 
operational tools. Most forest reserves for example, are supposed to have management 
plans, but none exist, and without them, district offices cannot act properly. There is no 
coordination between extension research and policy implementation branches, and 
within the research division itself there is often a breakdown between good research 
plans and subsequent forest based actitivities. Similarly, coordination between financial 
and field staff is poor, and there is very little communication and sharing of information 
between senior and mid-level management.  
 
At the top level, there is the Director, Chief of Research and Chief of Extension, but the 
relationship between the three is not good. The existing director has been in charge since 
1995, after her predecessor was ‘retired’ because of sticking too closely to existing law on 
forest evictions. Although convicted of corruption in 2003, she has been returned to 
office thanks to political connections. She now spends more than half the month 
travelling to conferences on lucrative per diem contracts, and because she has ‘iron 
control,’ there are constant decision making delays. Clientelism is rife – according to a 
number of former employees, transfers and promotions are conducted according to 
personal relationships with the leadership, with little thought given to matching skill sets 
to the functions of an office. Junior officers are assigned responsibilities supposed to be 
undertaken by their superiors in exchange for some favours, and with the promise of 
future promotion, undermining confidence and morale. Dissenting views are dismissed, 
and often result in transfers or exclusion from decision making processes. The result is 
that the Department “has cultivated an ideal ground for a frustrated, disoriented and de-
motivated labour force” (Makano 2008: 298).  
 
The effects of this institutional and legal paralysis on the actual day to day management 
of Zambia’s forests cannot be understated. For example, Emmanuel Mutamba, the 
district officer charge of the Mpika district in northern Zambia is responsible for two 
local and six national reserves, spread over an area twice the size of Wales. To do this, he 
has a staff of one part time forester and one office assistant, and one vehicle, a Toyota 
128 
 
Hilux, but no fuel allowance. When I asked him how much he would need to cover the 
area effectively he suggested around 500 litres (roughly US$700 worth) of diesel per 
month. There is almost no prospect of this money coming from ZFD headquarters, and 
instead he is forced to catch lifts with local NGO groups, or to use his bicycle. He said 
that the continued existence of the 1973 Act was a big problem, because it speaks of 
‘Forestry Officers’ yet such a category no longer exists. This means when he attempts to 
prosecute offenders he is often told by local judges that he has no legal jurisdiction to do 
so.  
 
He also complained about the perverse system of license fees, which were hiked by the 
government to K162,000 (around US$30) for 10 bags in 2008 in an attempt to combat 
illegal charcoal production. However, since the total retail cost of a bag is only around 
K20,000 (US$4) in Mpika, as opposed to around K90,000 (US$18) in Lusaka, and the 
fine for transporting charcoal without a license is K45,000 (US$9) it makes more sense 
for producers to risk prosecution than pay the license fees. In a ‘good’ month, he says, he 
probably receives around K900,000 (US$180) in fines, but this creates a lot of bad blood 
between him and the community and makes his job much harder. He says that the 
government “has been addressing the effects, and not the root causes.” 
 
Even in relatively more affluent districts such as Solwezi, the ZFD is struggling. Rachel 
Manda, the officer in charge there, has a staff of one driver, nine foresters and seven 
general workers, and the use of two vehicles. With this, she is required to cover 23 
national reserves and one local reserve. There is no fuel allowance. Revenues come in 
from firewood, timber and charcoal licensing, as well as fines, but this all goes straight to 
central government, who distributes funds back to the provincial offices, and then back 
to the district office. She complains that by the time funds reach district level, there is 
nothing left. Accordingly, she is forced to improvise by developing relationships with the 
mines and local development organisations operating in the area.  
 
However, this has created a quandary, since the mines have started encroaching on local 
forest reserves in order to build more infrastructure and to create settlements for their 
workers. Thanks to the influx of people looking for mining jobs, all council and 
customary land has already been taken, and encroachment into forest reserves is 
becoming increasingly commonplace. She says she is better off allowing this to go ahead 
and then fining the mine, rather than asking their workers to leave the forest, since she is 
so strapped for cash. She also complains about the low salaries of forest officers 
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compared to their agriculture and fisheries counterparts – hers is less than K2,000,000 
(about US$400) a month. Extension officers receive even less, and have no 
accommodation when visiting substations, instead having to organise their own or sleep 
in tents.  
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The failure of joint forest management  
 
The shortcomings of forest governance in Zambia in the last decade are perhaps best 
exemplified by the failure of the second phase of the Provincial Forestry Action Plan 
(PFAP II), which took place between 2000 and 2006. Funded by Finland, it was intended 
to build on the success of PFAP I by rolling out Zambia’s first examples of JFM in seven 
pilot forest areas. It was created on the assumption that the Forest Act of 1999 would 
commence – indeed, according to Elizabeth Ndhlovu, an official at the Finnish Embassy 
who was involved in the process, this had been one of the pre-conditions during 
discussions between donors and the government. Initially a temporary delay had been 
predicted, and so a Statutory Instrument (SI 52) was created in order to provide a legal 
framework while the 1999 Act was still in abeyance. However by 2005, after almost a 
year’s delay in approving a draft Statutory Instrument to replace SI 52, the Ministry of 
Justice declared that the legal framework for JFM was not possible given the non-
commencement of the 1999 Act. They also stated that the SI 52 of 1999 should never 
have been passed in the first place.  
 
With the PFAP II scheduled to end very soon, donors attempted to try and find a way 
forward using the 1973 legislation. This was partially successful – in 2006, a new 
Statutory Instrument (SI47) was passed in an attempt to provide a replacement 
regulatory framework for JFM, and the Plan was extended for a further 18 months. 
However, there were still no allowances for revenue sharing that would enable piloting 
of JFM as agreed with communities. Local communities in the pilot areas could be 
assigned the means and measures of control and management for a forest area, but were 
not allowed immediate access to monetary benefits. Instead, monies continued to be 
collected centrally. They first came to the district officer, were then sent through to 
headquarters and on to the Ministry of Finance. Once they had been approved they were 
then supposed to come back to the to the MTENR, then the ZFD, and finally back to 
the communities via the district offices.  
 
Not surprisingly, communities were not prepared to operate like this, since they knew 
what would happen to money that changed so many hands on its way back to them. They 
therefore hid stocks, withheld payments and generally refused to cooperate once the 
financial arrangements were made clear. In some cases, the pilot JFM projects did more 
harm than good. For example, Felix Njovu, a lecturer on forest economics at the 
Copperbelt University told me the story of how 20 acres had been set aside for a 
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community in Shibuchinga, in the Copperbelt, for a government run program to train the 
community in forestry practices. The project was only funded to last six years though, 
and training only happened in the final two years, by which stage the project was ending. 
After the years of promises, the lack of tangible benefits left many in the community 
disappointed, and determined not to work the ZFD ever again.  
 
According to Marja Ojanen, FINIDA’s Head of Environment and Natural Resources, 
the lack of benefit sharing arrangements doomed the PFAP II from the start: it meant 
that a governance structure was piloted, but without the necessary financial 
arrangements to make it work. In the end, the outcomes were limited to JFM plans for 
six forests in local reserves, one on customary land, ‘capacity building’ in 45 villages, 
guidelines for JFM planning and implementation, a ‘lessons learned’ document and a 
tentative model for collaborative forest management. The financial model proved to be 
completely unsustainable – each project ended up costing an average of €13,900 per 
community or €285 per household, compared to annual per capita income of around 
€300 per year. In terms of local economic development and livelihoods, the impact was 
negligible. And most importantly, the PFAP had little to no effect on actual rates of 
deforestation – as the program completion report stated, “it can be assumed that any 
degradation of forest resources has thus continued at its normal pace, and hence the 
conclusion that PFAP impact has been neutral on the status of forest resources“ 
(FINIDA 2005: 25). It was made clear in the same report that that failure was primarily 
institutional – without the implementation of the ZFC or the legal backing for JFM and 
the necessary benefit sharing arrangements, there was never any prospect of success.  
 
Why then, despite the continued managerial and programme failures, and in the face of 
the seemingly obvious need for change, did the MTENR never issue the commencement 
for the 1999 Forest Act? The decision seems strange given the 1999 Act had both 
parliamentary and executive approval, and as the years have gone by, increasingly 
perverse considering the Department’s own complaints about under staffing and lack of 
resources. After all, one of the key justifications for JFM was that it would reduce 
operational costs by involving forest communities. The official line, according to 
Deuteronomy Kasaro, a current employee at the ZFD, is that the Act’s non-
commencement was due to concerns about the financial viability of the ZFC. Apparently 
the experience of ZAWA, created around the same time to manage the wildlife sector, 
had raised a number of concerns since it had required substantial state funds in order to 
stay afloat. Officials were also worried about retrenchment, trade creditor and startup 
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costs associated with the ZFC (Pope 2006). There were therefore a number of doubts 
about changing a fully fledged government department into another semi-autonomous 
parastatal. And, since the formation of the ZFC was attached to all other provisions in 
the Forest Act, including JFM, none of them obtained regulatory approval. 
 
However, perceptions about the ZFC’s financial viability were driven by the ZFD’s 
obsession with forest based activities rather than the potential for revenues from actual 
products. A good business plan for forests would have easily allowed for the 
development of a self sustaining commission if the ZFD had been willing to look at a 
complete revamp of the way they conducted operations. As a number of former foresters 
pointed out to me, a vast potential income stream in the form of both wood products and 
NWFPs is available, provided it is administered and collected in conjunction with 
communities. Indeed, as Ephraim Shitima, a mid-level manager at the MTENR pointed 
out, the ZFC was not only viable, but had a huge opportunity, since the ZFD is the only 
department in the MTENR that reaches all the way to district and village level.  
 
Moreoever, although it is true that the ZFD receives far less from the Treasury than 
other comparable productive sectors such as agriculture, a lot more has come in from 
donors and external funding. The operational budget for PFAP II for example, was €5.88 
million, several times greater than the ZFD’s entire budget. It provided direct training 
support in JFM to many of the ZFD’s staff, and provided badly needed vehicles and 
computing and field equipment to the ZFD to enable it to undertake its basic functions. 
According to one former manager, there is now greater capacity at the ZFD than ever 
before; funding problems within the Forest Department are therefore not about lack of 
capacity, but a lack of distribution.  
 
The suggestion that the ZFD did not want to follow in the footsteps of the ZAWA is also 
disingenuous. According to Jean-Michel Pavy (World Bank), the ZAWA, despite some 
severe problems, is still light years ahead of the ZFD in terms of management. There are 
now more protected areas in Zambia and game management has improved throughout 
the country. The ZAWA itself functions perfectly well as an institution and has excellent 
capacity, but has not been given support from government because it is semi-
autonomous. This has meant it has had to survive by relying on revenues from wildlife 
and hunting rather than from game parks. As Winnie Musonda, a UNDP advisor put it, 
“they might be broke, but they’ve done their job properly.” Financial concerns and the 
experience of the ZAWA were therefore poor reasons for terminating the ZFC. 
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FINIDA had even offered to pay all retrenchment and subsequent rehiring costs for the 
proposed ZFC and approval had been granted by those in charge of budgets and at the 
highest levels of government. According to one official, central government even went 
back to the ZFD in 2006 and said “let’s get this passed,” but the leadership refused. 
 
This last point suggests the most likely reason for the non-establishment of the ZFC – 
that it would have threatened the autonomy and jobs of those in charge. Donors were 
requesting a more professional unit, able to utilise the forest resource to its maximum 
potential. They also wanted to get rid of corruption, and demanded accountability. This 
is what had happened via the donor driven ZAWA process – and according to Davison 
Gumbo, head of CIFOR in Zambia, the leadership of the ZFD had determined not to 
make the same mistake again, preferring to retain the status quo of a traditional civil 
service entity because of the perks involved. Donor funds to the environmental sector for 
example, are plentiful, and travel to the spate of international conferences and meetings 
is lucrative and glamorous. Ultimately, the leadership of the ZFD could not recommend 
its own removal, and institutional rules and internal power plays and politics within the 
Department and the MTENR allowed them to delay the decision indefinitely.  
 
For the foreseeable future, the current configuration of power and interests within the 
ZFD and the MTENR means that Zambia is likely to carry on running behind the 
problem of deforestation. So long as the status quo remains convenient for those with 
decision-making power, this situation will not change. The prospect of a ZFC is 
effectively a non-starter as well, since it would cost more to implement today than it did 
back in 1999. The government is therefore now looking at changes to policy and 
legislation again, and in this regard, commissioned a re-drafting of the Forest Policy in 
2009. Once again, this document incorporates JFM principles and recommends 
wholesale changes to the way in which the ZFD runs. The pattern continues though; the 
document has remained in draft and has subsequently disappeared, with the ZFD’s 
leadership now claiming it needs to wait for policy guidance on the UN-REDD+ forest 
program before going ahead.  
 
Figure 16: Zebra in miombo woodland, Equuus burchelli, Northern Zambia. Image courtesy Stephen Robinson / WILDFOTO
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6 
The Structural Causes of 
Deforestation in Mozambique 
 
 
 
In this chapter, I examine Mozambique's record on deforestation, beginning with the 
massive resettlement process that took place following the end of the civil war in 1992. In the 
years that followed, demand for charcoal and land for agricultural smallholdings increased 
drastically as people returned to their rural homes. This coincided with structural adjustmet 
reforms that were designed to improve, amongst other things, the efficiency of the 
agricultural sector. However, while this has resulted in an increase in overall production in 
the last 20 years, productivity has declined, meaning more people are farming more land, 
less efficiently. The effects of this agricultural extensification have been compounded by a 
growing charcoal trade, driven by poverty, a lack of alternative livelihoods and the continued 
lack of access to electricity in urban areas of Mozambique.  
 
Forest governance during the immediate post war period has focused on the reconstruction 
of institutions and the passing of legislation, which culminated in the passage of the Forest 
Act of 1999 and the Lands Act of 2002. A spate of environmental legislation was also passed, 
setting up a dedicated ministry and mandating environmental impact assessment for all 
major developmental projects. However, the enforcement and the implementation of forest 
laws since then has provided some significant challenges. This is partially a result of the 
institutional arrangements for forest governance – the National Directorate of Land and 
Forest (DNTF) is housed within the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG), and therefore relies 
on it for funding.  
 
Nevertheless, the existence of strong policy guidelines and progressive legislation has 
stopped the worst depredations. The DNTF has a clear mandate, and provincial officials 
have guidelines to follow on licensing, export quotas and the granting of concessions and 
leaseholds. There have also been some encouraging advances in decentralisation and the 
implementation of CBNRM programs. In recent years, new challenges have arisen in the 
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form of illegal logging by foreign firms; however, as yet this is not a major threat to the 
health of Mozambique’s forests. The result is that while deforestation is still occurring at 
unsustainable levels, the problem is not as severe as it would have been in the absence of 
progressive legislation and clearly defined roles and guidelines for those in charge of forest 
governance.  
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Post war agricultural expansion 
 
Between 1977 and 1992, Mozambique suffered one of the most devastating and 
protracted civil wars in African history. In fifteen years, more than a million people were 
killed, and more than six million were displaced either as refugees or to the relative 
safety of cities, the coastline and major transport corridors (Hanlon 2010). Most of the 
country’s transport infrastructure such as roads, railways and bridges was destroyed or 
abandoned, and economic activity ground to a halt. By the end of the war it was 
estimated that the country’s GDP was around half of what it would have been in the 
absence of conflict (UNICEF 1989). In the immediate aftermath, rural areas saw an 
influx of many returning refugees; according to the United Nations, these numbered 
around 1.7 million people from six different countries (UNHCR 1996). The former 
refugees faced considerable challenges; entire villages had disappeared during the war, 
and much of the old colonial infrastructure had been either destroyed or had fallen into 
ruins. There were also conflicts over land and natural resources between former refugees 
and demobilised soldiers who had remained in the vicinity of their dismantled bases 
(Hatton et. al. 2001).  
 
Most rural migrants were forced to rely almost immediately on subsistence agriculture. 
However, they faced an uphill battle. The workforce had been drastically depleted, and 
in some places farm productivity had dropped to as little as one fifth of the regional 
average (Bruck 2005). The network of small cantinas that had existed in the colonial 
period for the purposes of bartering, purchasing inputs and acquiring credit had been 
almost completely destroyed, and farmers were forced to travel long distances to local 
markets instead (Norfolk 2004). Indigenous knowledge and traditional natural resource 
management systems were also generally weaker, as the new generation had been 
brought up away from the land. Initially, there was hope that the aid agencies pouring 
into Mozambique in the wake of the war would help, as they had professed great 
concern for the protection of natural resource and for reviving agricultural production. 
However, from around 1996 onwards, donor concerns shifted away from agricultural 
productivity towards social sectors, primarily in urban centres, leaving marginalised 
regions out of the picture (Wuyts 2001).  
 
It was decided instead that the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the agricultural sector 
should be left to market forces in line with the Economic and Social Rehabilitation 
Programme (ESRP) being implemented by the World Bank and the FRELIMO 
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government. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADER) would focus 
on providing public goods and adequate regulation, while direct interventions in 
everything considered to be the sphere of the private sector such as pricing, input and 
output markets, subsidies and marketing would be phased out. In 1993, subsidies on 
fertiliser were abolished and prices for major food products such as maize meal, cooking 
oil and rice were liberalised. In 1996, remaining controls on wheat, bread, rents, fuel, 
utilities and transportation fares were removed, and in 1997, minimum producer prices for 
white maize, beans, groundnuts, sunflower, raw cashew nut, cotton, mafurra, paddy and 
tobacco were either pegged to world prices or transformed to indicative prices only. 
Veterinary services, credit and marketing and input supply were also eliminated, and free 
or significantly subsidised inputs were limited to cases of natural disasters (World Bank 
2011).  
 
It quickly became apparent that the reforms had been premature. Far from improving 
productivity, rapid privatisation and the liberalisation of markets for agricultural goods 
had removed established support structures with little thought as to what might happen 
should the promised assistance from the private sector fail to materialise. In the absence of 
a guaranteed buyer and without either the required expertise or infrastructure to get their 
products to market, small scale farmers reverted back to subsistence farming. Supply side 
problems were particularly severe, as former state run companies were unable to adapt 
quickly enough to the harsh demands of the marketplace. The state owned seed company 
Sementes de Moçambique (Semoc) for example, had been privatised in 1993, but lacking 
an extensive commercial network struggled to survive. Production plummeted to just over 
5,000 tons in 1995 (well below the installed processing capacity of 18,000 tons/year), and in 
1998 Semoc was sold off to a Zimbabwean company (Coulter 1996; Coughlin 2006). As a 
result, by the early 2000s, 48 of Mozambique’s 128 administrative districts had no retail 
seed at all (World Bank 2005: 64). 
 
In 1998, a five year National Agricultural Program (PROAGRI I) was set up by a group 
of donors and MADER in order to reform what were seen as governance shortcomings 
at the heart of the problem. Led by the World Bank, its aims were to coordinate the 
fragmented patchwork of agricultural programs and build institutional capacity in 
MADER at the national, provincial, and district levels. PROAGR I was also intended to 
be a way of better managing donor intervention in the sector by moving away from 
project based aid and towards more direct public sector assistance (Norfolk 2004). 
However, despite some successes, such as the introduction of a modernized public 
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accounting system, PROAGRI I was largely considered to be a failure. According to 
Daniel Sousa, the World Bank’s project leader at the time, one of the main problems 
was the continued lack of capacity within MADER. Dspite their best intentions, donors 
were unable to create permanent institutional changes, and in many cases newly trained 
staff would leave for more lucrative jobs with other donors or within the private sector. 
There was also little to no leadership from the government which was preoccupied 
instead with large industrial projects and attracting foreign investment. 
 
PROAGRI I was succeeded by a second phase, PROAGRI II, which ran from 2005 to 
2009. It aimed to further build institutional capacity, increase food security, develop the 
commercial sector, increase the agricultural sector’s contribution to the economy and 
sustainably manage forest and wildlife resources (Nhantumbo 2009). However, once 
again, it proved difficult to translate the strategic aims into operational successes and in 
2006 the World Bank pulled out, complaining that the results had not been 
commensurate with the expenditure of resources. Today after two decades and billions 
of dollars of investment MADER is still notorious for its low level of human and physical 
resources, poor coordination and internally conflicting policy priorities. Around four to 
fiveper cent of Mozambique’s total GDP is spent in the agricultural sector, yet according 
to Dr Rafael Uiane, a senior researcher at the International Food Policy Research 
Institute (IFPRI), most of the MADER budget is in the form of salaries and non-
necessary equipment such as cars for mid-level to high level management.  
 
At the district level, farmers continue to complain of low or fluctuating producer prices, 
a lack of modern inputs and high transport costs to market. Productivity is the lowest in 
southern Africa – of a total of 3.8 million farms, only 144,000 use fertiliser (four per 
cent), and 90,000 of these are in Tete, which is dominated by commercial tobacco 
farming (Census 2010). Only 266,000 (seven per cent) use improved seeds, most of them 
emergency gifts from NGOs. Savings and credit facilities are almost entirely absent – just 
three per cent of farms have access to credit and this nearly always comes from the 
concessionaire companies managing large cash crop schemes. Technical assistance is also 
sparse; only 14 per cent of the population have access to extension services, with an 
average of 1.3 extension workers per 10,000 rural inhabitants (Virtanen & Ehrenprais 
2007). In 2010, around 1.6 million farms (42 per cent of the total) were forced to 
consume less than the normal amount of food at some point during the year. 
 
An extensive survey of rural smallholders in 2006 concluded that, “frequently, farmers 
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associate these conditions to periods following the structural adjustment program, which 
they perceive them to have introduced risk to their agricultural activities as prices 
become unstable” (Mole 2006). Statistics from the latest agricultural surveys and census 
indicate that overall agricultural production in the last two decades has broadly kept 
pace with economic growth, averaging 6.4 per cent between 1996 to 2007 (World Bank 
2011). However, researchers and policy analysts agree that most of these gains in 
production have come from increasing the area of land under cultivation, i.e. via 
agricultural extensification rather than intensification. In 1992, only five per cent of the 
country’s 36.1 million ha of arable land was under cultivation; by 2001 this had increased 
to 11 per cent, and by 2010 it exceeded 15 per cent (Boyd, Pereira & Zaremba 2000; 
World Bank 2006).  
 
The reason is that land availability is one of the few factors that is not a constraint for 
smallholders; the same study by Mole (2006) reveals that 55 per cent of typical farming 
households either start farming or increase their farm size by clearing virgin land. Since 
the majority of Mozambique's population lives in settlements that are either within or 
close by forests, this agricultural extensification has come largely at their expense. Land 
cover change as a result has been rapid – studies by Jansen et. al. (2008) and Temudo 
and Silva (2011) reveal how much of the previously virgin forest has been converted into 
either shifting cultivation with forests, or more permanent land under cultivation. Slash 
and burn is the dominant technique employed since it allows farmers to move onto new 
land very quickly and overcomes problems such as poor soil fertility and the lack of 
capital equipment such as chainsaws to clear the land.  
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Poverty, energy and the charcoal trade 
 
For rural Mozambicans, firewood collection and charcoal production offer an important 
source of income. Nhantumbo (2009) estimates that at least 50 to 60 per cent of the 
roughly 3.2 million families living in Mozambique's rural areas are engaged in activities 
related to this trade. Their degree of involvement ranges from seasonal activity in times 
of hardship to a significant proportion of a household’s income that can exceed 75 per 
cent (Herd 2007). In some cases, it appears to be an obvious choice. Samiro Megane, a 
former FAO environmental consultant, outlines it quite clearly, “what would you 
choose? Three to four months of hard work on your plot, with the possibility of having 
your harvest ruined by drought or pests at the end anyway, or one week of work with 
instant results and cash in your pocket?” However, while charcoal offers an easy source 
of income producers still earn very little. A case study by Herd (2007) for example, 
showed that 95 per cent of producers in Sofala Province earn less than a dollar a day 
while another by Nhantumbo et. al. (2003) showed that the annual income for full time 
producers in central Mozambique only averages between US$150 to US$260, well below 
the official poverty line.  
 
Accordingly, the charcoal trade is not a way for people in Mozambique to pull 
themselves out of poverty; rather, it acts as a quick way for the very poor to make money 
for essential products or as an activity of last resort in times of crisis (Wunder 2003). At 
the other end of the value chain are the retailers in urban areas. They are usually 
women, who make arrangements with the transporters to sell the charcoal and pay them 
afterwards. Like the producers they engage in retailing for subsistence needs and due to 
a lack of alternative employment opportunities. Many of them say they would have little 
alternative if the charcoal business was to be closed because of their age, educational 
level and lack of preparedness for formal jobs (Puna 2008). Their incomes vary between 
US$19 and US$54 a month, better than the producers, but not by much. As a general 
rule, the poorer the person, the greater their reliance on the production and sale of 
forest products such as firewood and charcoal for an overall share of their livelihoods. 
 
On the surface, this should be good news for Mozambique's forest resources – since the 
end of the war Mozambique’s economy has grown at an average rate of more than eight 
per cent, bringing almost three million people out of extreme poverty (AfDB 2011). 
According to proponents of ecological modernisation theory, growth should have 
created an income effect whereby people move away from both consuming and 
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producing fuelwood. The problem though, is that because Mozambique's economic 
growth has been primarily based on the post war expansion of agricultural production, 
one off mega projects and on donor assistance, it has not resulted in any real structural 
changes to the economy (see Castel-Branco & Ossemane 2009; Hanlon 2010; Cuangara 
& Hanlon 2010). Agriculture still accounts for 25 per cent of GDP and employs four out 
of every five people, while manufacturing, the next biggest sector, comprises only 12 per 
cent of GDP (and at least two thirds of this is accounted for by just one project – the 
Mozal aluminum smelter). Critics also argue that growth has not been very progressive. 
Boughton et. al. (2006), for example, have shown that 57 per cent of the total increase in 
consumption between 1996 and 2003 came from rich households and only eight per cent 
from poor households.  
 
In rural areas, the contrast has been even more pronounced: 70 per cent of the growth in 
consumption came from the top quintile, and only three per cent from the poorest. 
Moreover, poverty levels for the country as a whole have stagnated at around 55 per cent 
since 2003 and in rural areas have regressed to 57 per cent (Census 2010). According to 
Cuangara & Hanlon (2010) this means there are now two distinct groups in 
Mozambique’s rural areas. The first group, the top 40 per cent, earn more in cash than 
the value of what they produce for self consumption. A relatively minor proportion 
derive their income primarily from large scale commercial farming, formal employment 
or from their own businesses; the rest are small scale farmers who produce cash crops 
using chemical fertilisers and pesticides. Total family incomes range from US$1 to 
US$30 per day, of which half to two thirds is in cash. They also supplement their income 
through off farm wage labour, self employment and via remittances from family in cities 
and towns. This large off farm cash component means they are more productive farmers, 
even for their own consumption. These were the people that were pulled out of poverty 
between 1996 and 2003 and have subsequently seen a continued rise in income.  
 
The second group, the bottom 60 per cent, survive on a total income of under US$1 per 
day for the entire family. What little cash they have comes from small sales of crops or 
charcoal or from day labour on neighbours’ fields. They constitute what the authors call 
an ‘invisible majority’ caught in a poverty trap; too poor to participate in the market, and 
therefore incapable of using it to improve their situation (Canguara & Hanlon 2010: 10-
12. See also Addison 2008). Because they operate using such small quantities, everything 
is more expensive. For example, selling maize by the lata (a large can used as a measure) 
earns less per kilogram than selling by the sack or lorry load. The same principle applies 
143 
 
to the buying or selling of fuel, transport, clothing and medicines. It also applies at the 
community level – when no one has money to buy it makes little sense to produce more 
to sell on the local market. For this group total income has declined significantly since 
2002, and they are only marginally in the cash economy. It is these people who continue 
to rely on fuelwood in order to survive – and since 1992 their numbers have increased by 
over 30 per cent (Census 2010).  
 
The other reason for the lack of an income effect is that most of Mozambique's 
population continues to rely primarily on wood for their energy needs. Only 13.2 per 
cent of households have access to electricity and in some provinces, such as Cabo 
Delgado and Zambezia, the figure is as low as two per cent. Even in the province of 
Maputo, coverage is only 24.5 per cent (Mulder & Tembe 2008). The problem is not a 
lack of power sources – the Cahora Bassa and Mphanda Nkuwa hydropower plants on 
the Zambezi River have a generating capacity of over 2,200 MW between them. Rather, 
it is distribution; due to the lack of power transmission lines and distribution networks 
installed capacity of the national power utility, Electricidade de Moçambique (EDM), is 
only 240 MW. By 2008 for example, more than 15 years after the end of the war, 50 of 
the 123 district capitals were still relying on diesel or gas generators (Chabal 2010).  
 
While the EDM has had a sustained electrification program in place since the 1990s, the 
sheer logistics of its task are overwhelming. Mozambique is a massive country – over 
800,000 km2, and relatively sparsely populated. The majority of its citizens living in small 
towns and villages, often far from paved roads and urban centres. As Antonio Saide, 
Chairman of the National Directorate of Renewable Energies put it to me, “this is not a 
small little country like France!” Consumers are also often unable or unwilling to use 
alternative energies such as gas and electricity. The initial investment needed to acquire 
a gas stove for example, is at least US$25 while the other necessary equipment is 
estimated at around US$100, two times the minimum monthly wage (Puna 2008). Gas 
and electricity are also not available in small quantities – the minimum size for a bottle 
of gas is 1kg, which costs the same as a 60kg bag of charcoal. According to Osvaldo 
Manso, a consultant with the National Directorate for Lands and Forestry, the gas 
supply chain is also often interrupted, making it less reliable.  
 
Thus, despite the greater overall cost it is easier for the urban poor to pay for a few 
bricks of charcoal at a time. In Maputo for example, someone can go to the local 
markets and buy themselves a meal by spending MZN5 for a tomato, MZN3 for a 
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handful of rice, MZN4 for a small fish, and MZN10 for three pieces of charcoal. This is 
about the average earnings of a beggar or a local car guard in a day. In many cases, there 
is a stated cultural preference – many Mozambicans prefer food cooked on charcoal over 
food cooked on gas or electricity stoves. Brouwer and Falcao (2004) for example, showed 
that in Maputo, many higher income households use a mix of fuelwood and electricity 
despite the latter being cheaper.  
 
In a country where poverty is an absolute priority the issue of charcoal production is 
therefore primarily an issue of energy access rather than environmental degradation. As 
long as people continue cutting charcoal for their own usage and in order to supplement 
their income, government is unlikely to do anything about it. Alima Issufo, the head of 
the Forestry Department, admits that there is little they can do; as she points out, “you 
can't tell a hungry person to stop cutting for food and energy.” She suggests that a 
collective solution involving other ministries such as the Ministry of Energy is required, 
but that at the moment the political will does not exist. This has created gridlock; 
currently charcoal is too cheap to develop alternatives, but still too expensive for the 
poor. Accordingly until alternative energy sources become a reality, or until 
Mozambique attains sustained and lasting poverty reduction, charcoal production will 
continue as a major driver of deforestation.  
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Forest governance and legislation  
 
The rules and regulations governing access to Mozambique's forest resources are 
contained in the 1997 Land Act, the 1999 Forest and Wildlife Act and the 2002 Forest 
and Wildlife Regulation. Taken together, they constitute a landmark achievement for 
environmental law in southern Africa since they formalised, for the first time in 
Mozambican history, the rights of communities with regard to access, management, 
control and benefits from land and forest resources. The precedent was created by the 
1997 Land Act, which recognised and protected traditional rights to habitation. A 
mechanism to allow communities to formally acquire these rights was created via what is 
known as the DUAT. This can be granted to those occupying land according to 
customary norms and practices or to those who occupy land in ‘good faith’ for at least 
ten years. 
 
Crucially, the Land Act allowed for the recognition of DUATs without the need for 
formalisation and registration. The drafters recognized that local people had neither the 
know how nor resources to handle a registration process. They also knew that public 
land services were (and still are) unable to manage the workload of registering thousands 
of newly recognized customary land rights. Mandatory registration would simply cause 
most holders of customary DUATs to lose their newly legalised rights (Norfolk & 
Tanner 2007). Accordingly, the Act allowed communities to automatically hold a single 
state DUAT in their own name, with responsibility for the internal allocation and 
management of land rights taking place through their own customary systems. Lower 
order rights acquired by families and individuals in this way are equivalent to a state 
DUAT and do not need to be registered. 
 
The third method of acquiring a DUAT is by request to the relevant state body. These 
are granted on a 50 year state leasehold, renewable for another 50 years. In order to 
avoid conflict those requesting new rights must carry out a consultation with local 
communities to ensure the land is free or to determine the conditions by which local 
rights are given up in favour of the newcomer. The Land Act also recognizes the right to 
private property but only to improvements and constructions made on or to land over 
which a private person or firm has a DUAT. These assets can be bought and sold, while 
the underlying DUAT is administratively transferred to the new asset owner. The overall 
aim was to ensure that communities would have access to land, but would still be able to 
negotiate agreements around land use rights with private investors. Under this 
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arrangement the role of the state is limited to ensuring that minimum standards are 
applied in these negotiations, that registration complies with technical standards and 
that the taxation system functions effectively (Norfolk 2004).  
 
Many of the provisions of land use rights created by the Land Act were built upon by the 
subsequent Forests and Wildlife Act of 1999 and its Regulation of 2002. Communities 
were granted the legal right to freely access forest resources for subsistence needs not 
only in open access forests, but also production forests and protected areas such as 
national parks, reserves and cultural and historic sites. Two important instruments were 
included in order to try incentivise communities to participate in the co-management of 
those resources. The first, Article 102, stated that a part of the revenues generated 
through forestry and wildlife exploration should be allocated to communities living in the 
areas where resources are extracted. The actual share was later defined as 20 per cent by 
the 2002 Regulation.  
 
The second instrument, Article 36, required those applying for concessions to enter into 
consultations with local communities before the license is granted. The consultation 
process was designed to encourage long term partnerships between local communities 
and private sector investors in rural areas and to reduce the potential for later conflict. 
According to Nhantumbo (2009) these various provisions were based on the recognition 
that it was inefficient to have the state serving so many functions in the sector; it was 
already in charge of policy formulation, implementation and law enforcement. The hope 
was that not only would the new legislation lift the burden of management from the 
state, but that it would make communities better off financially.  
 
However, as Johnstone et. al. (2004) point out, there was a significant disparity between 
the Land Act and the Forests and Wildlife Act. While the former enabled the transfer of 
real rights to land, the latter maintained stronger de jure state ownership of forest 
resources, granting only subsistence level user rights to the community. This means that 
communities wishing to exploit forest resources for commercial gain are required to 
apply for a license, effectively putting them on the same playing field as the private 
sector. Originally, a Delegation of Powers had been drawn up to allow communities 
commercial rights without having to go through formal procedures; however, according 
to Duncan McQueen, a senior researcher at the IUCN who was involved in negotiations 
at the time, it was never passed because government wished to use land to generate 
money from outside investors.  
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The Forests and Wildlife Law also left a number of provisions open to further 
regulation. These included the delegation of power to management committees; 
mechanisms for revenue sharing from the 20 per cent community share and from fines 
for illegal activities, the content of management plans and appropriate levels of 
commercial taxes. As a result a number of further decrees and ministerial diplomas were 
developed and approved between 2000 and 2008. Some observers, such as Kir & Falcao 
(2004) and Bila & Salmi (2003) have complained that the failure to initially implement 
these further legal instruments created confusion and a negative atmosphere and led to a 
lack of motivation amongst many involved in the sector. Generally though, most 
observers agree that the principles of the legislation are strong and progressive, and that 
it has provided the land, wildlife and forest sectors with a firm base from which to work 
from.  
 
The passage of the Forests and Wildlife Law also coincided with a broader overall push 
towards decentralisation of natural resource management by the Mozambican state. In 
2000, traditional chiefs and headmen had been formally recognized as authorities within 
the government's administrative framework, and in 2003 the Law on the Organization of 
the Local State (LOLE) and its 2005 Regulation were passed, significantly strengthening 
the position of districts by giving them executive competencies and their own budgets. 
The LOLE also formalised the participation of local communities through the 
establishment of the District Consultative Councils, which brought together all relevant 
parties in decision making for local development. This created an important avenue for 
the channelling of local concerns into the district development planning and budget 
making processes (Brouwer 2008).  
 
At the same time, efforts were being made to disseminate information on the new rights 
and entitlements of communities via the Land Campaign. In 2005, the Land Campaign 
became permanently institutionalised as the Land Forum, although donors continued 
financing several NGO groups to carry on the awareness raising process. This resulted in 
hundreds of information sessions with community groups, community leadership and 
local administrative structures (Norfolk 2004). Although there were some criticisms of 
the way in which consultation with community groups was carried out, the campaign was 
successful in reaching thousands of communities who would have otherwise had no 
source of information about land rights.  
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Knowledge dissemination also benefited from parallel efforts to establish CBNRM 
projects. The first CBNRM project in Mozambique, Tchuma Tchato, was initiated in 
1994 in part of the Zambezi Valley in Tete Province. It was based on the experiences of 
CBNRM in Zimbabwe which emphasized that conservation must extend beyond 
protected areas into the wider landscape, requiring a compromise between the needs of 
wildlife and those of local communities (Virtanen 2005). In 1997 the focus shifted from 
wildlife to forest management, with pilot projects established in Maputo, Manica and 
Nampula provinces as part of PROAGRI I and with financial support from the FAO, 
the Dutch government, the Ford Foundation and the IUCN. Over the years many NGOs 
have also supported CBNRM in Mozambique. In 1998 there were 32 projects, in 2001 
there were 42 and by 2011, more than 70 existed.  
 
According to Nhantumbo et. al. (2006) these experiments in CBNRM have been 
instrumental in developing best practices on areas such as community leadership 
structures and democratic processes at the local level. They have also facilitated 
community land delimitation and created management plans and small enterprise 
development groups. In the process they have helped introduce the concepts of 
community management to various stakeholders and created important platforms for 
dialogue. Most importantly, they have produced measurable benefits in terms of the 
growth of number of species, biodiversity conservation and the harvesting of wood for 
firewood. This is attested to in comprehensive documentation by Nhantumbo et. al 
(2006); Sitoe at al (2007) and (Nhantumbo 2009). Communities have also started to 
receive direct tangible benefits from the commercial exploitation of forest and wildlife 
resources. The system has only effectively been operating since 2005, and already there 
have been reports of communities using the revenues to invest in social infrastructure 
such as roads, boreholes, schools and clinics, invest in community law enforcement, or 
provide small business infrastructure such as grain mills. Others have been able to 
extract significant concessions in cash or social investments from operators as a result of 
consultation requirements (ibid).  
 
However, there are now concerns that these successes will not prove sustainable. 
According to proceedings from a recent CBNRM conference, five years is the minimum 
investment period before enterprises are able to generate positive net benefits (MINAG 
2011). The problem is that in many cases, facilitators (i.e. donors) have left before the 
projects have become self sustaining. Reports have also shown that some of the 
consultation processes between communities and the private sector as mandated by both 
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the Lands Act and the Forests and Wildlife Act have experienced problems (Norfolk 
2002). Local administrative structures provide no support or guidance, and local elites 
often manipulate the consultation process for their own benefit. Structural problems 
exist, such as the inclusion of a mandatory financial ‘incentive’ for the community group 
and the lack of a system for capturing the terms of agreements and monitoring 
compliance. And, although there is now a high awareness on the part of communities of 
the requirement that they be consulted in applications for private land use rights, they 
often complain that there are other ‘local structures’ that are consulted in their name 
and that the quality of consultations has been unsatisfactory.  
 
There have also been complaints about the slow pace at which communities have 
received their share of the 20 per cent of revenues from forest extraction activities. An 
implementing mechanism for the distribution of these revenues was only approved in 
2005, more than three years after the proportion had been decided by the 2002 
Regulation. It required that communities be represented by a natural resource 
management committee and that the committee must have a bank account. Although 
this seems a minor requirement, most rural communities need assistance in establishing 
a committee and training it in basic legal and management issues. In addition few 
districts are served by financial institutions and very few rural residents have identity 
cards (Sitoe & Ttichque 2006). These factors have made take up slow – by 2009, more 
than 1100 communities had been identified as eligible, yet only 542 had received funds 
totalling US$1.9 million (about US$3,500 per community) (DNTF 2009). The risk 
therefore is that the enthusiasm and hope generated by the prospect of improved 
livelihoods is changing into frustration as CBNRM in forested areas is seen to meet only 
one objective – environmental sustainability – and not the improved income that people 
have been promised (Nhantumbo & Izidine 2009).  
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Institutional arrangements 
 
During the colonial and post independence era, Mozambique's forests and wildlife 
services were generally well regarded. Foreign consultants were often brought in for 
collaboration and assistance and there was a considerable effort to recruit and train the 
next generation of field agents. Between 1977 and 1981 for example, approximately 28 
Mozambicans, with the equivalent of 6th grade level education underwent an intensive 
one year course in parks administration, wildlife management and selected academic 
courses at the newly created Gorongosa Wildlife Training School. A parallel course was 
run for forestry staff, while in service training was provided to existing medium level 
Mozambican staff (Hatton et. al. 2001). Unfortunately the civil war brought most of 
these efforts to a halt. Protected areas and reserves were abandoned to the rebels, 
communities were forced to flee and almost all forms of government controls were 
stopped due an inability to patrol. After three rangers were killed on duty most wardens 
and rangers were relocated to headquarters in Maputo or in the provincial capitals.  
 
Following the Peace Accord in 1992 responsibility for all policy, legislative and 
regulatory functions related to the forest sector fell to the Forestry and Wildlife Services 
(DNFFB), part of what was then known as the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development (MADER). Milagre Navunga, who was the head of the DNFFB between 
1992 and 1995 recounts how, in the early years, much of their focus was simply on 
tracking down missing colleagues and investigating what infrastructure had survived. A 
major problem was landmines, and they would often have to ask former FRELIMO 
soldiers to guide them into former forest reserves. In a few instances, where the risk was 
too great, they would have to fly in by helicopter. Some offices were completely derelict, 
with trees growing out of the windows and wildlife sheltering inside. In other areas they 
would find piles, two to three stories high, of animal skeletons left behind by the roving 
army butcheries.  
 
Meanwhile, at the DNFFB headquarters there was concerted attempt to try to develop a 
coherent set of policies for forest governance and legislation to accompany them 
(Norfolk 2004). This began in 1991 with the drawing up of a provisional programme 
under a UNDP/FAO team. It was followed in 1993 by a Forestry Pre-Programme for a 
period of 18 months with finance provided from the UNDP. In 1995, a National 
Programme of Forestry and Wildlife was prepared, and in 1996 an Investment 
Programme for the Forest and Wildlife Sector, was drawn up with technical assistance 
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from the FAO/UNDP. In 1997 a substantive policy finally appeared when the Forestry 
and Wildlife Policy and Strategy was adopted by the Council of Ministers. In the same 
year the Land Act was passed, followed in 1999 by the Forestry and Wildlife Law and its 
Regulation in 2002, representing a major triumph for forestry policy in Mozambique.  
 
In 2001 however, the forest sector underwent a series of institutional changes. A 
Presidential Decree transferred ‘wildlife in protected areas’ (i.e. in parks, national 
reserves, hunting areas and areas of community development) to the Ministry of 
Tourism (MITUR), leaving behind ‘wildlife outside protected areas’ under the 
administration of the DNFFB. And in 2005 MADER itself was restructured, losing 
Rural Development to become simply the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAG). Under the 
new arrangement the DNFFB was combined with the Lands Directorate to become the 
National Directorate of Lands and Forestry (DNTF). By combining forests (which cover 
more than 50 per cent of the country’s surface) together with lands (encompassing all 
continental mass) the DNTF became the key institution in addressing issues of equitable 
access to resources, benefit sharing and sustainable resource management in 
Mozambique (Nhantumbo 2009).  
 
However the new arrangement was a poor deal for the forest sector. When forests and 
wildlife were still housed in the same department, both received a similar level of 
attention. Now, since land is politically more important than forests, it tends to be 
prioritised. As Alima Issufo (Head of the DNTF) remarks, “it still feels like we're on 
trial.” Forests are not high on MINAG’s list of priorities either; forestry is the only sub-
sector of agriculture for which the minister has no assistant, and is regularly ignored in 
favour of other initiatives. One of the major stated aims of the agricultural sector in 
recent years for example, has been the improvement of food security. As Nhantumbo 
and Izidine (2009: 11) point out though, “in a low input agriculture based economy such 
as that of Mozambique, agricultural production increase results from area expansion, 
often accompanied by unsustainable practices such as slash and burn. Therefore, while 
food security may improve, the forest cover and the carbon sink potential may be 
reduced – particularly if the crops grown are annual rather than perennial.”  
 
Forests have also received the short end of the stick when it comes to the allocation of 
ministerial funds. Under the current arrangements most of of the DNTF’s revenues (54 
per cent) go towards the centrally administered Agricultural Development Fund (FDA), 
with the rest going to communities (20 per cent), the Ministry of Finance (20 per cent) 
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and the SPFFB (6 per cent). Fines are distributed between the FDA (50 per cent) and 
the SPFFB (50 per cent). Forestry accounts for the bulk of the FDA's disbursement and 
in recent years its overall contribution has increased noticeably thanks to a readjustment 
of timber royalties and increased international demand for precious species. Yet, as 
Table 4 shows, only a small proportion of those revenues are regularly returned to the 
DNTF for activities like reforestation and law enforcement. This arrangement appears 
even more perverse when one considers that many of the agricultural activities funded by 
the FDA contribute to the problems experienced by the forest sector in the first place. 
However it appears unlikely that the arrangement will change; according to Carla 
Cuambe (UN-FAO) the DNTF received a stern rebuke from the Minister of Agriculture 
when it proposed getting some of its revenues back at an internal meeting in 2010. 
 
Year 
Total forest 
sector revenues 
(millions US$) 
Forest sector 
revenues 
allocated to 
FDA (millions 
US$) 
FDA 
expenditure 
(millions US$) 
FDA allocated 
to the forest 
sector (millions 
US$) 
2002 0.66 - 1.06 - 
2003 2.23 1.5 1.48 0.18 (8%) 
2004 2.43 1.79 2.2 - 
2005 4.96 3.26 3.23 0.43 (13%) 
2006 5.9 3.36 7.24 1.40 (41%) 
2007 6.16 3 9.39 1.50 (50%) 
2008 4.36 4.3 - 0.40 (9%) 
 
Table 4: Mozambique forest sector revenues and financing.  
Sources: Kir & Falcao (2004); Nhantumbo (2009) and World Bank (2011).  
 
Of course, not all funding comes from the government. In the last decade, bilateral and 
multilateral donors including Norway, Italy, Germany, the FAO, SADC, the EU and the 
World Bank have made millions of dollars available to the forest sector via a series of 
programs. These ranged from support for community forestry to forest inventories and 
law enforcement programs, to the implementation of legislation and the provision of 
credit to forest industries. However this money has often been targeted at specific 
interventions and the bulk has been controlled by the donor institutions themselves. 
Accordingly, it has not provided financial independence to the DNTF. Moreover much 
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of it has not been spent; between 2007 and 2009, of the US$171 million made available 
from external sources US$42 million was not used (Nhantumbo 2009). The DNTF 
suffers therefore not only from a lack of funding but also a limited capacity to absorb 
and spend it when does become available. 
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Law enforcement and departmental capacity 
 
One of the main concerns of the environmental community in Mozambique is that while 
the legislation governing forests and wildlife is progressive, the government has failed in 
implementing and enforcing the laws. Responsibility for this is the duty of the Provincial 
Services of Forestry and Wildlife (SPFFB) which carries out this function through an 
inspection service (fiscalizaçao) in the field. It has however, experienced significant 
problems since the end of the war, when its inspectors first began encountering newly 
returning refugees moving into previously innaccessible areas. Because the resettlement 
process was regarded as a social issue little thought was given to the potential impact on 
forest resources. Moroever the issue of forest law enforcement at the time was a political 
non-starter; as Milagre Navunga (former head of DNFFB) recounts, the unnofficial 
government positition was that, “after fifteen years of suffering, the last thing we should 
do to our newly returned refugees is make any of their activities illegal.”  
 
The SPFFB were also woefully understaffed. According to Ana-Paula Reis, head of the 
SPFFB in Manica between 1991 and 1997, there were only 15 to 20 fiscaix available for 
the entire province, and around 300 for the country as a whole. They had no uniforms, 
and were badly paid – she received an annual salary of MZN8,000 a year, and the law 
enforcement officers between MZN1,000 and MZN2,000. An internal SPFFB report at 
the time also revealed that staff were unmotivated and demoralised due the low level of 
support, the lack of equipment and transport, concern about corruption, lack of 
leadership at the provincial level and a lack of contact with the DNFFB headquarters 
(DNFFB 1994). Their job was made even harder by the lack of effective enforcement by 
traditional authorities who were either absent or still re-establishing their authority over 
subsistence activities (Costa et. al. 1993). During the colonial era for example, traditional 
chiefs had overseen strict laws regarding the cutting of trees and the setting of fires. 
When civil war broke out though, the traditional system broke down. By the time people 
returned to their lands, many were not old enough to remember those laws, and 
proceeded to clear and burn unsupervised. 
 
The approval of the Forests and Wildlife Law and its Regulation in 2002 was supposed 
to improve the situation. Article 112 of the Regulation established that 50 per cent of the 
fines collected from illegal activities should be given to forest patrol agents and 
community members who participate in law enforcement activities or report 
infringements. Initially this had a noticeable effect – the application of non-compliance 
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penalties and sales of confiscated wood increased from US$17,700 in 1999 to 
US$172,000 in 2003 (World Bank 2005). The Regulation also established a rate of 20 per 
cent of the base salary of an inspector and assistant inspector as an additional benefit as 
compensation for the risk involved in their work. However while the implementation of 
the salary supplement was straightforward the distribution of fines was more difficult to 
implement, since it suffered from the same problem as other forest revenues which 
reverted to the budget of MINAG. By 2009, of the total value of fines issued by the 
SPFFBs, only around one quarter had been paid. In addition there was no provision 
made for the desegregation between state enforcement and cases in which the 
community has been the reporter (or informant) of the infractions. As a result, the 
incentives have not always worked as well as intended. 
 
Moreover thanks to the aforementioned institutional arrangements and a continued lack 
of funding there has been little improvement in overall capacity. By 2004 there were only 
435 active forestry and wildlife inspectors attached to the SPFFB, and following the 2005 
restructuring many of these were allocated to parks and reserves under MITUR. In 
2009, the entire DNTF consisted of 86 office staff, and there were only 345 forestry law 
enforcement officers in the SPFFB (Nhantumbo 2009). There is also lack of DNTF 
technical assistance to the provinces in forest management, industry, inventories, zoning 
and wildfires, and a noticeable lack of data collection and systematisation. The majority 
of inspectors (around 85 per cent) are either elementary level or basic level technicians 
with little or no vocational training and, despite the salary boost in 2002, are still poorly 
paid. A number of district offices lack any form of communication equipment such a 
radio, and armed patrols are often impossible due to a lack of weapons. Most provinces 
have only one or two cars and a handful of motorcycles available. Most of these are old 
and experience frequent breakdowns. 
 
The overall lack of coordination and harmonisation at all administrative levels has 
resulted in some noticeable gaps in the way in which certain laws are interpreted. An 
example is given by Dr Teresa Alves, a forester at the Institute for Agricultural Research 
(IIAM), who points out that while community users are allowed to use forest resources 
for subsistence use, in order to do so they have to clear cut. However as soon as they 
have clear cut they are not allowed to sell the timber for commercial use. This makes 
little sense – once the area is cleared the wood might as well be put towards productive 
uses. For example, why not let it be used by those who have applied for charcoal 
licenses? Another loophole pointed out by Sitoe and Ttchique (2006) is that it is possible 
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to transport reasonable quantities of forest products for subsistence use without transit 
tickets. This situation has led to commercial operators’ use of bicycle riding transporters, 
who carry two to four bags of charcoal as though for subsistence, thereby avoiding 
payment of licence fees. Officials in the town of Beira for example, have reported cyclists 
transporting as many as 400 bags of charcoal a day in total, clearly for commercial 
purposes.  
 
An interview with Maria Augusta, head of the SPFFB in Sofala, reveals how many of 
these challenges work in practice. Her headquarters are based in Beira, where there are 
17 employees in three departments – forests, wildlife outside protected areas, and 
enforcement. She is also in charge of the six employees for each of the five fixed road 
posts in the province, and one or two fiscaix in each of the 12 districts. According to her 
the resources are woefully inadequate – she would need five fiscaix per district and at 
least another ten fixed road posts in order to carry out proper enforcement. There are 
only two cars in the entire province, both of which are not working because of engine 
damage.  
 
Her biggest problem is the illegal trade in charcoal which is used to supply both Beira 
and the more distant Maputo. She says it is a simple matter of economics – a bag of 
charcoal in Sofala costs MZN100 yet retails in Maputo for MZN400, creating a thriving 
trade. Licenses for charcoal cost MZN11 per bag however, these are only enforced at 
road posts, and therefore almost impossible to regulate. In the agricultural sector the 
biggest problem is the lack of accurate information on land usage; without it her fiscaix 
are unable to enforce zoning laws. This creates major problems with human-wildlife 
conflicts and results in widespread illegal agricultural activities in the forest reserves. 
Fire is also a major problem since the first thing local users do when they acquire a new 
piece of land is to set it alight in order to clear the grasses and begin farming. In the dry 
season, this results in uncontrolled and widespread forest fires.  
 
The reality of daily enforcement duties is explained by Nhagumbo Diuis Ant'onio, the 
fiscal for Cheringoma, a district about 100km from Beira. His salary is MZN5,433 
(US$185) per month, a little higher than average since he has a high school education 
and has been working there since 2008. He receives a petrol allowance of seven litres a 
day which gives him a range of 70km; however he says he would need to do about 120 
km a day to conduct the job properly. Since most charcoal production in the area is for 
domestic usage his main job is the supervision of the two game farms and eight 
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commercial concessions in the area. While he seldom needs to visit the game farms he 
says the concessions are consistently in breach of the law governing resource extraction 
and that he regularly issues them with fines. When I visited, there were two impounded 
lorries and some confiscated wood next to the office – one lot of 23,494 m3 with a 
MZN41,748 fine, one of 17,324m3 with a MZN38,513 fine, and a third lot of 13,390m3 
with a MZN36,600 fine. Once the operators pay they are allowed to go free; however, 
the wood remains and is auctioned off. In practice the operators will often buy the same 
wood again at the auction since its value is still higher once sold off.  
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Commercial forestry and illegal logging 
 
One area in which the DNTF and SPFFB’s lack of capacity has been keenly felt is 
commercial forestry and in particular, the problem of illegal logging. Although not a 
direct cause of deforestation when conducted in an unsustainable or uncontrolled 
fashion, this can result in forest degradation, and contributes indirectly to deforestation 
by opening up new areas of primary forest to other users. In some cases, illegal logging 
has also reduced monitoring interest – once all the valuable timber in area has 
disappeared officials have had less of an incentive to look after the forests there. The 
surrounding area of Beira for example, was heavily logged after the war and has now 
been abandoned to charcoal and agriculture. Many of these difficulties have been 
related to the lack of enforcement, others are related to the way in which the commercial 
sector has been administered and legislated for by the government. That said, the story 
of commercial forestry in Mozambique in the last two decades is not uniformly negative. 
There have also been some notable successes such as the implementation of higher taxes 
on the exports of precious species and the growing salience of the issue within higher 
government circles.  
 
During the colonial and post colonial period and for the first decade after the war, the 
management of Mozambique’s forest resources was the exclusive responsibility of the 
state. With a few exceptions commercial logging was conducted based on simple timber 
extraction plans that were drawn up without any consideration to sustainability. The 
industry was dominated by traders of South African origin, who worked via a system of 
forward finance by providing chainsaws and capital to Mozambican logging operators in 
exchange for timber. While operating fees existed they were not enforced in practice. In 
2001 though, following the passage of the Forests and Wildlife Act, government 
introduced long term concessions to private operators on the proviso that they included 
approved management plans. These were required to have the names of tree species to 
be subject for exploration, the planned annual allowable cut for the first five years, any 
industrial or construction plans, mechanisms for law enforcement and monitoring and 
benefit sharing arrangements for local communities.  
 
An annual simple license was also introduced. Exploration under this regime was 
granted exclusively to Mozambican operators and local communities and limited to pre-
defined tree species, in a given area, and for a quantity not exceeding 500 m3. The stated 
goal of the DNTF was to phase out the annual license in favour of longer term 
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concessions over time; hence all applicants were requested to submit a basic forest 
management plan as well. The legislation came into effect in 2002 and subsequent 
demand for both forms of license has been high. The total number of long term 
concessions granted by the end of 2008 was 156, covering an area of 6.2 million ha, and 
between 400 to 600 annual licenses are granted every year (Nhantumbo & Izidine 2009). 
However compliance with their associated regulations has been difficult to enforce. 
There are not enough qualified personnel to conduct the kind of monitoring required 
and many of the administrative districts do not have copies of the forest licenses or up to 
date lists of areas on which to base the negotiation of licences.  
 
In practical terms this had made it almost impossible for the fiscaix and district 
authorities to monitor licensed volumes, and control often ends up being conducted 
based on what forest operators state verbally. (Ribeiro 2009). Many concessionaires, 
secure in the knowledge that they are unlikely to be monitored, have thus designed their 
management plans merely to ensure that the concession will be acquired rather than as 
an accurate indication of planned field level activities. Once approved the plan is 
effectively ignored. Others do not even bother; of the 167 concessions approved by 2009, 
76 had no management plan at all. Similarly annual license holders have made no 
attempt to prepare even the most basic plans. They sell their timber to transport 
middlemen and agents, and because enforcement is weak they are often able to exceed 
their annual allowable cut.  
 
As Table 5 on the following page shows, the licenses have not been phased out either; 
despite pledges from the DNTF, the total number of operators actually increased from 
448 in 2002 to 616 in 2008. A decade after the introduction of the legislation, the volume 
harvested by annual license holders still accounts for double that of the long term 
concessionaires. As Nhantumbo (2009) states, until adequate regulation and technical 
support becomes available existing annual operators are unlikely to either become 
concessionaires or leave the sector since the licenses are still an important source of 
employment and income. Alima Issufo (Head of the DNTF) admits as much, saying that 
policies and strategies are no longer enough and that a reduction in the numbers of 
annual licenses will now require a legal instrument. 
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Year 
Concessions 
approved 
Concessions with 
management plans 
Annual licenses 
2001 32 1   
2002 20 0 448 
2003 29 5 434 
2004 13 8 495 
2005 6 26 462 
2006 26 20 630 
2007 10 8 637 
2008 19 12 616 
2009 12 11 479 
TOTAL 150 91 4201 
 
Table 5: Evolution of the Mozambique’s two commercial harvesting regimes.  
Sources: DNTF (2009) and Nhantumbo (2009) 
 
In 2003 higher timber fees were introduced. The aim was to curb spiralling profits among 
forest industries and redress the low government revenues from the sector (FGLG 
2008). Forest tree species were placed into five different classes, and tax rates were 
calculated to allow reasonable but not excessive profits for the industry – although the 
amounts were still marginal compared to comparable tax rates in other countries 
(Rytkonen 2002). A ban on the exports of first class round timber species was also 
imposed, with the aim of encouraging local processing. However the move caused a 
furore amongst operators, local governments and politicians, based on the fear that the 
sector would be forced to cut production and that illegal cutting would dominate. 
According to Duncan Macqueen (IIED) there was also considerable opposition from 
former military interests in many of the provinces, something which created a lot of fear 
amongst those attempting to get the laws passed.  
 
A wave of lobbying via provincial governors to Ministers followed, and at the National 
Forestry Forum in 2003/2004, at least four pieces of proposed legislation were voted 
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down. A resulting ministerial diploma cut rates by 50 per cent and a 40 per cent fee 
reduction was also granted for all logs processed domestically, rising to 75 per cent for 
the three most popular species, umbila, chanfuta, (Pterocarpus angolensis) and jambirre 
(Millettia stuhlmannii). In 2004 these three species were upgraded to precious class in 
order to get around the ban on first class exports. These changes can be seen in in Table 
6, below. The problem with the new measures is that as Kir & Falcao (2004) point out, 
they have effectively acted as subsidies to compensate for the technical and economic 
inefficiency of most forestry operators. On the other hand revenues in the forest sector 
have greatly increased. Following the initial fee revision, revenues increased almost five 
fold from MZN12 million (US$0.5 million) in 2002 to MZN54 million (US$2.26 million) 
in 2003. By 2007 total sector revenues were MZN185 million, of which around 85 per 
cent was made up of license fees. However as previously described, a large proportion of 
these revenues has been directed towards funding non-forestry related activities by 
MINAG. 
 
Wood Class 
Old license fees, pre-2003  
(1000s MZN) 
New license fees, post-2003 
(US$) 
Precious 105,000 8.5 
1st class 65,000 5.2 
2nd class 45,000 3.6 
3rd class 30,000 2.4 
4th class 20,000 1.6 
Charcoal 2,500 0.3 
Others 25000 2 
 
Table 6: Commercial timber license fees in Mozambique 
Source: World Bank (2005) 
 
To make matters worse, illegal logging by overseas operators has increased substantially 
in recent years. This logging pressure is felt mainly on the most valuable commercial 
species which due to the low density nature and openness of Mozambican forests, are 
much easier to find, access and remove. In 2002 clandestine timber production was 
estimated to account for between 50 and 70 per cent of the total national production and 
the extraction of valuable trees at between two and four times its sustainable potential 
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(Reyes 2003). Since then the situation has deteriorated, as documented in a seminal 
report by Mackenzie (2006) on illegal logging in the province of Zambezia. Her research 
showed how Chinese logging companies entered the market aggressively in the early 
2000s, and have quickly managed to out compete other traders with better timber 
purchase prices. They have continued the forward financing system established by South 
African companies in the 1990s, providing trucks and chainsaws (mainly second hand 
and imported from China) and have acted as middlemen and transporters for annual 
license holders. Operators bribe officials at roadblocks and ports, and export the 
unprocessed logs to China.  
 
A follow up report by Mackenzie (2009) and a more in depth one by Kannounikof & 
Falcao (2011) have found a similar situation in the province of Cabo Delgado. According 
to these reports, there have been two major drivers for the recorrida para o mato (rush 
to the bush). The first is the failure to monitor the transportation of timber and other 
forestry resources between different administrative regions, as well as on the way to the 
ports and other points of export. When an annual logging licence is issued the operator 
is provided with transit tickets to be used during transportation of the forest products. 
Tickets are presented to forest guards positioned at fixed checkpoints along main roads 
only. A copy of each transit ticket is sent to the DNFFB for monitoring of the quantities 
exploited. The problem, as Graeme White, the owner of a forestry company in Sofala, 
points out, is that while these checkpoints can check if timber has been illegally logged 
they cannot check whether its been irresponsibly logged. The checkpoints are only 
manned during daytime and the guards are poorly paid, earning only around US$100 a 
month. When an operator with a load of logs worth more than US$10,000 arrives 
without papers it is not difficult to imagine how illegal activities might take place. Even 
where the contents of a truck are confiscated the problem is often easily solved with a 
phone call to a minister or provincial officer.  
 
The second driver is the continued high demand for Mozambique's forest resources from 
overseas. Chinese operators dominate the market because, in addition to high domestic 
demand its officials impose very low taxes on raw logs, and much higher ones on processed 
woods. On the Mozambican side increasing numbers of people have been encouraged to 
change jobs to start becoming simple license holders and sell timber to the traders whose 
“demand doesn’t stop” (Kannounikof & Falcao 2011: 9). Other observers have described 
the operating environment as being akin to ‘gold fever’ where everyone rushes madly to 
maximize their profits on the exploitation of a finite resource. Community members 
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participate in the frenzy by obtaining simple licenses often with the backing of foreign 
nationals, or by logging without a license and selling the trees to license holders (Reyes 
2003). As a one report concludes, “too many operators, large and small, are being allowed 
to take too many logs from too many places, degrading forest resources, often as much in 
traditional community areas as outside them,” (McQueen 2008: 2).   
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7 
Why Governance Matters 
 
 
“It’s really amazing. You plant a seed; it germinates and looking so fragile, and 
within a very short time it becomes a huge tree. It gives you shade and if it’s a 
fruit tree it gives you fruit… to build and transform lives… We want to see many 
Africans planting trees.  
 
… 
 
“It is a bit sad that we have a government in this country that is actually 
overseeing the destruction of the forests. There comes a time when humanity is 
called upon to shift to a new level of consciousness. You raise your consciousness 
to a level where you feel that you must do the right thing. We see governments 
mistreating their citizens to the fullest... who is going to question when the law 
keeper breaks the law?” 
 
Wangari Maathai (2007) 
 
 
This thesis is an investigation into the structural causes of deforestation in the miombo 
woodlands of southern Africa. In the opening chapter, I suggested that this is an 
important topic for social science research since the miombo woodlands are one of 
southern Africa’s least appreciated environmental resources. They are responsible for 
maintaining the livelihoods of millions of the region’s poorest people, and offer 
invaluable services as stores of biodiversity and carbon and as habitats and watersheds. 
Despite this, they are disappearing rapidly. Until now the problem has been relatively 
ignored by policymakers and researchers, who have tended to focus primarily on forests 
with high potential for carbon storage. I identified the central research question for the 
thesis as follows: what were the structural causes of deforestation in the miombo 
woodlands of Zambia and Mozambique between 1990 and 2010? In answering that 
question, my goal was to explain why Zambia experienced relatively higher levels of 
deforestation during this period than Mozambique. I also hoped to develop a better 
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understanding of why deforestation occurs not only in these countries, but also the 
miombo eco-region as a whole. I then introduced my argument, which was that different 
rates of deforestation in the miombo woodlands can be attributed to country specific forms 
of policymaking and institutional design. This was the basis of what I call the governance  
based explanation for deforestation, which contradicts conventional, resource based 
explanations.  
 
In the second chapter I laid out an analytical framework for developing that argument 
more fully. I began by emphasising the difference between proximate causes of 
deforestation (socio-economic activities that impact on forests) and structural causes of 
deforestation (the fundamental forces that underpin those activities). Having made this 
distinction clear, I went on to outline some conceptual guidelines for how to think about 
structural causes of deforestation, categorising them under the labels of demographic, 
economic and governance related factors. I showed how the impact of these factors is 
often not intuitively obvious, and how they interact with each other in complex ways to 
create different outcomes for forests. I also showed why, of the three, I considered 
governance to to be the most important structural cause of deforestation, because it 
either mitigates or exacerbates the impact of demographic and economic related factors. 
 
In the methological section of the thesis, I argued that a comparative, case study based 
approach offered the best way of approaching my research question. This is because it 
offers a ‘third way’ between quantitative macro-scale approaches, which are good at 
locating causal mechanisms but weak on external validity and specifying causal effects, 
and more limited but qualitatively richer single case study based approaches (Gerring 
2007). I then justified my choice of Zambia and Mozambique as the two country case 
studies, showing how their respective geographical and socio-economic conditions were 
at the same time ‘similar and incomparable’ enough to be able to derive some useful 
insights from a side by side comparison. I also described my research methods, showing 
how I obtained my data, what kinds of questions I wanted to ask and how I went about 
obtaining answers to those questions.  
 
In the fourth chapter I turned towards the findings of the research itself, beginning with 
data on the independent variable – rates of deforestation. Using the best available 
studies, I established that Mozambique’s annual rate of deforestation during the last 
twenty years has been much lower than Zambia’s. This was a crucial part of the research, 
since the difference in their respective rates of deforestation underpins much of the 
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comparative logic applied in the thesis. I then described and analysed the proximate 
causes of forest loss in each country. I showed how these were very similar in both cases, 
and could be attributed to a ‘vicious cycle’ of shifting cultivation, charcoal production 
and uncontrolled burning. This part of the analysis was important for two reasons. 
Firstly, it showed that the difference beteen Zambia and Mozambique’s rates of 
deforestation could not be attributed to the existence of different proximate causes. This 
lent greater strength to my argument that the difference must be accounted for by the 
impact of respective structural causes. Secondly, it provided an important preliminary 
step in trying to understand the links between proximate causes and structural causes of 
deforestation in each country. It would have made little sense for example, to later 
suggest that rural migration was a structural cause of deforestation if I had not been able 
to first show that shifting cultivation and charcoal production were leading causes of 
forest loss in rural areas.  
 
In the final two chapters, I delivered a historical and analytical account of the different 
structural causes of deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique respectively. The two case 
studies offer valuable new insights into the processes underpinning deforestation in each 
country, and contribute to the existing literature on causes of deforestation in developing 
countries. However, on their own they offer only partial clues as to the structural causes 
of deforestation in the miombo woodlands more generally, since they do not map their 
findings to other cases. Accordingly, in this chapter I compare and contrast the findings 
of the two case studies, with the aim of inferring the existence or absence of causality 
through correlation between the dependent variable (rate of deforestation) and the 
independent variables (different demographic, economic and governance related 
factors). In this way, I aim to move the analysis along the spectrum from statements of 
possibility towards a statement of probability, and thereby obtain some clear answers to 
the original research question. This offers an opportunity to deliver convincing policy 
relevant and contingent prescriptions of which strategies are likely to work best in order 
to limit deforestation in the miombo eco-region more generally.  
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A resource based explanation for deforestation 
 
In February 2011, I spent an afternoon in the company of Robert Chimambo, a well 
known environmental activist from Lusaka. Under the shade of the mopane tree in his 
backyard, he recounted the story of the encroachment, deterioration and eventual 
disappearance of the Lusaka East Forest Reserve. The reserve was originally set up to 
protect the source of the Chalimbana River and is the only public protected area and 
large natural green space in the immediate proximity of Zambia’s capital city. According 
to my host, several years ago the reserve had been in such good health that scientists 
from local research institutes had used it to conduct investigations into miombo forest 
ecology. Since then however, people from outlying rural areas had arrived looking for 
work, and unable to find space in any of the existing townships on the city outskirts, had 
created informal settlements inside the reserve.  
 
Lacking jobs or any alternative source of income, they began clearing the forest for small 
agricultural plots, and chopped down the trees to use for firewood and charcoal. In spite 
of numerous protests and petitions by local NGOs, the ZFD did nothing to stop the new 
settlers, stating that it had neither the manpower nor the mandate to do so. According to 
my host however, the real reason was that local politicians with powerful connections to 
the ruling party had warned the ZFD off, since the settlers represented new constituents 
and therefore new votes. Mr Chimambo then showed me recent pictures of the reserve, 
showing large areas of cleared forest now taken up by shacks and small vegetable plots, 
with a few scattered thickets of trees and evidence of heavy soil erosion. There was also 
evidence that developers had started clearing land for more permanent buildings. It 
seemed impossible that the same place had been a pristine forest just a few years 
previously.  
 
At the time, the story appeared to be a perfect example of the larger forces driving 
deforestation in Zambia. It contained a number of easily identifiable structural causes – 
population growth and urbanisation, poverty and unemployment – and was given force 
by its denunciation of the officials whose job it was to look after the forest. The next day 
however, I interviewed a mid-level employee in the ZFD and was surprised to hear him 
deliver an identical analysis, except this time, as an explanation for deforestation in the 
country as a whole. He told me how almost all of Zambia’s forest reserves were currently 
suffering from encroachment, and how poor communities, lacking alternative sources of 
income, had been cutting down forests for land and wood at a faster and more 
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unsustainable rate every year. Politicians, he suggested, were unwilling to do anything 
about the problem since it would be seen as a direct act of interference in the ability of 
the country’s poorest people to earn a living. This would equate to certain political 
suicide in a country like Zambia.  
 
What struck me as unusual was that while the activist and the official disagreed about 
what measures should be taken to tackle the problem, to an uncanny extent, they both 
agreed on its proximate causes (charcoal, agriculture) and structural causes (population 
growth, poverty and a lack of political will). In the days and weeks that followed, I 
encountered variations of this explanation in the majority of interviews I conducted. 
When asked the question “what have been the structural causes of deforestation in the 
last two decades?” most respondents almost always singled out the same factors. They 
claimed the economic reforms of the 1990s placed forests under increased pressure 
thanks to the fallout from privatisation, and changed the system from one that managed 
resources to one that was no longer able to do much of anything. This has been made 
worse by continued population growth, especially in the urban and peri-urban parts of 
the country, where demand for charcoal has been steadily increasing thanks to the lack 
of reliable and cheap electricity. Many respondents also pointed out that forests are not 
a priority sector, and that politicians and officials are more interested in their 
exploitation than their conservation. This, they told me, is why the forest sector has 
remained under funded, under staffed and unable to carry out its job for so many years.  
 
Those same politicians and officials responded by saying that in a country like Zambia, 
the responsibility of those in power is to lift people out of poverty and create jobs, and 
not to waste scarce resources on less important (and usually, Western) concerns such as 
forests. All however, agreed that at its core, the problem was an economic one. Zambia 
they explained, is a poor country, and poor people consume those resources (such as 
forests) that are most easily accessible to them. This, they suggested, is where the true 
problem lies, and until it is solved, deforestation will continue to be a problem. This 
narrative, which I subsequently came to call the ‘resource based explanation’, is 
encapsulated by a recent submission by Zambia to the United Nations as part of its 
REDD+ preparation strategy, in which the structural causes of deforestation are said to 
be “a result of the intrinsic nature of the Zambian economy, based on i) the 
overwhelming reliance of the largely poor rural population on natural resources for day 
to day survival; and ii) the lack of alternative energy sources in urban areas where much 
of the population also utilise charcoal and firewood for fuel” (UN-REDD, 2010: 9).  
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The resource based explanation for deforestation concentrates on the impact of both 
demographic and economic related factors, and is so called because it revolves around 
the issues of allocating scarce resources. In particular, it is based on the idea that a 
growing population of poor people frequently use forests as an ‘employment of last 
resort’’ (Angelsen & Wunder 2003), or as a ‘safety net’ during periods of hardship 
(Wunder 2001; McSweeney 2004; Pandit & Thapa 2004). Causality therefore runs from 
the poor to forest dependence whereby low return and unsustainable activities 
predominate since the poor lack alternative means to survive or earn or livelihoods. The 
implication is that the problem of deforestation can be solved by economic growth and 
poverty reduction, since this results in a shift away from the consumption of basic forest 
products such as fuelwood in favour of more efficient technologies such as gas stoves, 
and eventually, to fossil fuels. Economic growth is also supposed to result in lower rates 
of population growth as incomes improve, and changing agricultural practices via the 
development of better and more efficient technologies, which raise productivity and 
thereby reduce demand for cleared land.  
 
The problem however, is that the resource based explanation for deforestation does not 
seem to account for the difference in deforestation rates between Zambia and 
Mozambique. This is because, as the case studies show, both countries have experienced 
very similar demographic and economic related structural drivers of deforestation during 
the last two decades. Mozambique, like Zambia, experienced high levels of rural 
migration in the early 1990s following the post war return of refugees and urban dwellers 
to their traditional homesteads. In Mozambique's case though, these numbered in their 
millions, rather than hundreds of thousands. In the absence of any alternatives, people in 
both countries took up agriculture in order to survive. In Zambia, public sector reforms 
had crippled the ability of the ZFD to monitor these activities and their effects on 
forests; in Mozambique, surveillance and enforcement were even almost non-existent, 
due to political pressures and the almost complete destruction of the forest services 
during the civil war.  
 
In both countries, the liberalisation of agricultural markets imposed by the World Bank 
and donors reduced the availability of inputs such as fertiliser, eliminated access to 
markets and increased price volatility. 20 years later, despite the availability of abundant 
land and water, a significant number of households are not food secure. Rural agricultural 
markets are characterised by underdevelopment and poor inaccessibility, so  even when 
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smallholders produce a surplus, it is very difficult for them to sell their produce. 
Agricultural production systems are risky, due to low crop and variety diversification and 
the lack of fertilisers and other inputs for crops other than maize mean that mono-crop 
based farming systems are still practised in many places, and that farmers grow their crops 
in soils and under climatic conditions that are not suitable for In both countries, yields are 
low and crop failure is frequent, particularly when compounded by the effects of climate 
change and fluctuating prices (Nuebert et. al. 2011). 
 
At the same time in Mozambique, as in Zambia, subsistence agriculture has been practiced 
in tandem with charcoal production, which is used as an alternative or supplementary form 
of income. This has been driven by the profitability of the charcoal trade. For those in the 
middle of the supply chain, charcoal offers a lucrative source of income. For producers, it 
is more of a subsistence strategy, but one that is viable since it requires only minimal 
capital investment and know how. Demand is driven by consumers in urban areas, who 
continue to rely on charcoal for their energy needs thanks to a lack of access to electricity. 
Only 22 per cent of Zambians have access to electricity, while in Mozambique the 
equivalent figure is even less, at 13 per cent. This is not surprising; both countries are 
extremely large, and electrification has proceeded slowly due to the logistical challenges 
involved. In both countries the so called energy ladder effect, whereby charcoal usage is 
supposed to be replaced by better, more efficient fuels, has not occurred either. This is 
because poverty reduction has stagnated, and consumers continued to prefer charcoal over 
other energy sources such as gas stoves.  
 
The similarity of these structural drivers suggests a number of interesting conclusions. For 
a start, they show how difficult it is to estimate the impact of different types of 
demographic changes on forest cover. In Zambia and Mozambique, deforestation has 
been caused by agricultural extensification arising as a result of migration from urban 
centres to rural areas. At the same time, migration from rural areas to urban areas has 
resulted in increased charcoal production. In both cases, the effects of these different 
migration patterns has been determined by contextual factors such as the liberalisation of 
agricultural markets, unemployment and poverty and the continued reliance of people on 
fuelwood for the energy needs. It is very difficult therefore, to determine whether it was 
urban-rural migration or rural-urban migration that was the dominant driver in each case. 
This backs up one of the central theoretical claims made in this thesis, namely, that it is 
difficult to predict how shifting patterns of population growth and migration are likely to 
affect deforestation rates via changes in demand for forest lands and resources (Cropper 
172 
 
& Griffiths 1994; Rudel & Roper 1997; Reis & Blanco 2002). It also shows how the impact 
of demographic pressures are always mediated via other factors that link humans to forests 
such as technology, markets and institutions (York et. al. 2002; Burns et. al. 2003).  
 
Economic policymaking appears to have played a particularly important role. The lack of 
improvement in agricultural productivity in both countries appears to be a direct result of 
reforms which removed or drastically reduced government support in the form of 
subsidies, credits, extension services and marketing boards. This lends support to those 
who suggest that free market activity and the pursuit of economic growth are quite capable 
of producing unequal and unsustainable environmental outcomes when left to their own 
devices (Shandra 2007; Ozler & Obach 2009). Deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique 
cannot be simply characterised as the result of a temporary misalignment of market forces, 
since economic liberalisation appears to have resulted in an improvement to returns to the 
conversion of forested lands without producing a counteracting effect to mitigate the 
accompanying levels of deforestation. This provides an alternative to accounts of forest 
change based on the experiences of advanced industrial countries, and shows why the 
conduct of economic policy in areas that have both direct and indirect impacts on forests is 
a crucial consideration for anyone looking to diagnose drivers of forest loss.  
 
The case studies also show how economic growth and poverty elimination do not 
necessarily result in decreased deforestation (Fisher & Freudenburg 2001; Perz 2007). 
This is because they do not guarantee the required shift in the composition of a country’s 
economic base, nor can they be relied on to bring about the discursive shifts necessary to 
change the way a society values forest services. Average per capita income in both 
countries has more than trebled in the last two decades, yet appears to have had little 
effect on patterns of forest usage. This is not to say that economic growth has no effect – 
technological progress, increased efficiencies and sectoral production shifts can certainly 
still produce more sustainable outcomes for forests in Zambia and Mozambique. However, 
as these cases show, the context specific questions are all important, because the relationship 
between income growth and deforestation is governed by complex feedback mechanisms 
involving multiple institutional channels that affect both market and political forces.  
Finally, and most importantly, economic and demographic related factors do not seem to 
account for Zambia's markedly higher rate of deforestation. Indeed, an argument based on 
this logic alone would suggest that Mozambique's rate of deforestation should be higher, 
since it experienced greater rates of rural migration following the end of the war, and has a 
far greater population density in forested areas of the country. Mozambique has also 
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experienced many of the economic drivers of deforestation more severely than in Zambia 
– access to electricity is lower, its population is more reliant on fuelwood for energy needs, 
and poverty levels are greater, suggesting that a greater overall proportion of the 
population is reliant on forests for their everyday needs. Accordingly, it appears that 
resource based explanations for deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique misses out on 
an important part of the picture, namely, the role of governance and institutions. 
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A governance based explanation for deforestation 
 
In order to really understand the structural causes of deforestation in the miombo 
woodlands, we need to first know who determines who has access to forests and how they 
are used, monitored and managed. Such an approach looks at the power relations that 
govern decisions about natural resources, and incorporates the roles of actors and 
institutions that are usually absent from resource based narratives. It also incorporates a 
better understanding of the formal and informal rules that directly affect forests through 
forest management itself, and indirectly through governance in other natural resource 
related sectors and in the economy as a whole. Accordingly, I call it the ‘governance based’ 
explanation for deforestation. Not surprisingly, it is less popular amongst policymakers 
since it involves issues such as the impunity of powerful political and economic actors, the 
silencing of community voices, and mismanagement at different levels of the state 
apparatus. The argument made in this thesis however, is that it offers a better explanation 
for the difference between Zambia and Mozambique’s rates of deforestation. Specifically, 
it suggests that Mozambique’s relatively better record can be attributed to two major 
institutional factors.  
 
The first is the existence of different land tenure arrangements. Both countries underwent 
a process of land reform in the 1990s, culminating in the passage of the Land Act of 1995 
in Zambia and the Land Act of 1997 in Mozambique. In Zambia's case the reforms 
created a dual tenure system which divided land according to customary and statutory 
status. Under customary law users had no legal management privileges or access to formal 
titles for land ownership in order to avoid dispossession or protect fixed investments. 
Permission to use land in Zambia was therefore placed at the whim of traditional 
authorities and in the absence of checks and balances or recourse to formal channels in the 
case of disputes, that power became open to abuse. Traditional authorities were also given 
control over the conversion of customary land to leasehold tenure, creating an ongoing 
tension between commercial demands for strong property rights, and a lack of support for 
the same founded on customary land rights. At the same time, the 1995 Act vested all land 
in the name of the President, and allowed for titles to be retracted when valuable resources 
were discovered. This has left both customary and leasehold land open to confiscation or 
transfer by the state, creating a hierarchy in which customary land is recognised, but given 
lower status. At the state level, backlogs in land applications have led to increased 
boundary disputes, placing significant pressures on government departments. Since land 
has not been released quickly enough, informal settlements in forest reserves have 
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increased.  
 
The situation has been exacerbated by the existence of laws stating that land can be 
secured only as long as it it is utilised for development or commercial purposes. This has 
meant that under the current system of land management in Zambia, development works 
against sustainability by definition as well as in action. As a result, for the majority of 
Zambians who live in close proximity to forests land tenure remains insecure, encouraging 
those with access (either through traditional authorities or leasehold) to use forests for 
their maximum potential without thought to long term sustainability. Owners of forest 
patches are encouraged to use them for fear that others seeking land might make 
competing claims on the ‘unused’ land. Meanwhile, migrants moving to new areas will tend 
to clear more land than necessary in order to secure usage rights, or may approach the 
local leadership and make the case that patches of apparently unused forest land should be 
taken from the current holder. 
 
By contrast in Mozambique, the 1997 Land Act gave greater security to communities in 
the form of the DUAT, allowing them to automatically hold a formal title in their own 
name, with responsibility for the internal allocation and management of land rights taking 
place through their own customary systems. Lower order rights acquired by families and 
individuals in this way were equivalent to a state DUAT and did not need to be registered. 
This meant they were given stronger guarantees to land via a formal legal arrangement, 
and faced fewer obstacles to obtaining the rights to use that land as they saw fit. Those 
requesting new rights to land were required by the Act to consult with local communities 
to ensure the land was free or to determine the conditions by which local rights should be 
given up in favour of the newcomer. The onus to prove occupation by a community was 
therefore placed on the potential investor or the state, rather than the other way around.  
 
Also, by prohibiting private ownership of land, the Land Act discouraged certain types of 
speculation. The right to buy or sell assets on a piece of land extended only to 
improvements and constructions made on or to land over which a private person or firm 
has a DUAT. This has meant that while an effective shadow private property system exists 
in Mozambique in the form of selling rights to buildings and other infrastructure, it does 
not apply to the estate or the natural resources on it. Community custodianship is 
therefore over natural resources and the land itself, promoting greater sustainable long 
term usage and creating greater long term incentives to maintain forest health. Greater 
land tenure security has also meant that communities can enter into negotiations with 
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developers on a more even playing field, and can therefore can derive greater benefits 
from forests. 
 
The existence of these two different arrangements for land tenure offers a convincing 
partial explanation for the difference in rates of deforestation in each country. This 
accords with a significant body of theory which suggests that the security of property rights 
affects the decision to conserve forests to yield long term sustainable outputs (Rudel 1995; 
Southgate 1990; Kaimowitz 1996; Angelsen 1999, Mendelhson 1994). Users of forest lands 
will not forego current consumption for future return without assurance that they have 
guaranteed usage rights over that land. When owners and users of land are exposed to the 
risk that their parcel of land will be invaded by squatters, harvested by a timber company 
or confiscated by a government official, their incentive to invest is diminished. This causes 
forest users to extract and sell forest goods as fast as possible, or to clear land in order to 
establish legal claims. Where property arrangements are insecure, deforestation thus 
becomes a practical method to establish ownership claims. By contrast, where greater 
security exists in the form of guaranteed usage rights, access to formal channels for 
disputes, and the absence of speculation, users will tend to utilise forests more sustainably.  
 
The second, and arguably more important reason for the difference in rates of 
deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique concerns their different legal guidelines for 
forest management. Both countries inititiated very similar processes to deal with perceived 
shortcomings in their forest sectors during the 1990s. The new forms of legislation 
developed as a result involved a radical departure from old, centralised models of forest 
governance towards more participatory approaches. The laws stated that all stakeholders 
and particularly communities should be involved in the management of forests, that the 
role of traditional rulers should be recognised, and that partnerships with local users and 
the private sector in preparing management plans should be encouraged. Their guiding 
principles were therefore the idea of inclusiveness.  
 
The big difference of course, was that while both pieces of legislation were passed by their 
respective parliaments, Mozambique's legislation was the only which was actually 
implemented. The divergent records of the forest sectors in each country since then are 
revealing. In Zambia, the non-implementation of the 1999 Forests Act had created 
institutional paralysis. As a result, forest governance has effectively operated in limbo for 
most of the period under investigation – first as a result of public sector reforms made in 
the 1990s, then as result of the Forest Act's non-implementation during the 2000s. The 
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ZFD is still using licensing and charging arrangements developed under legislation that is 
now over 40 years old, and no longer fit for purpose. There are still no legal or technical 
allowances to allow the rollout of participatory forms of forest governance – and without 
the implementation of the ZFC or the legal backing for JFM and the necessary benefit 
sharing arrangements, there is no prospect of this happening any time in the near future. 
The lack of policy and legislative guidelines has acted in tandem with insecure land tenure 
to leave communities with no incentives to conserve forests at all. It is this, more than any 
other factor, that is currently preventing Zambia from tackling its current rampant levels 
of deforestation. 
 
In Mozambique though, the passage of legislation, in combination with strong property 
rights, resulted in a significant improvement in forest governance. Communities were given 
greater incentives towards long term sustainable forest resource usage since they now had 
both access to and usage rights over forests. The Forests and Wildlife Act also allowed the 
department to enact measures against illegal logging, and to generate improved revenues 
from formal forest sector activities. While collection of these revenues is still poor, a 
minimum of 20 per cent goes to communities to incentivize them to look after the forest 
estate. Clear guidelines on forest laws also allow those officers who are in the field to carry 
out their job, although this is made difficult by the sheer scale of the task facing them. 
Forest officers have also received greater incentives to monitor illegal forest activities by 
the inclusion of the 50 per cent benefit sharing regulation for fines.  
 
This is not to suggest that forest governance in Mozambique is fully functional; as the 
research reveals, significant challenges still remain. Current institutional funding 
arrangements result in the perverse situation whereby forests in Mozambique are 
effectively paying for their own destruction via agricultural programs. The DNTF also 
continues to face severe resource shortages and enforcement problems, particularly with 
regard to illegal logging by local and foreign owned companies. These issues are likely to 
become more problematic in the future. Shortcomings in other related areas, such as 
agricultural extension, further complicate the challenges already faced by forest services in 
Mozambique.  
 
Table 7, on the following page summarises the similarities and differences between 
Mozambique and Zambia’s structural causes of deforestation. The table uses the same 
theoretical categories of structural causes of deforestation outlined in Table 1, on page 
61. However, there are some significant differences. Firstly, Table 7 now includes the 
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designations of ‘resource-based’ and ‘governance-based’ explanations for deforestation. 
Secondly, where Table 1 contains descriptions of the findings from the general literature, 
Table 7 contains findings from the specific case studies, and compares and contrasts 
them according to each category. The table clearly delineates the similarities between 
the demographic and economic factors in each country and the differences in 
governance factors. What it shows is that the existence of at least some forms of what 
might be called ‘good governance’ in Mozambique have gone a long way towards limiting 
the worst forms of environmental degradation currently being experienced in Zambia.  
 
 
 
Type of 
explanation 
Structural cause Zambia Mozambique 
DEMOGRAPHIC 
FACTORS  
(resource based 
explanation) 
Population growth 
and density 
Population growth and increased density in 
rural areas has resulted in decrease in 
average fallow periods for citemene 
farming, leading to forest degradation. 
Increased population density in cities has 
led to an increase in demand for charcoal. 
Population growth and increased density in 
rural areas has resulted in decrease in average 
fallow periods for citemene farming, leading to 
forest degradation. Increased population 
density in cities has led to an increase in 
demand for charcoal. 
Migration 
patterns 
Migration to rural areas occurred following 
the privatisation of state assets and 
resulting unemployment in the early 1990s. 
Led to increased reliance on forests for 
agriculture and charcoal. 
Migration to rural areas occurred due to the 
return of former refugees to traditional 
homesteads after the end of the war. Led to 
increased reliance on forests for agriculture 
and charcoal. 
ECONOMIC 
FACTORS 
(resource based 
explanation) 
Income growth 
Charcoal industry driven by continued 
demand in urban areas. This is a result of 
low access to electricity (22 per cent of 
population). Has resulted in clear cutting 
and decreased fallow periods for forest 
patches. 
Charcoal industry driven by continued demand 
in urban areas. This is a result of low access to 
electricity (13 per cent of population). Has 
resulted in clear cutting and decreased fallow 
periods for forest patches. 
Economic 
liberalisation 
Agricultural liberalisation and privatisation 
implemented on the advice of World Bank 
and other donors. Resulted in 
unemployment, rural migration and 
agricultural extensification, rather than 
intensification.  
Agricultural liberalisation and privatisation 
implemented on the advice of World Bank and 
other donors. Resulted in unemployment, rural 
migration and agricultural extensification, 
rather than intensification. 
Poverty 
Charcoal production conducted by rural 
poor as a supplement or alternative to 
agriculture.  
Charcoal production conducted by rural poor 
as a supplement or alternative to agriculture. 
Trade and 
investment 
Some evidence of deforestation due to 
activities by foreign mining companies. 
However, overall impact is relatively small.  
In recent years problem of illegal logging and 
increased trade in timber by foreign firms has 
gotten worse. Monitoring and enforcement is 
difficult. Overall impact is still relatively small. 
GOVERNANCE  
FACTORS 
(governance based 
explanations) 
Political regimes 
Democratic transition in the early 1990s 
resulted in restructuring of forest sector, 
with forest services cut due to public sector 
reforms. Funding for the sector from 
central government remains low due to low 
prioritisation of forest sector by state.  
Democratic transition in early 1990s meant the 
end of civil war, and revitalisation of forest 
services Funding from central government 
remains low due to low prioritisation of forest 
sector by state. 
Land tenure, 
property rights 
and rule of law 
Lands Act of 1995 created insecurity due to 
lack of formal titles and hierarchy of state 
over traditional authorities. Encourages 
owners of land to use forests unsustainably. 
Monitoring remains a problem due to the 
non-implementation of the Forests Act and 
institutional paralysis in forest sector 
Lands Act of 1997 protected traditional rights 
to land. Communities given access to and 
formal control over resources. Encouraged 
greater sustainable use of forests. Monitoring 
has improved in recent years, especially 
following the passage of Forestry and Wildlife 
Act. However, significant capacity challenges 
remain. 
Participatory 
forms of forest 
governance 
Forests Act of 1999 not implemented. 
Centralised model of governance still in 
place. Pilot projects have failed due to non-
implementation of Forests Act. No 
mechanisms for benefit sharing exist.  
Forests and Wildlife Act of 1999, and 
Regulation of 2002 created participatory 
model of forest governance. Pilot projects have 
experienced mixed degrees of success. Benefit 
sharing mechanisms for communities in place. 
International 
institutions 
Signatory to majority of international 
conventions on climate change and forest 
conservation. However, these appear to 
have had little overall effect on forest 
policy. REDD pilot projects implemented, 
but lack of benefit sharing arrangements 
has limited their effectiveness. 
Signatory to majority of international 
conventions on climate change and forest 
conservation. However, these appear to have 
had little overall effect on forest policy. Some 
REDD pilot projects in place, but hampered 
by policy uncertainty and lack of resources and 
monitoring 
 
Table 9: A comparative analysis of the structural causes of deforestation in Zambia and Mozambique 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has shown that, for two of the main miombo countries, Zambia and 
Mozambique, a constellation of economic, demographic and governance related structural 
causes have resulted in two very different patterns of deforestation. The differences in 
these patterns appear to be accounted for primarily by governance related factors, and in 
particular, land tenure arrangements and forest sector specific legal guidelines. The focus 
on the the role of governance and institutions situates the research firmly within the 
existing body of scholarship on institutional drivers of deforestation. Until now, most 
claims for a connection between deforestation and institutional arrangements have 
either not paid sufficient attention to specifying their origin and outcomes within 
different historical, socio-economic and political contexts or where they have done so, 
have failed to take into account the effect of institutional arrangements in other related 
areas such as agriculture or energy.  
 
This thesis has attempted to tackle these shortcomings by analysing the causes of 
deforestation in one of the less studied forest regions of the world, and has presented 
new evidence on claims around the influence of institutional factors such as property 
rights, legislation and participatory approaches to forest governance. The findings 
suggest that greater recognition of community rights and more power over forests for 
communities can help achieve improved forest outcomes. This adds to the growing body 
of evidence for the claim that local actors have the capacity to protect and use forest 
resources sustainably and at lower costs than government agencies (Nelson & Agrawal 
2008; Poteete & Ostrom 2008; Agrawal 2012;). This is because community control makes 
greater use of the capacity of local users to identify and prioritize environmental 
problems more accurately. Local groups are also more likely to respect locally generated 
rules, making resource use monitoring easier to conduct. In the case of Zambia and 
Mozambique, issues around access to forest resources and the existence (and non-
existence) of benefit sharing mechanisms appear to have been particularly important. 
Mozambique’s relatively better record in these areas appears to be one of the defining 
factors in its relatively lower rate of deforestation.  
 
At the same time, the analysis shows why it is important to take into account the real 
level of benefits and the associated choices people in rural communities actually make 
about whether to conserve forests or not. This is because outcomes depend on range of 
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conditions including benefits derived from alternative land uses such as agriculture and 
charcoal production. In this sense, community based natural resource management does 
not operate in isolation; even if ideal models of devolved governance were implemented 
in other cases forest conservation would not necessarily follow. This is why the 
advantages and disadvantages of transferring control over resources to communities are 
better considered within whatever locally based resource management paradigm is most 
appropriate, e.g. co-management, joint forest management, common pool resource 
based management, or private access and property rights.  
 
From a research perspective the thesis represents only a glimpse into a potentially rich 
and complex avenue of enquiry. The results of the case studies certainly provide some 
strong clues as to the structural causes of deforestation in other miombo countries, but 
these cannot be confirmed without further investigation. In this regard history, geography, 
and social and economic contexts obviously matter. Future research would therefore do 
well to look more closely at the impact and interplay of economic, demographic and 
economic forces on drivers of deforestation in other heavly forested miombo contries 
such as Tanzania, Angola, Malawi, Zimbabwe. Proximate causes of deforestation in 
these countries are relatively similar to those in Zambia and Mozambique, and they 
share a number of structural socio-economic conditions too, such as high rates of 
poverty, low access to electricity, and economies which are dominated by smallholder 
agriculture.  
 
It would therefore be very interesting to see how economic, demographic and 
governance related factors have played out in other miombo countries, and how their 
forests have been affected as a result. In particular, there is a need for more research 
into different kinds of institutional arrangements. How have other miombo countries 
dealt with issues around customary tenure vs. private or leasehold tenure? What is the 
relationship between the state and traditional authorities? To what extent have 
decentralisation reforms been initiated, and what is the difference between policy and 
actual practice in this area? What kind of legislation is in place governing access to and 
usage of forest resources and how does this either compliment or conflict with legislation 
in other sectors? In both Zambia and Mozambique, answers to these questions have 
proved to be crucial in trying to understand the structural causes of deforestation, and 
are likely to be so for other miombo countries too.  
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There is also a need for more qualitative research incorporating governance based 
explanations for deforestation in other developing countries. Many studies and reports 
on mention that forest governance in a particular country is ‘bad’ but fail to specify 
exactly how and why that is the case. More questions therefore need to be asked about 
how governance in countries with large expanses of forest is structured at the most 
general level, and how much power resides in different types of public, private and civil 
society organisations. Land tenure and different ownership arrangements are 
particularly important in this regard since they determine who owns what and where, and 
what types of land use activities are likely to take place. Other factors to consider are the 
rule of law, how rules and regulations are both designed and enforced, the balance of 
power between central governing institutions and those at the provincial and local levels, 
and different arrangements for community based management regimes. These are 
questions which deserve further investigation in the context of the rampant deforestation 
which is occurring worldwide, and which could provide decisive in trying to implement 
policies to try and prevent it.  
 
It would also be interesting to combine qualitative case studies into governance and 
institutional arrangements with larger, macro scale quantitative research. Until now, a 
lot of cross national studies have focused on resource based explanations which 
emphasise the role of economic and demographic factors. This is because it is easier to 
obtain panel data for these variables at a global scale. Previous studies have covered the 
effects of population growth (Allen & Barnes 1985; Uusivori et. al. 2002; Ehhardt-
Martinez 1998; Cropper & Griffiths 1994); migration patterns (Rock 1996; Templeton & 
Scherr 1999; DeFries et. al. 2010) income growth (Koop & Tole 1999; Shafik and 
Bandhyopdhay 1992; Panayatou 1997; Antle & Heidebrink 1995; Meyer et. al. 2003; 
Culas & Dutta 2002; Rudel 1998; Mather et. al. 1999) macroeconomic policies 
(Capistrano & Kiker 1995; Kessler & van Dorp 1998; Kahn & McDonald 1995; Arcand 
et. al. 2008) and trade and financial liberalisation (Jorgensen & Rice 2005; Jorgensen 
2006; Godoy et. al. 1997; Wunder 2003; Rudel 2007). 
 
It is more difficult to obtain useful cross national panel data for measures of governance, 
and the literature in this area is therefore not as comprehensive. Some research has been 
done for example on the impact of corruption (Koyuncu & Yilmaz 2009), on property 
rights (Southgate 1998; Deacon 1999) and on political rights and civil liberties (Bhattarai 
& Hammig 2001). However as this thesis has shown, ‘governance’ is a broad term, 
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encompassing additional factors such as the such as regulatory burden, the quality of 
budgetary and financial management, the efficiency of revenue mobilisation, the 
efficiency of public expenditures and transparency, accountability, legal guidelines and 
degrees of decentralisation and devolution. Accordingly, it would be useful to try and 
quantify the impact of governance via a cross national study for example, on 
measurements of the strength of participatory governance in legislative arrangements, or 
on the security of land tenure in countries with customary systems of land 
administration.  
 
From a policy perspective, the research suggests that countries looking to limit 
deforestation would do well to look more closely at how current governance and 
institutional arrangements are affecting their forests. Why? Because governance revolves 
around the question of how forests should be managed, by whom and for whose benefit 
(Hobley 2007). It therefore largely determines the overall impact of demographic and 
economic drivers of deforestation. Understanding governance applies not only forest 
sectors, but also other, related sectors such as land, agriculture and energy. As this the 
cases show, understanding the linkages between these sectors is important since 
institutional arrangements or policy measures in one area can often have unintended 
consequences in another.  
 
The good news is that it is far easier to bring about a change in institutional arrangements 
than it is to do something about demographic or economic drivers. Factors such as 
population growth or migration patterns are largely beyond the control of policymakers. 
They have a bit more control over economic policymaking, but in many respects their hands 
are tied by international market pressures and the spillover of the economic policy making 
sphere beyond borders. Likewise while poverty reduction is a key policy aim for most 
developing countries, it is notoriously difficult to achieve. Trying to achieve reduced 
deforestation via reductions in poverty levels is not a realistic aim; the proliferation of 
international development agencies in the sub-Saharan African region and their mixed 
record in this area speaks volumes for how difficult this is as a policy goal. Nor is it 
guaranteed to be effective – as the case studies show, improved incomes do not always result 
in less deforestation.  
 
This is not to say that policy should ignore economic drivers of deforestation altogether. 
Extending access to electricity for example, is a policy measure that would make a major 
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difference to rates of deforestation in the miombo woodlands via the elimination of the 
charcoal trade. The benefits of increased energy access in the region would also be 
transformational for the lives of the poorest – lighting for schools, functioning health 
clinics, pumps for water and sanitation, cleaner indoor air, faster food processing and 
more income generating opportunities, among others (Kanagawa & Kanata 2008; 
Wilkinson et. al. 2009; Clancy et. al. 2012). However, as the analysis shows there are 
major logistical challenges involved in trying to extend grid access in countries as large as 
Zambia and Mozambique. There are also problems with patterns of consumption, given 
urban consumers’ preference for traditional fuels and the short term decision making 
horizons and inability of the poor to pay for electricity access. These challenges suggest 
the timeline for providing access to electricity will be measured in decades rather than 
years.  
 
Institutional changes therefore, appear to offer the easiest way to bring about changes in 
rates of deforestation in the miombo woodlands. The devolution of forest governance to 
communities for example, appears to serve as a strong incentive towards sustainable 
forest resource usage. However, it is not enough for policymakers to commit to 
decentralisation on paper – reforms need to be backed by specific mechanisms, including 
legislative directives that give communities actual access to and control over forest 
resources, that give them bargaining power with investors, and that institute real benefit 
sharing mechanisms. As the failure of the PFAP II program in Zambia vividly shows, in 
the absence of these measures, participatory forest management is doomed to fail. Good 
intentions, well designed programs and plenty of funding are powerless in the face of 
weak institutional arrangements and poorly defined legal guidelines.  
 
The research also shows that land tenure is a promising area of reform for miombo 
countries looking to protect natural resources such as forests. It suggests that a 
compromise needs to be found between accommodating the needs of traditional land 
arrangements, and promoting security via formal land registration and adjudication 
procedures. There are of course, many ways to do this – the solution imposed by 
Mozambique is just one of them and is by no means perfect. The country is still 
experiencing issues around land in the form of increased scarcity, pressure from foreign 
investors and corruption within the state apparatus. Such challenges notwithstanding, 
land tenure arrangements in Mozambique still provide more of an incentive for forest 
conservation than they do in Zambia. There, land tenure arrangements have tended to 
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promote insecurity via both the statutory and customary components of the law. 
Countries looking to promote security of tenure would therefore do well to look at the 
way in which Mozambique has managed to chart a course between demand for land, 
livelihoods security and sustainability.  
 
Of course there is still likely to be resistance to institutional reforms, since they speak to 
the problems of institutionalised power and vested interests. The current configuration 
of political interests in Zambia for example, has now delayed the implementation of a 
Forests Act for more than 13 years. The reason for this is that institutional changes there 
threaten the autonomy and jobs of those in charge. Those in power suggest there is very 
little that can be done about high rates of deforestation, since this is driven by economic 
and political factors outside of their control. However, the governance-based explanation 
for deforestation reveals that such claims are disingenuous at best. They provide 
policymakers with a convenient excuse for inaction, and mask the problems of 
governance that lie at the true heart of the problem. Accordingly, until greater pressure 
is brought to bear on these interests via either other governmental channels or more 
powerful international actors, bottlenecks to reform will remain.  
 
One potential means to create that pressure exists in the form of the UN’s REDD+. As 
currently conceived, REDD+ is based on the logic that deforestation is a market 
externality, and if the true economic value of forests, and in particular their usefulness as 
stores of carbon could be actually accounted for, then government and individuals would 
forego deforestation in exchange for other less costly activities. However as this analysis 
has shown, trying to address deforestation via market based mechanisms is doomed to 
failure unless it is accompanied by the proper institutional arrangements. There is no 
point in providing financing for communities for example, if there are no benefit sharing 
mechanisms to get that finance to communities in the first place. The fate of the PFAP II 
program in Zambia is again illustrative – substantial financing for community based 
forestry was provided, but in the absence of the right legal frameworks to channel those 
proceeds to communities the program proved economically unviable.  
 
International financing for forest conservation in the form of programs such as REDD+ 
should therefore be concerned first with asking what kind of rules and regulations can be 
put into place that will incentivise forest users to conserve forests for their long run 
value, rather than to cut them down for short term benefits. What is sure is that if issues 
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such as land tenure, access to forests, usage rights, benefit sharing mechanisms and 
institutional governance are not adequately addressed, it will make no difference how 
much money international financing offers in the end. In other words, should REDD+ 
attempt to implement financing for the conservation of forests in the miombo countries 
based on economic logic alone, it runs the risk of addressing symptoms of the problem 
rather than its true causes. Unless those causes are properly addressed by policymakers, 
deforestation rates in the miombo eco-region will continue to occur at high and 
unsustainable rates.  
 
None of these policy prescriptions suggest that deforestation in the miombo woodlands 
can be eliminated completely; some of the miombo countries rank amongst the poorest in 
the world and all of them face significant social and economic challenges. What the results 
of this research do suggest however, is that even in the context of high rates of poverty, 
poor agricultural productivity and a lack of institutional resources, it is possible to create 
policies that are progressive and contribute towards forest conservation. If countries in the 
miombo eco-region can find a way to incentivise users to conserve forests, to redistribute 
benefits to communities in such a way as to encourage long term sustainability and to 
create institutional safeguards to ensure that political barriers are not erected to prevent 
those reforms, then they can make a major difference to their overall rates of 
deforestation. That is why governance really matters for the fate of the miombo forests of 
southern Africa.  
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Zambia 
 
Surname Name Position Organisation Location Date 
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Bergschneider Martina Managing Director Southern BioPower Ltd Lusaka 8th March 2011 
Carr Judy CBNRM practitioner Norman Carr Foundation Lusaka 23rd February 2011 
Chandipo Rodwell  
Acting National Project 
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Zambia 
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Chimambo Robert Chairperson 
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Chisanga Eric  General Manager 
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Forestry Industries 
Corporation 
Ndola 
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Dauchi Ben 
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Officer 
MTENR Lusaka 
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Davies Ben Climate Change Advisor DFID Lusaka 8th March 2011 
de Voogd Hans  Counsellor Netherlands Embassy Lusaka 17th March 2011 
Francis Patrick  Environmental Fund Advisor  MTENR/ENRMMP Lusaka 10th March 2011 
Goulding Adam Assistant Director WECSZ Lusaka 24th February 2011 
Gumbo Davison Country Director CIFOR Lusaka 25th February 2011 
Hampwaye Godfrey  Head 
Geography Department 
School of Natural Sciences 
(UNZA) 
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Hengeveld Frederick Director 
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Jain Prem J 
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MTENR Lusaka 
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y Kasaro 
Extension Officer, Department 
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MTENR Lusaka 
1st March 2011 
Kawanga  Victor National Coordinator 
Commonwealth Forestry 
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Aid for Trade 
Embassy of Finland Lusaka 
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Ojanen  Marja  
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Finnish Embassy Lusaka 
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Pavy Jean Michel  Natural Resources World Bank Lusaka 9th March 2011 
Phiri 
Michael 
Annel 
M & E Specialist 
Environmental Council of 
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MTENR Lusaka 
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Biofuels Association 
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Vinya Royd PhD Student Oxford Cambridge 11th December 2010 
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Ziba Vincent Director 
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Forest Management 
Lusaka 
3rd March 2011 
Zimba  Noah Founder 
Citizens for Better 
Environment /HEBSZ 
Lusaka 
18th February 2011 
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Surname Name Position Organisation Location Date 
Bila Adolfo  Lecturer, Dept. of Forestry UEM Maputo 1st June 2011 
Salomao Alda  Executive Director Centro Terra Viva Maputo 24th May 2011 
Issufo Alima  Head of Forestry Department DNTF Maputo 27th June 2011 
Sitoe Almeida Lecturer, Dept. of Forestry 
Eduardo Mondlane 
University 
Maputo 20th May 2011 
Reis Ana-Paula  Consultant TFCA Maputo 23rd June 2011 
Saide Antonio  Chairman 
National Directorate of 
Renewable Energies 
Maputo 29th June 2011 
Cuco Arlito  Former Director DNFFB Maputo 28th June 2011 
Macome  Armando  Fiscal SPFFB Beira 30th June 2011 
Zolho 
Brit 
Reichelt  
Project Executant WWF Mozambique Maputo 13th June 2011 
Bias Calisto  Director Geral IIAM Maputo 27th June 2011 
De Sousa Camilla  Researcher 
National Institute of 
Rural Development 
Maputo 24th June 2011 
Cuambe  Carla  Project Officer FAO Maputo 17th June 2011 
Serra Carlos  
National Director of Agrarian 
Policy  
ORAM Maputo 11th June 2011 
Davies Carrie  Manager 
Beira Commercial 
Institute 
Beira 29th June 2011 
Donovan Cynthia  
Professor, Agricultural 
Economics 
Michigan State University Maputo 28th June 2011 
Ribeiro Daniel  Activist Justica Ambeintal  Maputo 20th June 2011 
Sousa Daniel  
Head of Agricultural 
Development 
World Bank Maputo 8th June 2011 
Macqueen Duncan  Head Researcher IIED Edinburgh 17th July 2011 
Baixo Eduardo  Minister Assistant MICOA Maputo 7th June 2011 
Langa Eduardo  Former Manager DNFFB Maputo 22nd June 2011 
Lundgren Eric  Country Director Africare Maputo 2nd June 2011 
Manhica Eugénio  Research Extension DNTF Maputo 23rd June 2011 
Saifodine Farida  
Programme Officer, 
Environment 
DANIDA Maputo 9th June 2011 
Munguambe Felicidade  Former Director MICOA Maputo 22nd June 2011 
Zermoglio  Fernanda  Policy Manager 
National Institute of 
Disaster Management 
Maputo 21st June 2011 
West  Flemming  Counsellor, Environment DANIDA Maputo 3rd June 2011 
Jungbluth Frauke  
Agricultural Development 
Analyst 
World Bank Maputo 2nd June 2011 
White Graeme  Owner TCT Dalmann Beira 29th June 2011 
Garrett James  Country Director IFPRI Maputo 2nd June 2011 
Hatton John  Partner   Maputo 8th June 2011 
Lissave 
Jose 
Caetano  
Fiscal SPFFB Beira 30th June 2011 
Colin de 
Verdiere 
Karen  Analyst AFD Maputo 28th June 2011 
Nakala 
Mandrate 
Oreste 
Deputy National Director DNTF Maputo 17th June 2011 
Ferrao Manuel  Head of GIS 
Centro Nacional de 
Cartografia e 
Teledetecção 
Maputo 19th May 2011 
Magaia 
Maria 
Augusta  
Head of Office SPFFB, Beira Sofala 1st July 2011 
Souto Mario  Managing Director COWI Mozambique Maputo 24th May 2011 
Falcão Mário  Professor, Forestry UEM Maputo 21st June 2011 
Morgues Mario Ruy  Land Specialist 
MCA-Millenium 
Challenge 
Maputo 2nd June 2011 
Couto Mia  Partner Terraviva Maputo 16th May 2011 
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Rein Mikael  Chief Technical Advisor FINIDA Maputo 8th June 2011 
Navunga Milagre  Director MICAIA Chimoio 3rd July 2011 
Ant'onio 
Nhagumbo 
Diuis  
Fiscal SPFFB Gorongosa 1st July 2011 
Manso Osvaldo  Forest Sector Support Officer DNTF Maputo 23rd June 2011 
Botillen Øystein  First Secretary NORAD Maputo 8th June 2011 
Uaiene Rafael  Agricultural Research Fellow IFPRI Maputo 17th June 2011 
Zacarias Rita  
Research Director, Climate 
Change 
DFID Maputo 31st May 2011 
Mabunda  Rito  Forestry Officer WWF Mozambique  Maputo 10th June 2011 
Morley Rob  Director 
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Management Africa 
Johannesbur
g 
13th May 2011 
Ramalho Rodrigo  Director, Dept. of Planning MICOA Maputo 10th June 2011 
Magane Samiro  
Manager, Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas 
MITUR Maputo 10th June 2011 
Wertz-
Kanounnikoff 
Sheila  Country Director CIFOR Maputo 20th June 2011 
Alves Teresa Head of Forestry Research IIAM Maputo 25th May 2011 
Chavana Xavier  Accounts Manager MPD Maputo 21st June 2011 
 
 
  
 
